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FOREWORD
Given that most SEACEN member countries are moving towards Basel II in the near-
to-medium term, many national regulators face potential problems in implementing the new 
Accord. One important concern is the possibility of the pro-cyclicality impact that may have 
adverse effects on the economy following the implementation of the new capital accord.  
This research project on Understanding and Addressing the Pro-Cyclicality Impact 
of Basel II in the SEACEN Countries is a collaborative effort between The SEACEN Centre 
and nine member central banks, namely, National Bank of Cambodia, Bank Indonesia, Bank 
Negara Malaysia, The Bank of Mongolia, Nepal Rastra Bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and State Bank 
of Vietnam. This research project, which is part of the SEACEN Centre’s research activities 
for Operating Year 2007/08, aims to analyze the pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II in the 
SEACEN Countries. The focus would be to examine some of the key linkages between 
Basel II requirements and the business cycle. In this regard, the main objective is to have a 
discourse on the intrinsically difficult issues of how risks move over the course of a business 
cycle and the regulatory responses to reducing risks affecting financial stability, and the 
attendant macroeconomic costs that could arise from Basel II. 
The study is divided into two major sections. Part I provides the integrative report and 
regional analysis authored by Dr. Pungky Purnomo Wibowo, Visiting Research Economist 
of The SEACEN Centre and concurrently Project Leader from Bank Indonesia, who is at 
present a Senior Researcher in the Financial System Stability Bureau of the Directorate of 
Banking Research and Regulation. Part II consists of country chapters authored by country 
researchers from nine participating member central banks.  
The SEACEN Centre wishes to thank Dr. Pungky Purnomo Wibowo for his efforts 
as the Project Leader and also the country researchers from the participating SEACEN 
member central banks for their contributions to the research project, namely, Mr. Ouk Sarat, 
Section Chief, Bank Supervision Department, National Bank of Cambodia; Mr. M. Ardian, 
Junior Banking Researcher, Banking Research and Regulation Directorate, Bank Indonesia; 
Ms. Nurhayati Mohd. Khalid, Senior Executive, Prudential Financial Policy Department, 
Mr. Raymond Yeo, Manager, Financial Conglomerates Supervision Department and Mrs. 
Diana  Paharodzi,  Senior  Executive,  Financial  Conglomerates  Supervision  Department, 
Bank Negara Malaysia; Mr. Battulga Ulziibat, Supervisor, Supervision Department, The 
Bank of Mongolia; Mr. Maha Prasad Adhikari, Director, Bank Supervision Department, 
Nepal Rastra Bank; Mr. Jermy Y. Prenio, Acting Bank Officer IV, Office of Supervisory 
Policy Development, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; Ms. H. A. Hettihewa, Assistant Director, 
Bank Supervision Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka; Mr. Johnny T.C. Hou, Assistant 
Director General, Economic Research Department, Central Bank of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan); and last but not least, Ms. Ly Thi Tho, Deputy Manager, Banking Supervision, 
State Bank of Vietnam.
The Centre also gratefully acknowledges the support of The SEACEN Centre’s staff 
in completing this study. The views, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this 
Report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of The SEACEN Centre 
or its member central banks/monetary authorities.
Dr. A.G. Karunasena   June 2008
Executive Director 
The SEACEN Centre 
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One of the central pillars of the new Basel-II regulatory framework is the 
concept of risk-based capital requirements. In this regard, under the internal-rating-
based (IRB) approach, the amount of capital that a bank will have to hold against 
a given exposure will be a function of the estimated credit risk of that exposure. 
One important concern is that the new regulatory capital requirement (CAR) will 
exacerbate business-cycle fluctuations. 
In this regard, in a downturn, when a bank’s capital base is likely to be eroded 
by loan losses, the existing (non-defaulted) borrowers will be downgraded by the 
relevant credit-risk models, forcing the bank to hold more capital against its current 
loan portfolio. As a result, it would be quite costly for banks to raise fresh external 
capital in down times. Banks would be forced to cut back on lending activity (bank 
lending channel), thereby contributing to a worsening of the initial downturn.    
Based on the empirical studies for several SEACEN countries, we find that 
that  there  is  no  strong  evidence  that  there  is  pro-cyclicality  impact  of  Basel  II 
implementation. Nonetheless, SEACEN countries must give serious consideration 
to their  economic situations, especially in case of unfavourable developments, when 
implementing Basel II for their banking sectors. 
execuTive summary
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CHAPTER 1
1. Introduction 
Economic reforms and fi  nancial liberalization have caused a bank lending boom 
in most of Asian countries as banks are the most important fi  nancial intermediaries. Th  is 
has led to surges in consumption and asset prices with the corporate and fi  nancial sectors 
experiencing very high growth rates. It is widely claimed that fi  nancial  liberalization 
is crucial to the boosting of economic development (Levin, 1997)2. However, it can also 
increase macroeconomic vulnerability of fi  nancial institutions’ portfolios especially for 
the banks. It is widely known that most of the Asian banks engaged in massive high-risk 
projects3. Aft  er enjoying persistently high economic growths for three decades, Indonesia 
along with Th  ailand and South Korea, in the recent past, experienced a turbulent “twin 
crisis”- a currency crisis and a banking crisis, which stood out as one of the major crises of 
the 20th century4.  
Its impact was devastating and was felt across the Asian countries. Th  e domestic 
currencies depreciated drastically, causing major defaults by fi  rms and commercial banks 
which had borrowed unhedged foreign currency denominated loans. Several banks were 
critically under-capitalized, even long before the crisis commenced. Reductions in bank 
capital resulting from the unstable markets drastically diminished the channel for bank 
loans since bond markets were still not fully functioning as alternative sources of external 
fi  nancing. Th   e crisis is now considered to be over but Indonesia will continue to experience 
its eff  ects for years to come. 
Since Asian commercial banks remain the most important fi  nancial intermediaries 
even aft  er a series of fi  nancial deregulation5, fragility in banking institutions can still 
be considered  as a main source of fi  nancial instability that can fi  nally lead to a crisis as 
UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING THE
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL II IN THE 
SEACEN COUNTRIES
by Dr. Pungky Purnomo Wibowo1
1  Th  e author is currently a Senior Researcher for the Financial System Stability Bureau, Directorate of Banking Research and Regulation of Bank 
Indonesia. He was Visiting Research Economist at Th   e SEACEN Centre for Operating Year 2007/08.
2  Financial liberalization generally incorporates interest rate deregulation, an increase in bank branch offi   ce expansion and fi  nancial deepening (the 
ration of money to GDP), and end to preferential credit, less credit to the government sector and more credit to the private sector (Levin, 1997). Th  e 
importance of the fi  nancial liberalization is also supported by McKinnon-Shaw and Fry (1995 and 1997) who argue that fi  nancial repression in the 
form of ceilings on interest rates leads to negative real rates distorting the economy.
3  One of the indicators of an increasing risk in Indonesian commercial banks’ portfolio is the massive increase in Non-Performing Loans in certain 
economic sectors for certain groups of borrowers by all groups of banks (state banks, private banks, foreign banks, mix or joint banks and regional 
banks).
4  Th   ere are many literature on the causes of the Asian crisis. Th   ere are two main polar views of the causes of the crisis. Th  e  fi  rst view argues that the 
main cause of the crisis were weak economic fundamentals and policy inconsistencies (Krugman (1998), Mishkin (1999a)). Th   e second view is that 
the root of the crisis was pure contagion and market irrationality (Radelet and Sachs (1998a and 1998b), Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Stiglitz 
(1999 and 2002)). Meanwhile, some other commentators such as Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) and Djiwandono (1999) took the middle 
ground arguing that both contagion and poor economic fundamentals caused the Asian crisis. Financial crises do not occur only in the presence of 
weak fundamentals, as weak fundamentals can also trigger a “bank run” psyche which in turn can have disproportionately adverse eff  ects on the real 
economy.
5  Th   e uniqueness of commercial banks is proposed by Guttentag and Lindsay (1968, p.991) by demonstrating that commercial banks have a greater 
capacity for varying aggregate volume of credit than other fi  nancial intermediaries with the consequence  that banks are potentially more important 
sources of cyclical instability. In this sense, shift  s in the demand by commercial banks for reserves have a signifi  cantly greater impact on total loans 
extended by all intermediaries (banks and non-banks) than do similar shift  s in the demand for reserves by non-bank intermediaries. Th  is  characteristic 
is also interpreted as bank uniqueness (also supported by Fama (1980 and 1989)). Th   ey argue that it is clear that banks are a much more potent engine 
of credit creation  even if the expansion process is not exclusively a bank phenomenon.
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mentioned above (Crockett, 1997). Banks interact directly with sectors of the economy 
through their roles as intermediaries. Th  ey hold a greater variety of assets and liabilities 
than any other fi  nancial institutions. Hence, any changes in the conduct of monetary policy 
with regard to credit and money are refl  ected in adjustments of their portfolios and those 
of their clients. 
Th  erefore, the eff   ectiveness and consequences of monetary policy require an 
understanding of the behavioural characteristics of commercial banks (Andersen and 
Burger, 1996). Hence, information about banks’ portfolio behaviour6 is oft  en viewed as a 
requirement for a complete understanding of the workings of the fi  nancial system of the 
economy as a whole and particularly of the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
(Baltenperger, 1980). 
Th  ere is a common understanding therefore that ensuring the soundness of  the 
banking system would create fi  nancial stability in in Asia. Th   e Basel II Accord is viewed 
as a new regulation that could help to achieve a sound banking system. Th   e New Accord is 
composed of three complementary “pillars”: Pillar 1 is a regulatory standard for minimum 
capital requirements. Th   e objective of Pillar 1 is the better alignment of regulatory capital 
requirement with “economic capital” which is demanded by investors and counterparties. 
Under this current Accord, all commercial lending is obliged to the same 8% capital 
requirement regardless of the creditworthiness of the borrower and collateral strength of the 
loan. Th   e failure to distinguish among commercial loans of very diff  erent degrees of credit 
risk has instigated the incentive to move low-risk instruments off   balance sheet and retain 
only relatively high-risk instruments. 
In this regard, according to Jones (2000), fi  nancial innovations that arose in response to 
this incentive have given banks with the means to “arbitrage” diff  erences between regulatory 
and economic capital. Meanwhile, Pillar 2 is about the supervisory review process which sets 
forth broad principals and some specifi  c guidelines for the review of capital adequacy that 
are intended to push both banks and supervisors beyond the mechanical application and 
satisfaction of Pillar 1 standards. Specifi  cally, banks are expected to establish and document 
internal processes for assessing capital adequacy relative to portfolio risk. Pillar 3 is regarding 
market discipline aimed at improving the transparency of banks to counterparties and 
investors as banks will be required to disclose detailed information on their risk profi  le and 
capital adequacy7. 
Th   ese developments in the fi  nancial sector, especially the banking sector, have played 
a major role in shaping macroeconomic outcomes in many Asian countries. Financial 
developments have reinforced the momentum of underlying economic cycles, and in some 
cases have led to extreme swings in economic activity and a complete breakdown in the 
normal linkages between savers and investors. According to Borio and others (2005), these 
experiences have led to concerns that the fi  nancial system would be excessively procyclical 
leading to unnecessary amplifi  ed swings in the real economy. Th  ese concerns have led 
6  “ banks are assumed to have a desired composition of their asset portfolios which depends on the entire constellation of yields on all fi  nancial assets 
the banks are legally allowed to hold. Th   is composition is to be viewed as a set of long-run preferences which, because of time and uncertainty, must 
depend on expected as well as current yields. Th   ese preferences for individual assets are assumed to be consistent with rational maximizing behaviour 
by the banks. Th   us, for example, the desired volume of loans will depend positively on its own yield… and negatively on all other yields “. (Borrio, 
1984, p.24).
7  Specifi  c reporting requirements in Pillar 3 include IRB capital for each of the major portfolio components (e.g. corporate, retail mortgages, 
securitization exposures) as well as for the bank as a whole.
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to a need for changes in prudential regulation, accounting standards, risk measurement 
practices and the conduct of monetary policy to improve not only the fi  nancial system but 
also macroeconomic stability.
2.  Objectives of the Study
Th   is paper aims to analyze the above concerns and discuss possible options for policy 
responses. Th  e focus would be to examine some of the key linkages between Basel II in 
the fi  nancial system and the business cycle. In this regard, the main objective is to have a 
discourse on the intrinsically diffi   cult issues of how risk moves over the course of a business 
cycle and the regulators’ responses to reducing the risk of fi  nancial stability, and the attendant 
macroeconomic costs that could arise from Basel II.  Specifi  cally, this study would endeavor 
to answer some important questions as follows:
1.  How does Basel II aff  ect the economy and banking industry in SEACEN countries in 
terms of regulation?
2.  Would the regulatory capital requirement as stipulated by Basel II overstate the 
magnitude and economic signifi  cance of pro-cyclicality in the New Accord relative 
to the existing capital requirement in SEACEN countries?
3.  How would the lending react to riskier behaviour as a result of tightening capital 
constraints and alternative proposed modifi  cations to the New Accord?
Th  e results of this study could hopefully be useful for the monetary authorities in 
the SEACEN countries in analysing the impact of Basel II and determining the appropriate 
policies for the pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II on the macro economy and fi  nancial system 
as a whole. Country chapters would include those from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Republic of China (Taiwan) [here aft  er referred to 
as ROC (Taiwan)], and Vietnam. Th   e country chapters would focus on the development of 
Basel implementation and the impact of Basel II pro-cyclicality on their economies. 
3.  Salient Features of Basel II Implementation in the SEACEN 
Countries
3.1  Basel II Implementation in the SEACEN Countries
Th   e new capital framework or Basel II implicates tremendous changes for the banking 
industry. Th   e framework consists of three pillars that cover a wide range of risks. Th  e  fi  rst 
pillar introduces a new capital requirement calculation that is more risk-sensitive. Th  e  formal 
capital requirement consists of capital charged from credit risk, market risk and operational 
risk. Th  e second pillar gives a new concept regarding active supervision process from 
the authority and also promotes the implementation of risk management in the banking 
industry. Th   e third pillar promotes active participation from the market and stakeholders 
for the oversight of the banking industry.
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Th   e main focus of Basel II is to achieve better diff  erentiation according to credit quality 
of the counterparty than that achieved by using the few broad categories of counterparty 
weights in the fi  rst Basel Accord. In particular, for sovereign risks, Basel II breaks away from 
former rules (IMF Special Data Dissemination Standards, Basel Core Principles for Eff  ective 
Banking Supervision, IOSCO 30 Objectives and Principles, and others) and does not rely on 
any mechanical assessment of credit quality. Instead Basel II will rely on the expertise from 
recognized external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) by employing the standardized 
approach or the internal-ratings-based approach (IRB). 
Th  e standardized approach is a natural extension of the current regulations with 
more credit quality based categories of counterparty weights. It will be available to all banks 
without the eligibility criteria. In this case, the fi  nal round of revisions favors a broader scope 
of counterparty weights with more ‘buckets’. It also includes a special treatment of asset 
securitization and some new credit conversion factors for short term commitments. On the 
other hand, the IRB approach would use a diff  erentiation of assets among 6 asset classes 
which involves corporate, banks, sovereign, retail, specialized lending and equities in the 
banking book. Banks adopting IRB must apply it on all asset classes and for all business units 
within a reasonably short period of time. Moreover, banks opting for the advanced stream 
will also have to calculate their credit capital requirement under the foundation approach 
for 2 years. Th   e capital requirement for the advanced approach will be fl  oored at 90% of that 
of the foundation approach. Historical data of 5 years will be required at the end of a 3 year 
transition period. 
In employing IRB, banks need to fulfi  ll the composition of minimum requirements, 
compliance with minimum requirements, rating system design, risk rating system operations, 
corporate governance and oversight, use of internal ratings, risk quantifi  cation, validation 
of internal estimates, supervisory loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD) 
estimates, requirements for recognition of leasing, calculation of capital charges for equity 
exposure and disclosure requirements. Moreover, banks must demonstrate to supervisors 
that the model meets certain minimum requirements at the outset and on an ongoing basis. 
It also has to be supported by rating and risk estimation systems and processes which could 
provide for a meaningful assessment of borrower and transaction characteristics, meaningful 
diff  erentiation of risk; and reasonably accurate and consistent quantitative estimates of risk.
As many in the banking industry are in agreement that this framework can make 
operations of the banking industry more prudent, many European countries have already 
implemented the Basel II framework in 2006. Some South East Asia countries have 
started implementing Basel II in 2007 beginning with the standardized approach. Th  e  full 
implementation will mostly take place in 2010 as presented in Table 1.
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While most of SEACEN countries will implement Basel II in 2007-2008, the strategies 
will be diff  erent. Most of them will start implementing Basel II by allowing banks to use 
the standardized approach with the advanced approach following later. Vietnam is the only 
country allowing banks to implement the standardized and the advanced approaches at the 
same time. 
Based on the reports of the nine participating countries for this project, it is clear that 
ROC (Taiwan) and the Philippines are two countries that are considered to be ready for 
in the implementation of Basel II in comparison with the other countries. Both countries 
adopted the standardized approach of Basel II in 2007 as a fi  rst step.  In the Philippines, prior 
to 2007, they gradually phased in elements of Basel II into the existing BSP risk-based capital 
framework to set the stage for the eventual full adoption of the entire Basel II standardized 
provisions.  Th   ese elements included the lower capital requirements for highly rated credit 
exposures for corporate entities and higher capital requirement for non-performing loans.  
Implementing the Basel II Framework will not be an easy task for the SEACEN 
countries. Th   e main challenges are how to tailor the framework to suit the varied country 
conditions, preparing the infrastructure such as regulations, systems, etc., and educating 
supervisory authorities and the banking industry regarding the framework. In some 
countries, the support from the government would be vital while in others, it may be less 
so. 
To implement Basel II successfully, the preconditions such as the mechanisms for 
providing an appropriate level of systemic protection must be in order. Most of the countries 
have serious concerns on issues such as the legal-foreclosure framework and its links to Basel 
II implementation. Th   ey have to ensure that the legal-foreclosure framework is suffi   ciently 
robust to assure the eff  ectiveness of credit risk mitigation techniques and appropriateness of 
credit risk weights in Basel II. 
  As a result of the above concerns, some policy implications can be gleaned, 
especially in terms of laying the necessary foundation to implement the Accord in the 
following table:
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Table 2
Readiness for Implication of Basel II
A base line level of supervising 
infrastructure is already in
place.
Focus on addressing material 
gaps in the supervisory 
infrastructure, such as:
- Preconditions need to be 
 improved.
- Modifications are required  
  to the legal framework.
- Any changes are required to 
  key prudential regulations.
- Aspects of the supervisory 
  review process need to be 
 strengthened.
- The current state of bank
  governance and risk 
  management practices at its 
 regulated  banks.
- Does the home/host country


































































3.2  Roadmap for Basel II Implementation
Th   e SEACEN countries under review have generally adhered to the BIS schedule for 
Basel II implementation by fi  rst adopting the standardized approach. Many of the countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Nepal) have more or less similar roadmaps as presented 
below: 
Table 3
Roadmap of Basel II Implementation
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Q1 2008-Q1 2009 
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Conversely ROC (Taiwan), Vietnam and the Philippines have made slightly more 
progress in implementing Basel II, especially in the area of credit risk. Th   is is particularly so 
for the Philippines as can be seen from its road map as follows: 
Figure 1






 and  standardized
 approaches
Credit Risk




Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review) - a continuing process
Pillar 3 (Market Discipline) - gradual implementation starting 2007
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Gradual phasing in







Pillar 1 (Minimum capital requirement) 
3.3  Overview of CAR of the Banking Industries in the SEACEN 
Countries 
Most of the SEACEN countries have capital adequacy ratios (CARs) which are higher 
than required by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Nonetheless, banks have 
continued strengthening their capital positions in preparation for Basel II implementation. A 
good example is the Philippines where capital is boosted with issuances of innovative capital 
instruments such as unsecured subordinated debts that would qualify either as hybrid Tier 
1 capital or Tier 2 capital. As of end-March 2007, the banking system’s consolidated CAR of 
the Philippines stood at 18.83%.  Th   is is well above the 10% and 8% requirements of Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and international standards, respectively.  It is worth noting that 
since the BSP adopted a capital adequacy framework based on the Basel standards in 2001 
(which was based on the 1988 Basel Accord), the banking system’s consolidated CAR has 
not gone below 15% (Figure 2). With the implementation of Basel II, data from the validated 
parallel run reports of universal banks showed that CAR, on average, will decrease by only 
around 300 bps. 
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Figure 2 
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In the case of ROC (Taiwan), the Regulations Governing the Capital Adequacy 
Ratio of Banks were implemented in 1992 followed by the Enforcement Rules of the Act of 
Privatization of Government-Owned Enterprises (amended in 1992). Resulting from these 
regulations and rules, three banks, namely, Chan Hwa Bank, First Bank and Hua Nan Bank 
were privatized in 1998. Meanwhile, the Regulations Governing the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
of Banks were revised to incorporate market risk capital requirements. Of the total assets of 
all fi  nancial institutions, assets of private banks rose from 8.9% in 1991 to 51.5% in 2001, 
while those of public banks declined from 53.7% to 19.7% during the same period.
 Th  e minimum capital adequacy ratio in Sri Lanka is 10% as against Basel’s 
recommendation of 8%.  Th   e risk-weighted assets (RWA) has increased by 35% on average 
during the last 7 years as a result of the increase in share of loans from 58% in year 2000 to 
65% of total assets in 2007. Th   e aforementioned growth is a result of the  increase in risk 
weights on ‘loans secured by primary mortgage over residential property’ and ‘other loans 
and advances’ up to 55% (from 50%) and 110% (from 100%) respectively. Subsequently, Tier 
II capital increased by 42% on average, which is higher than the increase of RWA (34% on 
average) while the CAR increased by 2.04 bp over the last 7 years. A continuous improvement 
in the CAR was recorded during the last 2 years as a consequence of enhancement of 
minimum capital requirement of licensed banks and the infusion of new capital by foreign 
banks with the change in the computation base for single borrower limit (SBL). 
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Figure 3 
Risk-Weighted Assets and CAR in Sri Lanka























In the case of Indonesia, commercial bank’s capital improved along with higher 
profi  tability. Th   e capital adequacy ratio, as an indicator of banking resilience in dealing with 
risk, improved from 19.3% in 2005 to 21.27% in 2006; remaining above the limit imposed 
by Bank Indonesia. Th   e upswing in the CAR is a consequence of an array of consolidation 
eff  orts incorporated in the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API) policy structure. Along 
with CAR improvement, the overall national banking resilience has strengthened enough to 
minimize potential fi  nancial sector instability. 
Figure 4 
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Capital ratios in Malaysia remain high, stable and well in excess of the minimum 
requirement. Th  e risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) and core capital ratio (CCR) had 
consistently averaged at approximately 13% and 10% respectively from 2000 to May 2007. 
During the earlier periods aft  er the Asian fi  nancial crisis in 1997, recapitalization eff  orts were 
largely driven by the Government via a special purpose vehicle, the Danamodal Nasional 
Berhad (Danamodal) which was established to ensure the preservation of healthy capital 
levels to absorb the high losses experienced in the fi  nancial sector. As at May 2007, total 
capital in the banking system stood at RM107billion, while the risk weighted assets stood at 
RM743.9billion. 
  In Mongolia, the total capital of its banking sector fell below zero during the fi  nancial 
crisis which occurred during 1996-2000. Th  e Bank of Mongolia and the Government 
implemented necessary measures to overcome the crisis such as refi  nancing, restructuring, 
and regulatory measures which have made a signifi  cant impact on banking indicators. As a 
result, banks’ capital has strengthened as well as their risk-bearing capacity.  Th  e  minimum 
capital requirement for banks increased gradually, from around USD 1 million in 2000 to 
USD 7 million in March 2006. As the profi  tability of banks has been high in the last several 
years, a signifi  cant part of the capital increase has emanated from their income. In addition, 
the opening of Mongolian banks to foreign as well as domestic investors has resulted in 
the increase in the total capital of the banking sector from USD 27.3 million in 2000 to 
USD 284.4 million in September 2007 while the capital adequacy ratio which has fl  uctuated 
between 14 and 24 percent, is 1.8-3.0 times higher than the Basel minimum requirement.
Figure 5 




































































Capital Capital adequacy ratio  
  In the case of Cambodia, the CAR of the banking system as a whole has been 
carefully monitored although it remains well above the regulatory limit. Th   e ratio decreased 
from 58% in 2001 to 26% in 2006, higher than the prudential limit of 15%, and well above 
the 8% requirement of the capital accord. Th   is trend is largely due to the increase in risk 
weighted assets particularly loans disbursement and loans commitment. However, in spite of 
banks’ increasing regulatory capital through the topping up of capital and profi  t generation, 
rapid credit expansion have placed enormous pressures on banks. Moreover, the absence of 
proper credit rating has meant that banks have little choice but to weigh counterparty risk at 
100% although the customers may prove to be strong and viable. 
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Figure 6 








































Th   e Nepalese banking system comprises 23 commercial banks, 58 development banks, 
79 fi  nance companies and a few micro fi  nance institutions, making up the major portion 
of the fi  nancial assets in the country. Nepal started its  fi  nancial liberalization eff  orts two 
decades ago while the central bank, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) has been working towards a 
transparent and prudent regulatory framework for banks and fi  nancial institutions. Th  ese 
regulations have contributed greatly to the growth of banks in the fi  nancial system. However, 
due to political problems and issues related to the appropriate allocations of resources, the 
Nepalese economy has not performed very well in the last few years, as refl  ected by the 
rather low GDP growth and increased unemployment rate, albeit with moderate infl  ation. 
Mirroring the economic development, the growth in NPA has increased while the overall 
bank capital has been negative, albeit showing signifi  cant improvement from -14.96% in 
2002 to -1.66% in 2007.
Vietnam’s banking system has undergone substantial reforms over the past decade 
which have included the  transformation from a mono-banking  system to  a two-tiered, 
market-driven banking system with participation from fi  nancial institutions under various 
types of ownership (state-owned, joint-stock, joint-venture and foreign). Th   e reform of its 
banking system has been implemented in tandem with economic reforms in its taxation 
system, policies for public fi  nance companies, monetary policy and reforms in state-owned 
enterprises. Th  ese fi  nancial and economic reforms have resulted in a stronger banking 
industry in Vietnam. While there is no explicit CAR data, the Tier 1 Capital and Total Assets 
of Vietnam’s banking industry are presented in the following fi  gure: 
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Figure 7 
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3.4  Pro-cyclicality Impact of Basel II
Economic reforms and fi  nancial liberalization caused a bank lending boom in Asian 
countries through banks, being the most important fi  nancial intermediaries. Th  is led to 
soaring consumption and asset prices with the corporate and fi  nancial sector experiencing 
a very high growth rate. While fi  nancial liberalization is crucial to boosting economic 
development (Levin, 1997)8, it can also increase macroeconomic vulnerability of fi  nancial 
institutions’ portfolios. As mentioned earlier, Asian banks engaged in massive high-risk 
projects9 which subsequently led to the fi  nancial crisis10.
8  Financial liberalization generally incorporates interest rate deregulation, an increase in bank branch offi   ce expansion and in fi  nancial deepening (the 
ration of money to GDP), and termination of preferential credit, less credit to the government sector and more credit to the private sector (Levin, 
1997). Th   e importance of the fi  nancial liberalization is also supported by Fry (1995 and 1997) who argue that fi  nancial repression in the form of 
ceilings on interest rates leads to negative real rates distorting the economy.
9  One of the indicators of increasing risk in Asian commercial banks’ portfolio is the massive increase in Non-Performing Loans in certain economic 
sector for certain group of borrowers by all groups of banks (state banks, private banks, foreign banks, mix or joint banks and regional banks).
10  Th   ere is a lot of  literature on the causes of the Asian crisis. Th   ere are two main polar views of the causes of the crisis-  the fi  rst argues that the main 
cause of the crisis were weak economic fundamentals and politic consistencies (Krugman (1998).
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Th  is crisis was mostly caused by insuffi     cient capital both in the corporate and 
banking sector. It has been recognized, advocated mainly from the work of Miller and 
Modigliani in 1958,  that the independency value of a fi  rm rests on its capital structure in 
a frictionless world with full information and complete markets - capital being the main 
issue in the fi  nancial sector. However, this idea had just taken hold as late as 1988 when 
the bank regulators and authorities of the G10 fi  nally agreed to adopt the Basel Accord11 
for common capital requirements and had only been recently adopted across countries. 
A specifi  c standardization was employed to provide a level playing fi  eld for banks within 
member countries and to establish the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system by encouraging banks across countries to comply with a set of common solvency 
requirements.
In this regard, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argued that the primary aim of capital 
adequacy regulation is to reduce risk-taking that may undertaken by banks. Most industrial 
countries now have deposit insurance to prevent bank runs and to protect small and 
uninformed depositors. Furlong and Keely (1989) also proposed that banks that are subject 
to a fl  at insurance premium, may have excessive incentives to take risks, since their payoff   
functions are convex with respect their net worth. As a result, capital adequacy may mitigate 
this problem since the marginal value of the deposit insurance option with respect to asset 
risk falls with declining leverage. 
Th   e concerns of the minimum capital requirement have also been a strategic issue 
for less developed countries like those in Asia where possible negative impact of capital 
requirements seems to be more relevant, given the larger role of the banking system in these 
countries. In order to protect the depositors from possible moral hazards of shareholders, 
it is optimal to transfer the bank’s control rights from its shareholders to the regulator who 
represents the interest of the bank’s depositors, before its capital is depleted (Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994).
While there are advantages to be garnered from the Basel Accords, especially Basel 
II, which aims to reduce the incentive for capital arbitrage by increasing the risk sensitivity 
of regulatory capital charges, there are also some concerns about the possibility impacts 
in the early phase of its implementation. In this regard, increased risk sensitivity of capital 
charges may cause an unexpected pro-cyclical eff  ect if the quality of the banks’ assets is 
closely in line with the business cycle. As a result, this could be counterproductive to the 
capital regulation’s original goal of enhancing fi  nancial stability not only of individual banks 
but of the whole fi  nancial system. 
11  In theory, although capital adequacy requirement could limit risk-taking by banks, there are some concerns about the existing Basel I regulation. Th  e 
main concern for Basel I is that its method of calculating the capital-to-risk- asset ratio does not accurately show the riskiness of banks’ portfolios, and 
therefore does not give adequate incentives for controlling their risk exposures. Th   erefore, to address these problems, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision revised the regulation set out by the 1988 accord, with the objective of developing more risk-sensitive standardized internal measurement 
approaches to capital adequacy. In this regard, one major proposal for reform is to incorporate the borrowers’ credit risk in calculating the capital 
adequacy ratio (Pillar I).
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In general, the pro-cyclicality impacts of minimum capital as required in Basel 
II12 could summarized in two main ways. First, in relation to the fi  nancial sector, capital 
charges would be possibly subject to large swings should the perception of asset risk move in 
synchronization with business fl  uctuations. Th   is situation could cause an increased volatility 
of asset prices or loan interest rates with the potential of creating dangerous boom-and-bust 
cycles in the loan markets. Secondly13, increased volatility in the fi  nancial sector may lead to 
volatility in the real sector. Since banks are required to hold more capital against increased 
credit risk in an economic downturn, they would partly pass on the increased costs of capital 
to their borrowers. In this regard, it could possibly lead to a “credit crunch” phenomenon 
which will be refl  ected by the increase in interest rates. As a result of the lack of alternative 
sources of fi  nance, fi  rms would cut back on investment spending thereby aggravating the 
downturn. 
4. Empirical  Tests
4.1 Hypothesis
1. Th   e impact of Basel II varies across SEACEN countries in terms of regulation as it is 
infl  uenced by economic performance and the business cycle.
2. Th   e impact of regulatory capital requirement of Basel II is not always signifi  cant to 
the expected target of economic growth in each SEACEN country.
3. Th   e bank has reacted to the constraint of a tightening of capital by reducing credit to 
its riskier borrowers14. 
4.2  Methodology and Data
Th   e main goal of Basel II is to enhance fi  nancial stability by introducing incentives 
for banks to develop better measures of risk management, to hold appropriate and more 
sensitive capital and to improve the transparency of their risk profi  le. It is interesting to see 
that there is a certain relationship between modern thinking in monetary policy and the 
framework derived for fi  nancial stability in Basel II. 
12  Basel II off  ers banks the choice of adopting either the new standardized approach or the internal rating based (IRB) approach to measure credit risk. 
Under the new standardized approach, the risk-weights will be based on rating provided by an external credit assessment institution so that claims 
on borrowers with sound credit rating will have lower risk-weights. Under the IRB approach, bank will be allowed to use their own internal models 
to assess credit risk in their portfolios, subject to strict methodological and disclosure standards. Th   e IRB approach allows greater risk-sensitivity 
compared to the standardized approach, since it uses a wider range of risk-weights. In this regard, the supervisors are responsible for ensuring 
that banks adopting the standardized approach will comply with its conditions and requirements, while making sure that each bank using the IRB 
approach has a sound internal risk assessment process (pillar 2). Furthermore, banks adopting the IRB approach are expected to fulfi  ll a set of 
disclosure requirement to ensure that market participants have adequate information to discipline errant banks (pillar 3).
13  Th   is second scenario could be viewed as more damaging than the fi  rst scenario. In this regard, the volatility of regulatory capital may be partly off  set 
by banks holding an extra buff  er of its own capital while economic losses of the second scenario are diffi   cult to evade.
14  Kasyap and Stein (2004, p.23) suggested that active management muddles together the direct eff  ect of a tightened capital constraint with the bank’s 
endogenous response. For example, suppose we look at the evolution of a bank’s actively managed portfolio during a recession and fi  nd that average 
credit quality … is roughly unchanged. Should we conclude from this that there is no cyclicality problem deserving of policymaker attention? Probably 
not-it may just be that the bank has reacted to a tightening capital constraint by cutting off   credit to its riskier borrowers, which is precisely the policy 
problem that concern us. 
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To analyze the benefi  ts of Basel II and to conduct the analysis of pro-cyclicality of 
the framework, we must analyse its impact on both “fi  nancial output trend” and “volatility”. 
Based on previous researches, there are several views as follows: fi  rst, as suggested by Taylor 
and Goodhart (2005), Basel II is likely to intensify pro-cyclicality although it is not clear 
about the magnitude. Secondly, Basel II is not likely to give much impact on pro-cyclicality 
since it is viewed that lending behaviours are more aff  ected by economic capital rather than 
by regulatory capital and thus, are not likely to be signifi  cantly aff  ected by Basel II. Th  is 
argument is supported by Ayuso, Perez and Saurina (2004) that banks hold signifi  cant capital 
buff  ers that although maybe pro-cyclical would end up in an overall moderating eff  ect.
Channels through which the pro-cyclical impact of Basel II could be felt are depicted 
as follows:











4.2.1  Vector Autoregression (VAR) Approach for Analyzing the Pro-
Cyclicality Impact of Basel II
Analysis of pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II through lending on the real economy 
as presented from the model above would be based on the empirical standard semi-
structural vector autoregression (VAR) models. Th   is VAR model would be employed since 
this methodology avoids the need for a complete specifi  cation of a structural model of the 
economy. 
As mentioned above, it would be appropriate to incorporate monetary policy and 
Basel II through lending and its impact on the real economy, as this VAR approach would be 
more consistent and fruitful. In this context, Bernanke et. al. (1997, pp. 95-96) propose the 
employment of a VAR in measuring monetary policy and other changes in certain aspects 
in banking portfolio (as suggested by Kashyap et. al., 1997). 
Moreover, Rudebusch (1998) emphasizes that the ability of a VAR to produce useful 
results relies mostly on the ability to separate reactive policy actions from exogenous ones 
besides other crucial aspects of economic structure such as a sample period, structural 
breaks, variable selection, lag length and information sets. He suggests that the most 
important procedure is to distinguish monetary policy actions from exogenous ones. Here, 
endogenous (or reactive) policy responds to developments in the economy, while exogenous 
(or autonomous) policy consists of all other actions. 
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Vector autoregressive (VAR) models are widely employed in the empirical analysis of 
monetary policy issues. Th   is methodology avoids the need for a complete specifi  cation of a 
structural model of the economy. Th   e VAR analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism 
began when the failure of the traditional Cowles Commission models was rationalized by 
two main critics, Lucas (1976) and Sims (1980). 
Th  e traditional structural models proposed by the Cowles commission and semi-
structural VAR models designed to analyze the impact of monetary policy can be described 
as follows:
(4.2.1)       
Where Y and M are vectors of macroeconomic variables (such as output and prices) 
and variables controlled by the monetary authority (such as interest rates and monetary 
aggregates containing information on monetary policy), respectively. Matrix A defi  nes 
the contemporaneous relations among the variables and C(L) is a matrix fi  nite-order lag 
polynomial.   is the vector of structural disturbances. Th  e non-zero off  -diagonal 
elements of  allow some shocks to infl  uence more than one endogenous variable in the 
system. 
Here, the traditional structural model approach is designed to identify the impact of 
monetary variables on macroeconomic quantities in order to decide the value to be set for 
the monetary instruments (M) to achieve a given target of the macroeconomic variables (Y), 
by assuming exogeneity of the M since these are the instruments controlled by the central 
banks. In this case, identifi  cation in the traditional structural models is obtained without 
assuming the orthogonality of structural disturbances. 
Th   e Lucas critique deals with structural models above when the coeffi   cients explaining 
the impact of monetary policy on the macroeconomic variables depend on the monetary 
policy regimes. In this case, no model estimated under a specifi  c regime can be applied to 
simulate the eff  ects of a diff  erent policy regime. Th   e Sims critique applies to identifi  cation 
from a diff  erent perspective, pointing out that the restrictions needed to support structural 
exogeneity in Cowles Commission-type models are “incredible” in an environment where 
agents optimize inter-temporally. 
Moreover, Sims (1980) introduced the unrestricted VAR into macro-econometrics. 
It stands at the other extreme from the large-scale models and focuses on fi  tting a “model” 
to the data at the expense of theoretical consistency. Unlike the simultaneous-equation 
model, a VAR model is a-theoretic. According to Sims, if there is simultaneity among a set 
of variables, they should all be treated equally. Generally, a fi  nite-order VAR is a multivariate 
model in which each endogenous variable is regressed on its own lags and lags of all other 
variables in the system, where the number of lags determines the order of the VAR. Th  e 
objective of the VAR is to investigate the dynamic response of the system to the shocks 
without having to depend on “incredible identifi  cation restrictions” inherent in structural 
models, or “controversial restrictions” from economic theory. 
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Since the individual coeffi   cients in the estimated VAR models are oft  en diffi   cult to 
interpret, it is useful to evaluate the so-called impulse response functions (henceforth, IRF). 
Th   e IRF traces out the response of any dependent variable in the VAR system to shocks in 
the error terms for several periods in the future. Th   e IRF is the centrepiece of VAR analysis. 
However, a possible defi  ciency of this analysis is that the impulse responses do not consider 
the “endogenous” component of monetary policy, such as any feedback rule linking it to 
state of the economy. But, since it is hard to identify and single out the original source of the 
many shocks hitting the economy and to which policy responds, the consequences of these 
changes in monetary policy are more diffi   cult to interpret as they combine the eff  ect of the 
original shocks and that of the policy reaction.  
In the context of the defi  ciencies of IRF above, Rudebusch (1998) suggests that a 
VAR may produce impulse responses that are inconsistent with other, exogenous, aspects of 
monetary policy. Th   ereby, in employing VAR to measure monetary policy, we must embody 
exogenous infl  uences; and these must represent other actions of monetary policy that are 
extraneous to the VAR. Rudebusch proposes that one way to overcome this problem is 
by identifying a policy shock time series and then fi  nd the eff  ects of policy essentially by 
regressing everything else on that policy shock series. Here, the  -period impulse response 
of a variable to a monetary shock could be calculated as the sum of the fi  rst  coeffi   cients 
of a regression of the variable on lagged exogenous shock; he suggests that there is no 
consequence in omitting other relevant variables since they are uncorrelated with the 
exogenous monetary policy shocks by construction15. 
Nevertheless, following Ford et. al. (2002), we take this problem into consideration by 
investigating the structural residuals from the inter-bank call money or other representative 
interest rate in each country equation in our VARs against some indicators of exogenous 
monetary policy and the past behaviour of monetary policy as presented. 
In this regard, the monetary innovations derived from a given VAR only have meaning 
if these monetary innovations can be related to changes in exogenous monetary policy due 
to alterations in direct monetary policy instruments, such as a need to adjust the interest rate 
issued by the Central Bank or other monetary variables in order to engender the shocks to 
such an interest rate itself.
4.2.2 Th   e Formal VAR Model 
Th  is study will apply the same approach as other analysis. To address the 
aforementioned issues, the eff  ects of a monetary policy shock on banks’ balance sheets and 
economic variables would be analyzed using the standard semi-structural VAR approach by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) of the form given in equation (4.2.2) as follows:
15  Christiano et al. (1996a and 1996b) support the argument of Rudebusch by proposing that the procedure of omitting other relevant variables is 
asymptotically equivalent to the usual one based on interpreting the coeffi   cients of a full VAR as suggested by Sims (1980). In this case, Sims (1980) 
purposed that should each VAR measure a diff  erent independent component of the true monetary policy exogenous shock, each VAR could precisely 
and correctly estimate the appropriate impulse response.
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(4.2.2)  Syt = A(L)yt + εt  
A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L for a VAR (p):
(4.2.3)  A(L) = A1L + A2L2 + K + ApLp
Th   e MA representation of 2 is:
(4.2.4)  yt = Φ(L)εt  
where  . Th   e structural parameters of the contemporaneous 
endogenous variables are contained in S. yt  is the vector of endogenous variables in the 
system including one policy (indicator) variable and non-policy variables. While for εt, the 
vector of structural disturbances, E[εt]=0 and as in  Sims (1980)16,   = In. In this case, 
 will be In if yt = n × 1, the matrices S and Ap being conformable with the y vector. Lp is 
the lag operator, where p describes the order of the VAR. 
Deterministic terms can be added on the right-hand side, as is frequently the case in 
a Johansen’s analysis of co-integration, by adding a term ΨDt. We do so in order to allow 
dummies to capture possible structural breaks. Th  en, a reduced form17 of the equation 
(4.2.2) is estimated by OLS:
(4.2.5)  yt = S-1 A(L)yt + S-1ΨDt + ut  
where
(4.2.6)  ut = S-1εt , and
(4.2.7) 
                                  
                                   1 given the assumption:
  
    
So S-1 is the Cholesky decomposition of Ω, the reduced-form covariance matrix. 
Furthermore, the dynamic responses to shocks are summarized by the moving average 
(MA) representation (assuming that the process is invertible):
(4.2.8)  yt = [I – S-1A(L)]-1ut = [I – S-1A(L)]S-1εt
It is assumed that all the roots of   remain outside the unit circle in 
the absolute value, or are in 1 in the presence of cointegration and unit roots. In this sense, 
the companion matrix has roots that are less than one in the absolute value or are equal to 
plus 1. In these circumstances, the VAR is (mathematically) stable. 
16  Th   at is, they assumed covariance matrix is diagonal, which implies that the structural disturbances are orthogonal (mutually independent) (Sims, 
1980).
17  t is assumed that the errors are i.i.d and are normally distributed, being independent of any vector Dt; and that yt-1, yt-2, K, yt-p, Dt, t = 1,2,K,T, are not 
perfectly collinear. 
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Th  erefore, the Cholesky decomposition of Ω provides the zero restrictions (to 






















Th  e system is then a recursive model or Wold-causal chain; the way in which the 
variables aff  ect each other is determined by their position in the ordering. In this sense, the 
contemporaneous innovations in the other variables infl  uence all those below them in the 
chain and none of those variables above them in the order. Th   e ordering of the variables in 
the system therefore, infl  uences the recursive chain of causality among the shocks in any 
given period. 
Th   erefore, according to Sims (1992), the policy variable, such as a leading indicator 
of monetary policy, is ordered fi  rst if we assume that there is no contemporaneous feedback 
from non-policy variables onto the policy variables. Th   us, we assume that monetary policy 
decisions are set without considering the simultaneous evolution of economic variables. 
Th   is assumption is applied if information on non-policy variables is not readily available to 
the monetary or policy-making authorities. Furthermore, had we assumed that the policy 
variables respond to contemporaneous feedback from non-policy variables, the policy 
variable should be ordered last. 
However, in our study, given the high frequency data (monthly) that we employ in 
constructing our VARs and the existence of information lag from non-policy variables18, we 
prefer the former identifying restriction. Nevertheless, since the correlations across residuals 
εt are very small, the ordering is actually not signifi  cant. Th  is condition is supported by 
Enders (1995) who stated that if   < 0.2, then i ≠ j, the ordering of variables in a VAR is 
not relevant. 
Alternative decompositions to Cholesky as proposed above are those by Sims (1980), 
Lutkephol (1991), Koop et. al. (1996), and Pesaran and Shin (1997). Pesaran and Shin, 
for example, suggest the generalised impulse response analysis for unrestricted VAR and 
cointegrated VAR models. Unlike the traditional impulse response analysis, their approach 
does not entail orthogonalization of shocks. For a non-diagonal error variance matrix, the 
orthogonalized and the generalized impulse responses correspond only in the case of the 
impulse responses of the shocks to the fi  rst equation in the VAR. 
18  Interest rate data (the policy variables) is readily available while non-policy variables such as real output, stock market index and price were available 
with a lag. 
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Pesaran and Shin (1997) suggest that the orthogonalized and the general impulse 
response functions diff  er in a number of respects. Th  e generalized impulse responses 
are invariant to the reordering of the variables in the VAR. Pesaran and Shin also admit 
that there are many alternative reparameterizations that could be used to calculate the 
orthogonalized impulse responses and there is no exact guidance as to which of these 
possible parameterization alternatives should be employed. On the other hand, they view 
the generalized impulse responses as reliable tools to measure the historical patterns of 
correlations observed for diff  erent shocks. 
Furthermore, we could potentially develop our approach in this study by investigating 
the possibility of cointegration. Under the existence of cointegration, we can use the 
resultant VECs to examine the structural shocks by exploiting the cointegrating vectors to 
constrain the long-run multipliers in the systems using the KPSW model (King, Plosser, 
Stock and Watson, 1991) decomposition. Here, if cointegration exists in our VARs, then 
the impulse responses could be evaluated from the resultant Vector Error Correction 
Mechanism (VECM). In this context, the KPSW decomposition model which investigates 
the cointegrating relationships, which is also based on the Cholesky decomposition, gives 
an alternative methodology for uncovering impulse responses than the straight use of the 
Cholseky decomposition on the VECM. 
Given the importance of the possibility of cointegration in our VARs estimation, 
before the VAR specifi  cation is explained and the empirical results are presented, the test 
to investigate the presence of cointegration was fi  rst conducted in all the VARs, which 
confi  rmed that the approach as proposed by KPSW could not be invoked as there were no 
evidences of cointegration in our estimations. However, there were nominal evidences since 
all of our VARs contained dummy variables of which the critical values for the trace statistics 
(Johansen, 1995) had to be estimated by the Monte Carlo studies since the standard ones are 
based on the presence of special forms of dummy variables, which must have an expected 
value of zero. 
Th  e models proposed for estimation and the variables they contain therein are 
presented in Table 4. In examining the eff  ects of monetary policy on the bank’s balance 
sheet, we adopt Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1995) in specifying the 
VAR. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) have also employed this kind of VAR. 
Based on the possible relationship as found by Gertler and Gilchrist, the system 
involving nine variables VARs was developed with the following ordering: inter-bank 
money market overnight rate, bank deposits, bank loans, minimum bank capital (regulatory 
minimum capital as required by Basel II for the second VAR to see the diff  erences as 
comparison to minimum bank capital), bank securities, stock market index, output (real 
GDP) and prices (Consumer Price Index or CPI). In this case, a random innovation on one 
variable oft  en occurs simultaneously with innovations to another variable in the system. In 
order to overcome this, as noted above, the innovations are orthogonalized by a Cholesky 
decomposition in which the covariance matrix of the resulting residuals is the lower 
triangular. 
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By including conditioning variables, stock market index, output and prices, which are 
likely to be associated with the aggregate demand for loans, the VAR could determine how 
loan supply responses vary across diff  erent capital (minimum bank capital and regulatory 
minimum capital). In addition, we also employ the exchange rate in the VAR. Th   e reason for 
this is that the exchange rate (as proposed in the “money view”) plays an important role in 
relatively small and open economies like Indonesia and other SEACEN countries. Here, any 
changes in the exchange rate aff  ect the banks’ balance sheet variables, stock market index, 
output and prices. 
Moreover, if we are to conduct tests for the presence of co-integration within a specifi  c 
VAR, it is necessary to determine the order of integration of the variables. In general, to use 
the standard procedures developed by Johansen (1995), we require them all to be I(1), i.e., to 
be stationary in their fi  rst diff  erence. In addition, as Philips (1986) demonstrated, any OLS 
regressions which are based on the levels of the variables will be a spurious one. However, 
the implication that only stationary, I(0), variables should be included in VARs has tended 
not to be accepted. We fi  rst concentrate on tests for the presence of unit roots, that is, for the 
existence of I(1) variables. 
Th   ese are three “important” tests for unit roots -  the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), 
Phililips-Perron and Perron’s (1997) structural break test. Th   ese tests are conducted to see 
if  the null hypothesis can be rejected and if so,  the series y are considered to be stationary, 
y~I(0). Whilst, a non-rejection of the unit-root null hypothesis for level data raises the 
question as to whether its fi  rst diff  erence is stationary, y(1). Th   is testing procedure by further 
diff  erencing, can be continued until stationary series are achieved. Th   is testing procedure is 
justifi  ed when we assume that most economic series are I(1).
4.2.3 Th   e Lending Behaviour Responses to Riskier Borrowers as a 
Result of Tightening Capital due to Basel II
  For this, the above same model is used by dividing the loans data based on borrower 
risk type such as investment grade and non investment grade. However, for simplifi  cation, 
the loans data is segregated into investment loans, working capital loans and consumption 
loans. 
Based on the logical framework described above, it is realized that the panel data 
approach can be employed to gauge the lending behaviour across  countries due to the 
diff  erences in the way each country implement Basel II. However, since there is a varied 
time frame in the implementation of the Accord in each country, we prefer to use the same 
model to determine the condition of lending behaviour in each country. 
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4.2.4 Data
To estimate the above described model, this study will use monthly data from 1998:01 
to 2006:12 for each variable: interest rates (issued by authority), exchange rates, deposits, 
loans, actual capital (and regulatory capital requirement), securities, stock market index, 
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4.3 Th   e Overall Simulation Results for the SEACEN Countries 
Th   is paper has so far discussed the implementation of Basel II19 in some SEACEN 
countries.  Th   e overall simulation results for the SEACEN countries are presented in the 
following section. 
  Based on our simulation, it is observed that the impact of a monetary shock 
will aff  ect deposits and loans in the short run in most SEACEN countries under review. 
However, in the long run, the eff  ect is most likely to be insignifi  cant, indicating that the 
banking industry is well capitalized.
19  Basel II aims to strengthen banks’ incentives to control their risk exposures relative to Basel I, which relies on a more simple method of risk 
measurement. In this regard, Basel II is also likely to reduce the scope for capital arbitrage. Basel II eff  ectively employs information about the 
borrowers’ creditworthiness held internally by banks by allowing fi  nancial institutions that fulfi  ll certain requirements to adopt the IRB approach. 
Th   erefore, in several respects, Basel II is considered to be superior to Basel I.
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 Th  e country characteristics also have a bearing on whether the impact on pro-
cyclicality from Basel II will be signifi  cant. For example, in ROC (Taiwan), although the 
implementation of Basel II will aff  ect bank lending, the impact on the economic growth is 
not signifi  cant due to its export-oriented economy. ROC (Taiwan) is dependent on exports 
as the main engine of economic growth and is more susceptible to changes in the world 
economy.
  Overall, based on the simulation results of the SEACEN countries, it can be 
concluded that the impact of the pro-cyclicality of Basel II implementation is insignifi  cant. 
While there are some impacts on the CAR or capital, banks would still be more than able 
to perform their intermediary function due to the more than ample average CAR of the 
banking industry in SEACEN countries vis-à-vis the minimum  requirement of 8%.
5.  Conclusion, Recommendations and Future Researches
5.1   Conclusion
We have investigated empirically whether there are diff  erential eff  ects of monetary 
policy and simulations of Basel II implementation on banks’ balance sheet were carried out 
across countries, particularly on loans and other bank balance sheet components such as 
deposits and securities and their implications on each country’s economy. Th  e  study  covers 
diff  erent time periods for the various countries due to data limitation. 
  In summary, interesting and important fi  ndings of the pro-cyclicality impact of 
Basel II are as follows:
1. Th   e increase in capital requirements as a result of Basel II does not have signifi  cant 
pro-cyclicality impact on lending and on GDP since most of the countries have 
average CARs which are well above the 8% minimum requirement.  We can therefore 
conclude that most of the SEACEN countries are placing more emphasis on banking 
and fi  nancial stability  especially in the wake of  the fi  nancial crisis in 1997.
2. Th   e more developed the economy of a country as refl  ected by the development of its 
capital market, the less pro-cyclicality impact there would from Basel II implementation 
and visa versa. As can be seen from the impulse response functions, when there is a 
“constraint” on bank lending, an increase in the impulse response functions of the 
capital market (stock market index) follows, indicating that the private sector have 
easy access  to the capital market as an alternative source of fi  nancing.
3. Th   ere is no indication at all that the implementation of Basel II would cause a credit 
crunch, a situation where the supply of bank loans is lower than its equilibrium level 
at the prevailing interest rates.  
4.  In the case of a “tight monetary policy” as refl  ected by the increase of interest rates, 
there could be “more” pro-cyclicality impact from Basel II implementation especially 
on banks’ lending behavior which could cause a slowdown in economic growth as 
represented by the decrease in the GDP impulse responses. 
Seacen_Pungky.indb   23 Seacen_Pungky.indb   23 6/27/2008   2:13:26 PM 6/27/2008   2:13:26 PM24
5.2 Recommendations
  Based on the empirical results for the various SEACEN countries, some 
recommendations can be drawn as follows:
1.  As a result of Basel implementation, the experience of the 1997 fi  nancial crisis and 
the need to mitigate risks, it is important for SEACEN countries to maintain capital 
requirements as proposed by Basel Regulation, especially in light of the US mortgage 
crisis which had widespread negative impact on the global economy. Th  e better a 
bank’s capital, the better would be its capability to mitigate risks. 
2.  It is also important to consider the implementation of Basel II with the economic 
performance of each individual country since each country has its own business cycle 
which can diff  er from the others. It is vital therefore for each country to make the 
right decision in terms of the timing of the implementation of Basel II in light of 
its economic performance. For example, in the case of a situation of an economic 
slowdown, careful consideration need to be given on the pro-cyclicality impact of the 
Basel II especially on loans extended by banking industry. 
3.  Following from the above, to improve the capability of banks to mitigate risks 
as a consequence of the increase in capital requirement of Basel II, monetary and 
banking authorities have to  set prudential standards and supervise banks to decrease 
their NPLs especially since NPLs hinder the way capital requirement works on the 
macroeconomic variables. 
5.3 Further  Researches 
  Possible follow-up researches on the pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II may be 
suggested as follows:
1.  To widen the VARs by utilizing the complete components of assets and liabilities 
to provide more integrated results and give a more comprehensive picture on the 
SEACEN banks following the change in Basel II capital requirements and in the 
conduct of  monetary policy. 
2.  An important variable such as NPLs could be considered as they are becoming more 
important in aff  ecting banks’ behavior as a result of Basel II implementation. 
3. Th  ere are, of course, theoretical foundations that can be employed to derive the 
pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II. However, any extension of the work in another 
direction may be more useful if there is data available for a longer period of time; and 
the components of loans can be divided based on economic sectors and usage since 
these would provide more analyses and evidence on the pro-cyclicality impact of the 
increase in required capital due to Basel II on bank lending.  
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CHAPTER 2
1.   Overview
In order to understand the state of the fi  nancial sector in Cambodia, it is important to 
note that at present banks are the only major fi  nancial institutions and the fi  nancial market is 
underdeveloped. Upon the promulgation of the Law on Banking and Financial Institutions 
in December 1999, the entire banking system was restructured and 16 banks were either 
voluntarily or forced to liquidate. Following this restructuring exercise, confi  dence in the 
banking system eroded and restoring confi  dence has been a diffi   cult and an ongoing mission 
for the National Bank of Cambodia.
1.1   Progress of the Banking System in Cambodia
Th   e performance in the banking system has improved in the past few years. As of 2006, 
the banking system in Cambodia consisted of 16 commercial banks, 6 specialised banks, 
and around 40 microfi  nance institutions. Customer credit increased in average by 28% in 
the past fi  ve years.  To the same extent, customer deposits grew at a yearly average of 26%. 
Th   e number of depositors and borrowers in the banking system also rose to 400,000 and 
600,000 respectively. Th   is rapid growth is a sign of the return of confi  dence in the banking 
system. Customers perceive that Cambodian banks are much safer now than ever before and 
indeed, they are enjoying the various services being currently off  ered by banks. Banks have 
not only extended their loans to various kinds of businesses within the economy but also 
increased the volume of their participation in the development of those business sectors.
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1  Author is Section Chief of the Bank Supervision Department at the National Bank of Cambodia.
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Th  e increase in total assets of the Cambodian banking system also tracked that of 
customer credits and deposits since banks are only involved in traditional banking activities 
such as providing loans, accepting deposits, and settling payments while the capital market 
is non-existent. Compared to GDP, total assets in the banking system rose from 21% in 2003 
to 29% in 2006. However, this proportion is relatively low compared those of other countries 
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Cambodia has been recognised as a highly dollarised economy in the region, making 
it diffi   cult for the central bank to manage money supply through the  policy rate. While the 
interest rate gap for commercial banks has narrowed over the past three years, the lending 
rate remains high at around 17% per annum while deposit rate is still low at around 5% per 
annum. Th   e high lending rate is largely explained by the lack of reliable information provided 
by the borrowers and in many cases, the information cannot be verifi  ed or realisable due to 
poor accounting practice. Th   eir repayment capacity cannot be assessed through their cash 
fl  ows. Hence, most lending approvals are likely to be based on property collateral with high 
interest rate to compensate for the high credit risk and operating costs. At the same time, 
due to the lack of reliable information, banks are reluctant to lend and this has resulted in 
excessive liquidity. In order to reduce their cost of holding high liquidity, banks lower the 
deposit rates.












2003 2004 2005 2006
Interest on loans Interest on deposits
Interest Rate on Credits and Deposits
Figure 3
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
1.2   Potential Weaknesses
Despite progress in the Cambodia banking system, some weaknesses have been 
observed. First of all, credit seems to present a much greater risk to the system. Credit port-
folios have increased rapidly which have a potential for risks. Since the restructuring 
programme in 2002, non-performing loans declined markedly from 15% to only 8% in 2005, 
largely due to the strengthening of the organisational structures of both the supervisory 
authority and fi   nancial institutions. Strong enforcement of prudential regulations had 
been put into place and weak institutions were subject to possible liquidation if they did 
not present a sound and reliable restructuring plan. Th  e fi  nancial institutions especially 
commercial banks, were able to strengthen their operations through the recruitment of more 
experienced staff  , tighter disbursement  of credit and being very selective with customers. 
Th   e nonperforming loans had increased to 9% in 2006 but this fi  gure is expected to 
be lower by the end of 2007. While the fast growth of credit has given supervisory authority 
a lot of concerns, fi  nancial institutions have continued to relax their lending procedures in 
return for higher profi  ts. Approvals on credit disbursement are largely reliant on property 
collateral rather than positive cash fl  ows of the borrowers. With the property market 
booming in Cambodia, borrowers have been getting increased access to bank fi  nancing. 
Th   is development is of concern to supervisory authorities since fi  nancial institutions would 
suff  er massive losses should property prices reverse their current trend. In addition, credit 
risk management within commercial banks remains very poor as some fi  nancial institutions 
do not have the resources or the required skill to mitigate credit risk. At the same time, credit 
information sharing between fi  nancial institutions is still at the very initial stage. However, 
some banks still remain very optimistic about the credit quality and have continued to 
expand their loan portfolios.



























































































Source: National Bank of Cambodia
Besides rapid credit expansion, credit concentration or exposures of the individual 
customer or group of customers pose a major threat to the banking system. Total 
exposures to net worth in the banking system increased from 26% in 2002 to a peak of 
90% in 2005. Prudential regulation in Cambodia forbids fi  nancial institutions from lending 
to an individual customer or group of customers in excess 20% of their net worth while 
the demand for credit is likely to be much more than that. As Cambodia is developing, it 
needs huge amounts of capital to fi  nance large projects such as infrastructure development, 
industrial parks, fi  nancial centres, tourist locations, and so on. Th   ese projects are entirely 
fi  nanced by commercial banks as the capital market, especially the bond and equity market, 
is non-existent. Th   e supervisory authority has permitted such fi  nancing for the development 
of the country since they are relatively secure. At the end of 2006, the revised regulation 
on the management of large exposures was issued for implementation. With this amended 
regulation, sound and strong fi  nancial institutions would have increased opportunities to 
fi  nance large projects while relatively small institutions would have to reduce their exposures 
to comply with the regulation. Following this, the total exposures in the banking system 
dropped signifi  cantly to 47% of the net worth. Despite this improvement, credit exposures 
remain a major threat to the stability of the system, given that any project failures would put 
pressure on the soundness of banks and fi  nancial institutions.
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Another weakness is the concentration of credits in various economy sectors. Th  e 
rapid credit growth has not only caused concern for non-performing loans but also for the 
concentration of credit in the booming sectors. Loans to the services, retail and wholesale 
sectors have increased considerably refl  ecting the growing number of tourist and consumer 
spending. Tourism is a major sector sustaining the growth of the Cambodian economy. 
However, this sector is highly vulnerable to both internal and external factors. Internal and 
external destabilising factors such as political confl  ict or an outbreak of avian fl  u would 
greatly put the sectors at risk as well as the banking system and economy as a whole. Th  e 
increase in personal consumption loans is also a matter of concern. Previously, banks 
have always focused on commercial loans and were reluctant to issue consumption loans 
due to the lack of collateral and necessary legal framework. However, banks currently are 
increasingly extending personal consumption loans although customers’ incomes may not 
be suffi   ciently adequate and stable for repayment. Housing loans are becoming increasingly 
popular in Cambodia and many contractors operate with direct funding from commercial 
banks. With both buyers and contractors having access to the same source of funding, a 
reverse in residential prices would cause severe fi  nancial problems to banks and fi  nancial 
institutions. 








































































































































Total net credits classified by type of businesses 2006 (billions of KHR)
Credits by Economic Sectors
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
In addition, the prudential provisions of the Cambodian banking system are still 
weak in the areas of liquidity, solvency, profi  tability, and sound corporate governance. Th  e 
low ratio of loans to deposits has resulted in excess liquidity that banks have diffi   culty in 
managing. Th   e regulation which requires banks to maintain all their local deposits in the 
country coupled with the lack of fi  nance instruments, have obligated banks to place their 
excess liquidity in the central bank, earning moderate interest rates. Banks generally have a 
high liquidity ratio exceeding the regulatory requirement of 50% of the net worth. However, 
from the prudential perspective, given that the banking system is highly dollarised and the 
limited role of the central bank as lender of last resort, such highly liquidity is required 
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Th   e solvency ratio of the Cambodian banking system is closely monitored although 
it remains well above the regulatory limit. Th   e ratio decreased from 58% in 2001 to 26% in 
2006, higher than prudential limit of 15%, and above the 8% of capital accord. Th  is  trend  is 
largely due to the increase in risk weighted assets, particularly for loans disbursement and 
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loans commitment. Despite the increase in regulatory capital of banks from time to time 
through raises in capital and profi  t generation, rapid credit expansion has put enormous 
pressure on banks. Th   e lack of credit rating has also left   no choice for banks except to weigh 










































Source: National Bank of Cambodia
Th  e performance of banks in Cambodia seems to be encouraging with improving 
returns on assets and equity overtime. At the end of 2006, ROA and ROE stood at 2.8% and 
14% respectively. Despite this improvement, profi  tability of banks in Cambodia remains 
relatively low compared to neighbouring countries. High operating costs are a key factor 
in the relatively low profi  ts of banks. Poor physical infrastructures as well as lack of legal 
frameworks have made it diffi   cult and costly for banks to obtain necessary information 
about customers. Even as banks have set high interest rates for loans and made eff  orts to 
generate income through charging fees and commissions, the high operating costs have 
generally resulted in low profi  ts for banks.
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Source: National Bank of Cambodia
Corporate governance is becoming increasingly imperative for banks and fi  nancial 
institutions in Cambodia. Th  e majority of Cambodia’s banks do not satisfy the regional 
standards of corporate governance as the country lacks regulations on governance. Poor 
banking practices arising from poor corporate governance have already proven to be a 
serious problem within banks. Poor internal control, risk management, and performance 
have been observed in many banks and this would lead banking system fragility. While 
regulations on corporate governance is urgently required, time is needed to educate the 
public on its importance and thus, the instilling of  market discipline on banks. 
Th  e banking system in Cambodia is highly concentrated which presents a strong 
systemic risk. Of the total licensed banks, the top 5 banks hold 71% of total deposits and 
the top three banks have 62% of total credits. Th   is implies that the stability and soundness 
of these banks is a major factor in ensuring that the already weak confi  dence in the banking 
system would not erode further. It has always been the regulatory authority’s stance to allow 
banks to compete freely and fairly in the market and to foster competition by allowing 
access to entrance of foreign banks. Th   ere is no limitation on foreign participation in banks 
operating in Cambodia. Th   e recent growing number of banks is expected to ease the systemic 
problem.
1.3   Development of Prudential Norms
Th   e regulatory and supervisory system is aimed at promoting fair competition among 
fi  nancial institutions while safeguarding the integrity of the fi  nancial system. Continuous 
development of prudential norms has been identifi  ed as key to achieving this vision. Given 
that the Cambodian banking system is at rudimentary stage and faces several weaknesses, 
the regulatory and supervisory authority understands the need to enhance effi   ciency in 
banking supervision and the need to upgrade prudential norms in Cambodia in line with 
international best practices.
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1.3.1 Enhance  Effi   ciency in Banking Supervision
Th   e regulatory and supervisory authority in Cambodia has identifi  ed three aspects 
to enhance effi   ciency in banking supervision. First, the supervisory authority recognises 
the need to improve regulatory framework. Th   is task is an ongoing process and involves 
numerous changes in prudential regulations. However, at the current stage, three regulations 
are being prioritised for upgrading, including the regulation on internal control, net worth 
calculation, and open position in foreign currency. Second, the supervisory process also 
needs to be enhanced. Th   e supervisory authority has done a lot in terms of capacity building 
and procedures but there is still room for improvement since Cambodia has yet to comply 
with the Core Principles for eff  ective banking supervision. Th   e authority is considering the 
phasing out progressively of the reporting paper which is a source of doubloons and mistakes 
for both banks and supervisor. Th   e authority also intends to improve the computerisation 
of  the supervision  process through strengthening and complementing the database 
system to enable supervisors to make a better judgment on problem banks and fi  nancial 
institutions. Lastly, strengthening enforcement is the key factor for enhancing effi   ciency in 
banking supervision. In the past, there were excessive time lags in the supervisor’s reactions 
to identifi  ed breaches of regulations. Th   e authority is currently adopting a more collective 
mode of decision making process in order to be more proactive in enforcing prudential 
regulations and standards. It  also intends to promote virtuous circles in the banking system 
by developing internal controls, fostering competition, increasing transparency through 
published fi  nancial statements, and promoting cooperation among banks.
1.3.2   Implementation of the Basel II
According to an informal assessment by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
several concerns raised in the 25 Core Principles were not covered by Cambodian laws and 
regulations, mainly because of its irrelevance in the current banking system. Th   is is no doubt 
this is one of the main obstacles towards a successful implementation of the Basel Accord. 
Another barrier is the level of development of the banking system. Th   e banking system in 
Cambodia is very young (there is still a lack of public confi  dence and regulatory and legal 
frameworks) and lack sophistication (in terms products off  ered, information system, and 
human resources). In response, the regulatory authority has set a higher capital adequacy 
ratio for banks than the standard set by Basel I. While Basel I has not been fully implemented 
with various obstacles in the way, the authority is now focusing on the compliance with the 25 
Core Principles, the foundation of eff  ective bank supervision. In light of this, so far as Basel 
II is concerned, Cambodia would need time for its compliance since its fi  nancial market 
is not yet developed and fi  nancial products are still very rudimentary consisting mainly 
of short-term credits with collaterals. Th   erefore, many market risks (stock exchange risk, 
interest rate risk) are not really present and coupled with this is that the technical aspects 
required by the New Accord is not available in Cambodia. Th   e lack of statistical data and 
human resources make it diffi   cult for the supervisory authority to implement Basel II.
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1.4   Objectives of the Study
In this paper, we would like to answer some important questions as follows:
1.  How does the Basel II aff  ect the economy and banking industry in Cambodia in 
terms of regulation?
2.  Would the requirement of regulatory capital requirement as required by Basel II 
overstate the magnitude and economic signifi  cance of pro-cyclicality in the New 
Accord relative to the existing capital requirement in Cambodia?
3.  How the lending behaviour responds to the riskier behaviour as a result of 
tightening capital constraints; and alternative proposed modifi  cations to the New 
Accord?
Th   e results of this study could hopefully be used by the monetary authority to analyse 
the impact of Basel II and aid in choosing the appropriate policies to counteract possible 
pro-cyclicality impacts on the fi  nancial system and macro economy as a whole.
2.   Data Analysis
2.1 Data
Th  e data used in this study are presented in the Table below. Monthly data from 
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2.2 Model  Specifi  cation
2.2.1 Logical  Framework
We have seen that the main goal of Basel II is to enhance fi  nancial stability by 
introducing incentives for banks to develop better measures and manage risk, to hold 
appropriate, more sensitive capital and to improve the transparency of their risk profi  les. It is 
interesting to note that there is a certain relationship between current thinking in monetary 
policy and the framework derived for fi  nancial stability in Basel II. 
In order to analyse the value added of Basel II and to conduct the analysis of pro-
cyclicality of the framework, we must analyse its impact on both “fi  nancial output trend” and 
“volatility”. Based on previous researches, there are several views on this as follows: fi  rstly, 
as suggested by Taylor and Goodhart (2005), Basel II is likely to intensify pro-cyclicality 
although they are not clear about its magnitude. Secondly, Basel II is not likely to give much 
impact on pro-cyclicality since it is viewed that lending behaviours are much more aff  ected 
by economic capital rather than by regulatory capital.  Th   is argument is supported by Ayuso, 
Perez and Saurina (2004) that banks hold signifi  cant capital buff  ers and  moving pro-cyclical 
would lead to an overall moderate eff  ect. 













2.2.2   Th  e  Model
Th   e Pro-Cyclicality Impact of Basel II
Analysis of pro-cyclicality of Basel II through lending on the real economy as 
presented in the model above would be based on empirical standard semi-structural vector 
auto regression (VARs) models. Th   is VAR model would be employed since it  avoids the 
need for a complete specifi  cation of a structural model of the economy. 
As mentioned above, since we would like to incorporate monetary policy and Basel 
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II through lending and its impact on the real economy, this VAR approach is expected 
to be consistent and useful. In this context, Bernanke et al (1997, pp. 95-96) propose the 
employment of a VAR in measuring monetary policy and other changes such as banking 
portfolio (as suggested by Kashyap et al, 1997). Moreover, Rudebusch (1998) emphasises the 
ability of a VAR to produce useful results relying mostly on its ability to separate reactive 
policy actions from exogenous ones besides other crucial aspects of the economic structure 
such as the sample period, structural breaks, variable selection, lag length and information 
sets. He suggests that the most important procedure is to distinguish monetary policy actions 
from exogenous ones. Here, endogenous (or reactive) policy responds to developments in 
the economy, while exogenous (or autonomous) policy consists of all other actions. 
Like those analyses, this study will apply the same approach. In order to address  the 
issues above, we employ the semi-structural VAR approach by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
of the form given in equation (1). It can be presented as follows:
(1)  Syt = A(L)yt + εt
A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L for a VAR (p):
(2)  A(L) = A1L + A2L2 + K + ApLp    
Th   e MA representation of 2 is:
(3)  y1 = Φ(L)εt    
Where  . Th  e structural parameters of the contemporaneous 
endogenous variables are contained in S. yt is the vector of endogenous variables in the 
system including one policy (indicator) variable and non-policy variables. While for εt, the 
vector of structural disturbances, E[εt]=0 and as in Sims (1980)2,   =  In. In this case, 
 will be In if yt = n × 1, the matrices S and Ap being conformable with the y vector. Lp  is 
the lag operator, where p describes the order of the VAR. 
Deterministic terms can be added on the right-hand side, as is frequently the case 
in a Johansen’s analysis of cointegration, by adding a term ΨDt. We do so in order to allow 
dummies to capture possible structural breaks. Th   en, a reduced reduced form3 of equation 
(1) is estimated by OLS:
(4)  yt = S-1 A(L)yt + S-1ΨDt + ut
where
(5)  ut = S-1εt, and
2  Th   at is, they assumed covariance matrix is diagonal, which implies that the structural disturbances are orthogonal (mutually independent) (Sims, 
1980). 
3  It is assumed that the errors are i.i.d and are normally distributed, being independent of any vector Dt; and that yt-1, yt-2, K, yt-p, Dt, t = 1,2,K,T, 
are not perfectly collinear.
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(6) 
  
             given the assumption:
  
  
So S-1 is the Cholesky decomposition of Ω, the reduced-form covariance matrix. 
Furthermore, the dynamic responses to shocks are summarised by the moving average 
(MA) representation (assuming that the process is invertible):
(7)  yt = [I – S-1A(L)]-1ut = [I – S-1A(L)]S-1εt
It is assumed that all the roots of     remain outside the unit circle in 
absolute value, or are in 1 in the presence of cointegration and unit roots. In this sense, the 
companion matrix has roots that are less than one in absolute value or are equal to plus 1. In 
those circumstances the VAR is (mathematically) stable. 
Th  erefore, the Cholesky decomposition of Ω provides the zero restrictions (to 
complement the   constrains) on Ω needed to identify the elements of S-1. Th  e  latter 
is lower-triangular:
Th  e system is then a recursive model or Wold-causal chain; the way in which the 
variables aff  ect each other is determined by their position in the ordering. In this sense, the 
contemporaneous innovations in the other variables infl  uence all those below them in the 
chain and none of those variables above them in the order. Th   e ordering of the variables in 
the system therefore infl  uences the recursive chain of causality among the shocks in any 
given period. 
Th   erefore, according to Sims (1992), the policy variable such as leading indicator of 
monetary policy, is ordered fi  rst if we assume that there is no contemporaneous feedback 
from non-policy variables onto the policy variables. Th  us, we assume that the monetary 
policy decisions are set without considering the simultaneous evolution of economic 
variables. Th   is assumption is applied if information on non-policy variables is not readily 
available to the monetary or policy-making authorities. Furthermore, had we assumed that 
the policy variables respond to contemporaneous feedback from non-policy variables, the 
policy variable should be ordered last. 
However, in our study, given the high frequency data (monthly) that we employ in 
constructing our VARs and the existence of information lag from non-policy variables4, we 
prefer the former identifying restriction. Nevertheless, since the correlations across residuals  
4  Interest rate data (the policy variables) is readily available while non-policy variables such as real output, stock market index and price were available 
with a lag.
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εt are very small, the ordering is actually not signifi  cant. Th  is condition is supported by 
Enders (1995) who stated that if   < 0.2 therefore i ≠ j , the ordering of variables in a VAR 
is not relevant. 
Furthermore, we must explain the models that we propose for estimation and the 
variables that they contain (see Table 1). In examining the eff  ects of monetary policy on the 
bank balance sheet, we adopt Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1995) in 
specifying the VAR. For an example, Gertler dan Gilchrist (1993) also employed this kind 
of VAR. 
Based on such possible relationship as found by Gertler and Gilchrist above, we built 
the VAR model using nine variables  in the following order: inter-bank money market 
overnight rate, bank deposits, bank loans, minimum bank capital (regulatory minimum 
capital as required by Basel II for the second VAR to see the diff  erences as comparison to 
minimum bank capital), bank securities, stock market index, output (real GDP) and prices 
(Consumer Price Index or CPI). In this case, a random innovation to one variable oft  en 
occurs simultaneously with innovations on another variable in the system. Th  erefore, in 
order to overcome this, the innovations are orthogonalised by a Cholesky decomposition in 
which the covariance matrix of the resulting residuals is the lower triangular. 
By including conditioning variables, stock market index, output and prices, which are 
likely to be associated with the aggregate demand for loans, the VAR could determine how 
loan supply responses vary across diff  erent capital (minimum bank capital and regulatory 
minimum capital). In addition, we also employ the exchange rate in the VAR. Th  e  reason 
for this is that the exchange rate (as proposed in the “money view”) plays an important role 
in relatively small and open economies of the SEACEN countries. Here, any changes in 
the exchange rate aff  ect the banks’ balance sheet variables, stock market index, output and 
prices. 
Moreover, if we are to conduct tests for the presence of cointegration within a specifi  c 
VAR, it is necessary to determine the order of integration of the variables. In general, to use 
the standard procedures developed by Johansen (1995), we require all of them to be I(1), 
i.e., stationary in their fi  rst diff  erences. In addition, as Philips (1986) demonstrated, any OLS 
regressions which are based on the levels of the variables will be a spurious one. However, 
the implication that only stationary I(0) variables should be included in VARs has tended 
not to be accepted. We fi  rst concentrate on tests for the presence of unit roots, that is, for the 
existence of I(1) variables. 
Th   ere are three “important” tests for unit roots, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
Phililips-Perron and Perron’s (1997) structural break test. Th   ese tests are conducted in order 
to test the null hypothesis to be rejected, then the series y are considered to be stationary, 
y~I(0). Whilst, a non-rejection of the unit-root null hypothesis for level data raises the 
question as to whether its fi  rst diff  erences is stationary, y(1). Th   is testing procedure by further 
diff  erencing, can be continued until stationary series are achieved. Th   is testing procedure is 
justifi  ed when we assume that most economic series are I(1).
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Th   e Lending Behaviour Responds to Riskier Borrower as a 
Result of Tightening Capital
Th   e model above was used but the loans data was diff  erentiated by borrower risk type 
such as investment grade and non-investment grade. For simplifi  cation, the loans data was 
divided into investment loans, working capital loans and consumption loans. 
Based on the framework described above, the panel data approach can actually be 
used instead to diff  erentiate lending behaviours across SEACEN countries resulting from the 
implementation of Basel II in the various countries. However, due to the varying time frames 
for implementing Basel II, the same model was employed to analyse lending behaviour in 
each country. 
2.3 Empirical  Results
Th   is analysis will look at how the implementation of Basel II will impact on the banking 
industry and country output, with the assumption that Cambodia has already implemented 
the Basel II framework.  Given that Cambodia is a highly dollarised-economy, the monetary 
authority is not able to use interest rate as a monetary tool to stabilise the economy. Instead, 
the exchange rate for stabilisation has been adopted in Cambodia in the management of 
monetary policy. In this study, the eff  ect of exchange rate fl  uctuation on credits, deposits, 
capital adequacy ratio, consumer price index, and gross domestic product is simulated. Th  e 
simulation with 10% and 15% increase in CAR were conducted to observe the eff  ect of 
exchange rate on all variables. 
2.3.1  Simulation with 10% increase in CAR
Due to Cambodia’s highly dollarised economy, we see in the simulation that if there 
is a shock on the exchange rate, the loan response will be declining by being negative in the 
fi  rst 2 months. Aft  er that, the loan response is steadily increasing and remains stable in the 
5th months and forward. Th   is response is due to a real sector that is highly dependent on 
the banking industry for fi  nancing as there is no capital market in the country as yet. With 
the large gap between loan rates and deposit rates, any increase in loan rates will most likely 
be followed by a response in increasing deposit rates. Th   is is confi  rmed since the average 
deposits rate and average lending rate in Cambodia are moving in the same direction over 
the past fi  ve years. Th   e deposit response increased for the fi  rst two months and remained 
stable for the next 2 months. Aft  er that, it decreased slightly but still remained above the 
horizontal line. Th  e response in bank loan causes the CAR to respond in the opposite 
direction. Th   e CAR response increased for the fi  rst 3 months, decreased in the next two 
months and remained stable along the horizontal line aft  er that.
Th  is can be observed in the current situation of Cambodia. Th  e movement of the 
exchange rate has little eff  ect on deposits and credits since around 95% of these are held in 
foreign currencies especially US dollar. Th  e  confi  dence in the local currency remains very 
low and almost every transaction is made in US dollar. Indeed, the comprehension of the 
need to protect against exchange rate risk is low among the public and even most business 
entities. Th   erefore, deposits or credits would not be much aff  ected due to a fl  uctuation in 
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the exchange rate. Th  e  eff  ect of exchange rate on CAR is also insignifi  cant in Cambodia. 
Given that credit constitutes a large part of assets and the weighting for assets denominated 
in local and foreign currencies are the same, the total risk weighted assets would virtually 
remained unchanged even if there were a large movement in the exchange rate. At the same 
time, prudential regulations in Cambodia also require banks and fi  nancial institutions to 
hold minimum capital requirements in foreign currency especially US dollar, which makes 
it highly improbable that the CAR would change in case of an exchange rate shock.
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Th   e shock also makes CPI movements increase signifi  cantly for the fi  rst 2 months, 
although aft  er 2 months, the response decreased signifi  cantly by becoming negative and 
remain stable around the horizontal line thereaft  er. In the case of Cambodia, the exchange 
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rate is highly correlated with infl  ation. CPI is mostly composed of imported goods from 
neighbouring countries especially Th  ailand and Vietnam. Although the exchange rate 
between the US dollar and local currency is relatively stable, the local currency is depreciating 
against currencies of neighbouring countries. Consequently, the imported price has been 
increasing over the past few years and has translated into higher CPI as well as higher 
infl  ation. 
Th  e impact of the exchange rate shock is not signifi  cant on the GDP. Th  e GDP 
response remained stable around the horizontal line although in the 2nd to 5th month, the 
response is decreasing. Th  is response in the GDP is somewhat interesting. Th  e Granger 
Causality test was carried out  to determine the relation between exchange rate movement 
and GDP. Using 5% confi  dential level, we see from the test results that hypothesis GDP does 
not granger cause exchange rate was rejected. Th   is means that GDP aff  ects exchange rate. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis ex_rate does not granger cause GDP is not rejected which 
means that the movement on the exchange rate will not have direct impact on the GDP. 
One possible reason why the GDP response remains stable in the event of an 
exchange rate shock is that the main contributions to the GDP are from private investments. 
Cambodia is a small open economy and most private investments are in the form of foreign 
direct investments since domestic investments are relatively small and portfolio investments 
are non-existent. For several years, FDI has always been a major driving force stimulating 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Annual FDI infl  ows averaged at 4% over the past 
fi  ve years while the stock of FDI reached more than 40% of the GDP. Recently, these capital 
infl  ows have put a huge pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate. However, sterilisation 
of foreign capital by the central bank has been able to maintain the stability of the US 
dollar and Riel exchange rate. Th   is has also led to a depreciation of the domestic currency 
against neighbouring trading partners such as Th   ailand and Vietnam. Th   is has led to the 
gradual increase in the infl  ation rate with the increase in imported prices. However, despite 
the depreciation, market expectations and investors’ confi  dence remain good and steady 
economic growth has been maintained. 
Table 2
Pairwise Granger Causality Test GDP Vs Exchange Rate
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests




GDP does not Granger Cause EX_RATE









Overall, based on the accumulated response from our simulation, we can see that the 
shock from the exchange rate will not have any signifi  cant impact on all the variables. Aft  er 
implementing Basel II, due to the high dependence on the banking industry, banks can still 
perform their main activities as intermediaries while GDP would remain stable.
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Table 3
Accumulated Reponse of Exchange Rate to Cholesky
(D.F Adjusted) One S.D Innovations







































































Cholesky Ordering: DEX_RATE DDEPOSIT DLOAN DCAR10 DCPI DGDP
From the impulse response simulation, the variance decomposition shows the 
contribution of changes in exchange rate to the changes in each variable. A one standard 
deviation change in exchange rate contributes 5.88% change in bank lending. Th  ere  is  no 




























































































Cholesky Ordering: DEX_RATE DDEPOSIT DLOAN DCAR10 DCPI DGDP
2.3.2  Simulation with 15% increase in CAR
Simulation with 15% increase in CAR shows similar results as the simulation with 
the 10% increase in CAR. A shock in the exchange rate will reduce credits in the fi  rst four 
months and remain stable that. Th  e  eff  ect on deposits is also strong in the fi  rst six months 
and is relatively stable there onward. Th  e inverse response in the CAR is observed aft  er 
the second month and becomes relatively stable beyond the fi  ft  h month. A shock in the 
exchange rate pushes CPI to go up sharply in the fi  rst two months and then decline within 
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the next two months. Th   e CPI will adjust to initial equilibrium aft  er the fi  ft  h month onward. 
Th  e  eff  ect on GDP is also strong where income goes down from the second month until the 
fi  ft  h month. To sum up, the eff  ect of exchange rate on all variables is not signifi  cant. It can 
be concluded that the banking industry is still able to perform its intermediary role aft  er the 
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3.   Summary and Conclusion
Th   e Cambodian banking system is at a rudimentary stage where the confi  dence is low 
with fewer products off  ered. Th   ere is also a low level of intermediation and relatively weak 
business operations. However, the regulatory framework is being reformed to comply with 
the Core Basel Principle aft  er the restructuring in 2000. Th   is exercise would be carried out 
for many years to come and the adoption of the new capital accord is considered unviable 
for the time being and also too burdensome for the system as a whole. However, this study 
attempts to explore the empirical evidence whether implementation of the Basel II is feasible 
for Cambodia.
Th   e results from this study shows that the adoption of the Basel II will impact the 
banking system and the economy for the very short-term and will stabilize beyond that. 
Additional capital requirements will diminish lending while increasing deposits during the 
fi  rst six months and remain relatively stable aft  er that. Th  e  eff  ect on CPI and GDP is also 
signifi  cant in the fi  rst fi  ve months but would adjust back to initial equilibruim from the sixth 
month onwards. In conclusion, since the impact of additional capital is not signifi  cant for all 
varibles, the adoption of the Basel II would be feasible for Cambodia.
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CHAPTER 3
1. Th   e Impact of Basel II on the Indonesian Economy and the 
Banking Industry
1.1  Development of Basel II
 
Th  e International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework or known as Basel II, is a revision of the Basel Capital Accord document 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 1988 (Basel I) and also an 
amendment of the 1996 Accord. Th   e Basel Capital Accord has been criticised for weaknesses 
in various aspects, including the Accord’s inability to refl  ect the bank’s actual risk profi  le 
Feedback, comments and suggestions from practitioners led to BCBS’ proposal to 
revise the Basel Capital Accord to (i) improve the soundness and stability of the banking 
system through viability and adequacy of banking capital, (ii) improve banking competition 
by leveling the playing fi  eld, and (iii) establish a more comprehensive approach in anticipating 
risks and provide alternative approaches in calculating capital adequacy that commensurate 
with a bank’s risk profi  le. Although the BCBS recommendation is for internationally active 
banks, the basic principles of the Basel II framework is applicable for all  banks regardless of 
their level of complexities.
If Basel I focused on the estimation of bank’s capital adequacy to manage the solvency 
problems, Basel II provides a wider spectrum or perspective. In Basel I where there is only 
one approach for capital adequacy calculation for Pillar 1 – minimum capital requirement 
- in Basel II, there is the standard or advanced approaches that banks can use to calculate the 
capital charged for every type of risk. For example, for credit risk, a bank can use either the 
standardised approach or the Internal Rating-based approach. Also for operational risk, a 
bank can use the Basic Indicator approach, standardised approach or advanced measurement 
approach.
 
Besides providing new approaches for calculating the bank capital adequacy, Basel II 
also proposes the supervisory framework for supervision authorities (Pillar 2 – supervisory 
review process) to ensure that the bank’s capital calculation is aligned with the bank’s risk 
profi  le and also transparency framework (Pillar 3 – market discipline) that will bring in 
the involvement of the public and market practitioners to establish market discipline in the 
banking industry.
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL II IN INDONESIA
by Muhamad Ardian Dwinanto1
1  Author is Junior Bank Researcher at the Banking Research and Regulation Directorate of Bank Indonesia. Th   e views expressed in this paper are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily refl  ect those of the Bank Indonesia. Th   is paper is part of the SEACEN research project.
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1.2 Th   e Overview of Basel II Implementation in Indonesia
As one of the largest country in South East Asia, Indonesia has an important role to 
play in maintaining fi  nancial stability in the region. With 130 commercial banks, Indonesia 
realises that maintaining fi  nancial stability will be a challenging task. Having gone through 
the fi  nancial crisis, Bank Indonesia (BI) as the banking regulator,  believe in the need to 
implement more prudent regulations to promote the stability of the banking industry.
Since the revision of the BCBS’ framework for International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards, or more popularly known as Basel II, BI has set the 
time frame for its  implementation as BI realises that the framework is not only focused on 
capital requirement, but also encourages the implementation of good risk management. 
To facilitate the implementation of the Basel II framework and also to foster 
improvement in banks’ risk management, BI is setting up a working group that consists of 
representatives of the  banking industry. As this working group will discuss all aspects of 
the Basel II framework, BI expects that the banking industry will be well-informed on its 
implementation.
As part of the preliminary assessment on the impact of Basel II implementation, BI 
conducted a quantitative impact study 5 (QIS 5) in 2006 and 2007. Based on the results of 
the 2007 study, the average risk weight assets increased 13.89%,  mainly due to the impact in 
the operational risk capital charge.
Based on the survey of the banking industry, Basel II implementation will be started 
with the Standardised Approach for credit risk and Basic Indicator Approach for operational 
risk. To ensure that the implementation is suitable for the Indonesian situation, BI has 
already issued the consultative paper that consists of national discretions for implementing 
the Standardised Approach, which is targeted for implementation in 2008. As for market 
risk, the Standardised Approach has already been implemented in 2006. 
Th   e implementation of the Advance Approach is not mandatory for all banks. Th  ose 
that wish to implement the Advance Approach must have prior approval from BI. BI 
allowed banks to use the Advance Approach for market risk in 2007, while 
for the Approach for other risks is expected to be implemented in 2010.
Seacen_Pungky.indb   50 Seacen_Pungky.indb   50 6/27/2008   2:13:37 PM 6/27/2008   2:13:37 PM51
Table 1











































































Q1 2008 - Q4 2008
begin Q3 2007
Q1 2008 - Q1 2009
begin Q1 2010
Q1 2008 - Q1 2009
begin Q1 2010
begin Q1 2010
PILLAR 1 PILLAR 2 PILLAR 3
1.3  Overview of the Indonesian Banking Industry
Th   e Indonesian banking system consists of 2 types of banks – the commercial banks 
and the rural banks. Th  e commercial banks can provide any type of services related to 
banking transactions and also may operate within the country or abroad. On the contrary, 
several restrictions have been placed on rural banks such as limiting their operating 
territories and services. In term of services, the rural banks cannot off  er demand deposits 
and cannot participate in activities using foreign currency. Hence, rural bank businesses are 
purely focused on taking deposits and granting loans. 
 
Currently, the banking industry is still playing a very important role in Indonesia’s 
fi  nancial system with around 80% of fi  nancial assets belonging to banks. As of September 
2007, there are 130 banks with 9619 offi   ces in Indonesia, an increase of 5% as compared to 
December 2006. Th   e increasing number of offi   ces indicates that the public’s access to bank 
services is increasing. However, the actual number of banks decreased due to the merger of 
2 banks to rationalise operations and garner benefi  ts from economy of scale, in the wake of 
similar phenomenon globally.
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Overall, the banking industry in 2006 has demonstrated relatively satisfactory 
performance in the midst of unsound real sector risk from banking perspectives. Numerous 
structural problems in the real sector made it necessary for prudential regulations to be 
enforced, particularly in the disbursement of credit. In 2006, banking credit grew by 14.1%, 
which was well below the initial target of 20% as well as actual credit growth in 2005 (Table 
3). Low credit growth, albeit with improvements in credit quality, was refl  ected by a drop in 
both gross and net NPL ratios due to the restructuring of non-performing corporate loans 
at two state-owned banks. To manage low credit growth, funds raised from the public were 
invested in low-risk assets. Th   is strategy boosted banking profi  tability, as refl  ected by the rise 
in net interest income (NII). Th   e developments outlined above triggered an increase in the 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), which remained above the minimum level set forth by Bank 
Indonesia. In general therefore, banking resilience in 2006 was slightly better than in 2005, 
which in turn, reduced potential instability in the fi  nancial system.
Th   e role of banking intermediation, particularly credit disbursement, was confronted 
by numerous constraints; evidenced by the fall in credit supply and demand. From the demand 
side, soaring interest rates for credit together with weaker purchasing power initiated a slump 
in credit demand. Th   is was refl  ected in the value of undisbursed loans, which escalated to 
IDR163.3 trillion in 2006 from IDR50.9 trillion in 2005. From the supply side, numerous 
unresolved structural issues resulted in heightened banking perception of risk in the real 
sector which precipitated extra vigilance in terms of policies for the disbursement of credit. 
Consequently, the distribution of new credit in 2006 decelerated compared to 2005. 
Table 2
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Th  e credit growth target for 2006 was not achieved as a consequence of sluggish 
performance. Credit expansion increased by IDR 102.8 trillion to IDR 832.9 trillion at the 
end of December 2006, or grew by 14.1% (y-o-y). Th   is was far below the target set forth 
in the Business Plan at the beginning of 2006, namely 20%. However, credit growth did 
surpass the revised target of 12%-13%. As banking deposits grew by 14.1% (y-o-y), the loan 
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Working capital credit recorded the highest growth. Along with robust credit growth 
in the trade sector, working capital credit grew by 17.0% (y-o-y), followed by growth of 
investment credit by 12.5% (y-o-y). Consumption credit growth plunged compared to 2005 
due to the composition of debtors which comprise primarily of household debtors who are 
highly sensitive to interest rate fl  uctuations. 























Bank Deposit, Credit and LDR
Th   e restructuring of non-performing corporate loans undertaken by two state-owned 
banks infl  uenced the quality of banking credit positively as evidenced by the gross NPL, 
which fell from 8.3% in 2005 to 7.0% in 2006 (bringing net NPL down from 4.8% to 3.6%). 
Th   e restructuring programme primarily aff  ected corporate debtors in the industrial sector, 
who make intense use of the investment credit facility. As a result, gross NPL for the industrial 
sector as a whole plummeted from 15.6% to 10.5% and in terms of investment credit, from 
15.2% to 10.3%, over the same period. Meanwhile, the deterioration in purchasing power led 
to a drop in consumption credit quality as shown by the rise in gross NPL of consumption 
credit from 2.2% to 2.9%.
Th   e investment strategy of banks, the interest rate diff  erential and credit restructuring 
infl  uenced banking profi  tability positively. Credit disbursement growth, bank placements in 
low-risk securities, high interest rate diff  erential between credit and deposits all contributed 
to the rise in income. In terms of expenditure, credit restructuring to improve credit quality 
was able to cut the cost of earning asset losses allowance, which in turn, improved bank 
profi  tability marked by the increase in NII from IDR 6.2 trillion in 2005 to IDR 7.7 trillion 
in 2006. However, the increase in net interest income did not enhance the return on assets 
(ROA) of banks as a consequence of the balance of income and asset growth.
Along with higher profi  tability, commercial banks’ capital also improved. Th  e  capital 
adequacy ratio, as an indicator of banking resilience in dealing with risk, improved from 
19.3% in 2005 to 21.27% in 2006; remaining above the limit imposed by Bank Indonesia. 
Th   e upswing in CAR is a consequence of an array of consolidation eff  orts promulgated in 
the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API) policy structure. Along with CAR improvement, 
the overall national banking resilience has improved enough to minimise the potential of 
fi  nancial sector instability.
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Figure 2
Capital (Trillion of IDR)


























Bank CAR, Capital and RWA
2. Th   e Regulatory Capital Requirement of Basel II and its
Pro-cyclicality Impact in Indonesia.
2.1. Model  Specifi  cation
 
Vector autoregressive (VAR) models are widely employed in the empirical analysis of 
monetary policy issues. Th   is methodology avoids the need for a complete specifi  cation of a 
structural model of the economy. Th   is Paper will employ the semi structural VAR models to 
analyse the impact of pro-cyclicality of Basel II. 
Th   e traditional structural models proposed by the Cowles Commission and the semi 
structural VAR can be described as follows:
       
(1)
Where Y and M are vectors of macroeconomic variables (such as output and prices) 
and variables controlled by the monetary authority (such as interest rate and monetary 
aggregates containing information on monetary policy), respectively. Matrix A defi  nes the 
contemporaneous relations among the variables and C(L) is a matrix of fi  nite-order lag 
polynomial.   is the vector structural disturbances. Th  e  non-zero  off  -diagonal elements 
of B allow some shocks to infl  uence more than one endogenous variable in the system.  
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2  It is assumed that the errors are i.i.d and are normally distributed, being independent of any vector Dt; and that yt-1, yt-2, K, yt-p, Dt, t = 1,2,K,T, 
are not perfectly collinear.
Based on the Bernanke and Blinder (1992), the equation (1) can be presented as
Syt = A(L)yt + εt        ( 2 )
Where A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L for a VAR (p):
A(L) = A1L + A2L2 +…+ ApLp         ( 3 )
Th   e MA representation of  (3)  is
yt = Φ(L)εt         ( 4 )
where  . Th  e structural parameters of the contemporaneous 
endogenous variable are contained in S. yt are the vector endogenous variables in the system 
including one policy (indicator) variable and non-policy variables. While for εt, the vector 
structural disturbances, E[εt] = 0 and, as in Sims (1980),  . In this case,   will 
be In if yt = n × 1, the matrices S and Ap being conformable with the y vector. Lp is the lag 
operator, where p describes the order of the VAR.
Deterministic terms can be added on the right-hand side, as is frequently the case 
in a Johansen’s analysis of cointegration, by adding a term ΨDt. We do so in order to allow 
dummies to capture possible structural breaks. Th  en, a reduced form2 of equation (1) is 
estimated by OLS:
yt = S-1A(L)yt + S-1ΨDt + ut       ( 5 )
where
ut = S-1εt,  and        (6)
       ( 7 )
    
     
given the assumption:    
 
So S-1 is the Cholesky decomposition of Ω, the reduced-form covariance matrix. 
Furthermore, the dynamic responses to shocks are summarised by the moving average 
(MA) representation (assuming that the process is invertible):
yt = [I – S-1A(L)]-1ut = [I – S-1A(L)]S-1εt        ( 8 )
 
It is assumed that all the roots of   = 0 remain outside the unit circle in 
absolute value, or are in 1 in the presence of co-integration and unit roots. In this sense, the 
companion matrix has roots that are less than one in absolute value or are equal to plus 1. In 
those circumstances the VAR is (mathematically) stable. 
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Th  erefore, the Cholesky decomposition of Ω provides the zero restrictions (to 
complement the   constrains) on Ω needed to identify the elements of S-1. Th  e  latter 
is lower-triangular:
    
 Th   e system is then a recursive model or Wold-causal chain; the way in which the 
variables aff  ect each other is determined by their position in the ordering. In this sense, the 
contemporaneous innovations in the other variables infl  uence all those below them in the 
chain and none of those variables above them in the order. Th   e ordering of the variables in 
the system therefore infl  uences the recursive chain of causality among the shocks in any 
given period. 
 
Th   erefore, according to Sims (1992), the policy variable such as leading indicator of 
monetary policy, is ordered fi  rst if we assume that there is no contemporaneous feedback 
from non-policy variables onto the policy variables. Th  us, we assume that the monetary 
policy decisions are set without considering the simultaneous evolution of economic 
variables. Th   is assumption is applied if information on non-policy variables is not readily 
available to the monetary or policy-making authorities. Furthermore, had we assumed that 
the policy variables respond to contemporaneous feedback from non-policy variables, the 
policy variable should be ordered last. 
However, in our study, given the high frequency data (monthly) that we employ 
in constructing our VARs and hence, the existence of information lag from non-policy 
variables3, we prefer the former identifying restriction. Nevertheless, since the correlations 
across residuals εt are very small, the ordering is actually not signifi  cant. Th   is condition is 
supported by Enders (1995) who stated that if   < 0.2 for i ≠ j, the ordering of variables 
in a VAR is not relevant. 
 
Furthermore, we must explain the models that we propose to estimate and the 
variables that they contain. In examining the eff  ects of monetary policy on the bank balance 
sheet, we adopt Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1995) in specifying the 
VAR. For an example, Gertler dan Gilchrist (1993) also employed this kind of VAR. 
 
Based on such possible relationship as found by Gertler and Gilchrist above, we 
develop the system involving nine variables VARs with the following ordering: inter-bank 
money market overnight rate, bank deposits, bank loans, minimum bank capital (regulatory 
minimum capital as required by Basel II for the second VAR to see the diff  erences as 
comparison to minimum bank capital), bank securities, stock market index, output (real 
GDP) and prices (Consumer Price Index or CPI). In this case, a random innovation on 
one variable oft  en occurs simultaneously with innovations on other variables in the system. 
Th   ereby, in order to overcome this as noted above, the innovations are orthogonalised by 
a Cholesky decomposition in which the covariance matrix of the resulting residuals is the 
lower triangular. 
  3  Interest rate data (the policy variables) is readily available while non-policy variables such as real output, stock market index and price are available 
with a lag.
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By including conditioning variables, stock market index, output and prices, which are 
likely to be associated with the aggregate demand for loans, the VAR could determine how 
loan supply responses vary across diff  erent capital (minimum bank capital and regulatory 
minimum capital). In addition we also employ the exchange rate in the VAR. Th   e reason for 
this is that the exchange rate (as proposed in the “money view”) plays an important role in 
relatively small and open economies like Indonesia and other SEACEN countries. Here, any 
changes in the exchange rate aff  ect the banks’ balance sheet variables, stock market index, 
output and prices. 
 
Moreover, if we are to conduct tests for the presence of cointegration within a specifi  c 
VAR, it is necessary to determine the order of integration of the variables. In general, to use 
the standard procedures developed by Johansen (1995), we require them all to be I(1), i.e., to 
be stationary in their fi  rst diff  erences. In addition, as Philips (1986) demonstrated, any OLS 
regressions which are based on the levels of the variables will be a spurious one. However, 
the implication that only stationary, I(0) variables be included in VARs has tended not to be 
accepted. We fi  rst concentrate on tests for the presence of unit roots, that is, for the existence 
of I(1) variables. 
 
Th   ere are three “important” tests for unit roots - the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), 
Phililips - Perron and Perron’s (1997) structural break test. Th   ese are conducted in order 
to test whether the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning the series y is considered to be 
stationary, y~I(0). Whilst, a non-rejection of the unit-root null hypothesis for level data 
raises the question as to whether its fi  rst diff  erence is stationary, y(1). Th   is testing procedure 
by further diff  erencing can be continued until stationary series are achieved. Th  is  testing 
procedure is justifi  ed when we assume that most economic series are I(1).
2.2. Data  Specifi  cation
  
In this Paper, we will adopt Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein 
(1995) in specifying the VAR. Th   e system that we will use involves nine variables VAR in the 
following ordering: Bank Indonesia Certifi  cate rate (Rate), exchange rate (Ex_rate), third 
party funds in the bank (Dep), bank loans (Loan), capital adequacy ratios (CAR), bank 
securities (Sec), Stock Market Index (Stock), Consumer Price Index (CPI) and output (real 
GDP).
 
To consider the impact on the Basel II implementation in the simulation, we will 
employ the result from the Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) 5 as the add-on in the CAR. Th  e 
QIS 5 itself is constructed based on the data of June 2007 (for the complete data specifi  cation 
please see the Appendix).
 
Th   e simulation process was done using Eviews 4 and the time frame of the monthly 
data was from September 2000 to June 2007. Th  e data sources were from monthly bank 
reports, the Jakarta Stock Exchange and Indonesia statistical data.
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2.3. Empirical  Results
2.3.1  Unit Root Test
 
  According to Johansen (1995), in order to perform VAR model estimations and 
impulse response function analysis, we fi  rst must make sure that all variables are I(0), that 
is stationary in their fi  rst diff  erences. Table 5 shows the results of the ADF test. Using 5% 
confi  dential level, all variables appear to be stationary in their fi  rst diff  erences. Hence, all 
variable in our sample are considered to be stationary, y~I(0).
 
Aft  er the requirement on stationarility has been fulfi  lled, we attempted to use the 
VAR model to analyse the eff  ect of pro-cyclicality from Basel II implementation. Th  e  VAR 
model and impulse responses are expected to answer some questions are of concern to us. 
Would the regulatory capital requirement as stipulated by Basel II overstate the magnitude 
and economic signifi  cance of pro-cyclicality in the New Accord relative to the existing 
capital requirement in Indonesia? How would the lending activities respond to the riskier 
behaviour as a result of tightening capital constraint?
Table 5
ADF Unit Root Test
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2.3.2 Simulation  Results
 
We examined the VARs that include the nine variables of the Bank Indonesia Certifi  cate 
rate as monetary indicator, exchange rate, third party funds in the bank, bank loans, capital 
adequacy ratios, bank securities, Stock Market Index, Consumer Price Index and output 
(real GDP). Th   e impulse response analysis includes 10 months and is supplemented by the 
cumulative impulse response (10 months) and the variance decomposition (10 months). 
Th   e variance decomposition enables us to determine the proportion of the volatility in a 
series aft  er any time interval that is explained by each of the model shocks.
Th  e eff  ect of monetary policy (SBI rate) on the aggregate components of banks’ 
balance sheet (deposit, loans, CAR and securities), the exchange rate, stock price index, 
CPI and output for all period were estimated by computing the impulse response function 
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Figure 3
Response of SBI Rate to Cholesky (D.F. Adjusted)
One S.D Innovations
It is obvious that based on Figure 3 that the bank deposit response positively for the 
fi  rst 2 months (short run eff  ect) before moving down to negative in the next 3 months. For 
the rest of the months, the bank deposit response is relatively stable along the horizontal 
line. Th   is short run eff  ect on deposit and current average CAR that is above 20%, implies 
that bank loans response positively in the fi  rst 3 months (short run eff  ect) but aft  er that, the 
response starts to decline by becoming negative before getting back positive again in the 
10th month. As a consequence, with the bank loan response, the CAR shows the opposite 
response. It moves negatively in the fi  rst 3 months before increasing to positive for the rest of 
the months. For bank deposits, it shows almost a similar pattern as that for bank loans. 
Seacen_Pungky.indb   60 Seacen_Pungky.indb   60 6/27/2008   2:13:40 PM 6/27/2008   2:13:40 PM61
As a developing country, one of the parameters that is very important is the exchange 
rate. Clearly we can see that the exchange rate moved negatively in the fi  rst 3 months as an 
impact of the shock in the SBI rate before turning positive aft  er that4. Th   e shock on the SBI 
rate encourages the banks to obtain short term profi  t by buying securities or SBI. Th  is  is 
refl  ected in the securities response which moved positively in the fi  rst 3 months before going 
down below the horizontal line and remaining stable thereaft  er. 
With a well-developed capital market, the shock in the SBI rate was not translated 
signifi  cantly in the Indonesian stock price index as movement in the stock price index is not 
only caused by movement in the SBI rate but also by other variables such as country outlook, 
economic and fi  nancial stability, political condition etc. Th   e stock price index responded 
positively for the fi  rst 2 months before declining to negative in the 3rd month. Aft  erwards,   
the response increased above the horizontal line and remained relatively stable around the   
horizontal line. 
In terms of output, the GDP response moved positively for 2 months and subsequently 
declined below the horizontal line for 4 months and  increased again to being positive. Th  is 
response is in line with the bank lending response. Using a confi  dence level of 5% in the 
Granger Causality test (Table 6), we can see that the hypothesis for GDP does not granger 
cause LOAN was rejected by the data and vice- versa, showing that bank lending does aff  ect 
GDP and GDP does aff  ect bank lending. 
Table 6 
Pairwise Granger Causality Test GDP vs LOAN
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests




GDP does not Granger Cause LOAN









On the other hand, the Granger Causality test also shows that the capital market 
does not aff  ect GDP and vice versa as shown in  Table 7. Using a 5% confi  dence level, the 
hypothesis GDP does not granger cause IHSG and vice versa are not rejected. Hence, the 
GDP does not aff  ect IHSG and IHSG does not aff  ect GDP. Th   is evidence shows that although 
the capital market is already well-developed, the contribution to the GDP is not signifi  cant. 
Th   e investments from the capital market do not signifi  cantly aff  ect the GDP.
4  Please see appendix for Granger Causality test SBI Rate vs Exchange Rate
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Table 7 
Pairwise Granger Causality Test GDP vs IHSG
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests




GDP does not Granger Cause IHSG









Overall, based on the accumulated response from our simulation (Table 8),  we can 
see that the shock from the SBI rate will not have any signifi  cant impact on all the variables. 
Aft  er the implementation of Basel II, banks will still have the capacity to perform their main 
role as intermediaries, as refl  ected in the current average CAR in the Indonesian banking 
industry which is above 20% and which has not restrained the banking industry from 
lending to the public. Th   ere is therefore no signifi  cant eff  ect on the GDP. 
From the impulse response simulation, the variance decomposition (Table 9) shows us 
the contribution of changes in SBI rate to the changes in each variable. For each magnitude of 
one standard deviation change in SBI rate is a contribution of 1.7% change in bank lending. 
With the current average CAR in the banking industry being much above the minimum 
capital requirement, banks can still perform lending activities. Th  ere was no signifi  cant 
impact on bank lending and the contribution to the GDP was also insignifi  cant (1.3%). 
Table 8
















































































































Cholesky Ordering: DRATE DEX_RATE DDEP DLOAN DCAR_SIM DSEC DIHSG DCPI DGDP



























































































































Cholesky Ordering: DRATE DEX_RATE DDEP  DLOAN DCAR_SIM DSEC DIHSG DCPI DGDP
3.  Summary and Conclusion
Th   e Basel II Accord is a new capital framework initiated by the BCBS with the main 
purpose to enhance the risk management practices of the banking sector. Many studies 
have cited that one of the inherent risks in implementing Basel II is its pro-cyclicality eff  ect. 
However, the empirical analysis for Indonesia from September 2000 to June 2007 shows that 
the pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II is insignifi  cant, the reasons of which are as follows:
1.  Indonesia is planning to implement the Basel II framework starting with the 
Standardised Approach. Based on the QIS 5 results in 2007, the implementation 
of Basel II will increase RWA by 13.87%. In other words, there will be a decrease 
in CAR of about 1-2%. With the current average CAR of Indonesian banks, the 
implementation of Basel II will not cause signifi  cant impacts on the banking sector.
2.  As a developing country, Indonesia’s economic growth still depends mostly on 
consumption. Although the implementation of Basel II may aff  ect the banking sector, 
the impact on industrial development will be insignifi  cant as the well-developed 
Indonesian capital market would provide alternative sources of funding. 
3. Th   e Granger Causality test shows that bank lending aff  ects GDP and GDP unidirectional 
aff  ects bank lending. On the other hand, the capital market does not aff  ect GDP and 
vice versa, showing that although the capital market is well-developed, it does not 
contribute signifi  cantly to GDP as the banking sector still has a major impact on GDP. 
Hence any regulation that impact on bank lending behaviour would also likely aff  ect 
GDP.
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Appendix 1
Supporting Eviews Simulation
A. AR  Stability
In performing VAR, we must fi  rst confi  rm the stability of AR to ensure that the model 
is stable. Aft  er few experiments, the maximum lag that the AR stable is 5.
Roots of Charactersitics Polynomial
Endogenous variables: DRATE DEX_RATE DDEP DLOAN 
DCAR_SIM DSEC DIHSG DGDP DCPI
Exogenous variavles: C RATE
Lag specification: 1 5
Date: 01/03/08   Time: 08:24
Root Modulus
 0.492975 + 0.854578i    0.986574 
 0.492975 - 0.854578i    0.986574 
 0.846250 + 0.493317i    0.979541 
 0.846250 - 0.493317i    0.979541 
 0.949595   0.949595 
-0.380662 - 0.815979i    0.900403 
-0.380662 + 0.815979i    0.900403 
 0.656981 + 0.604380i    0.892692 
 0.656981 - 0.604380i    0.892692 
-0.131139 + 0.855109i    0.865106 
-0.131139 - 0.855109i    0.865106 
-0.603715 - 0.594577i    0.847345 
-0.603715 + 0.594577i    0.847345 
-0.800458 - 0.270066i    0.844789 
-0.800458 + 0.270066i    0.844789 
-0.835458 - 0.088263i    0.840108 
-0.835458 + 0.088263i    0.840108 
 0.391921 - 0.728986i    0.827661 
 0.391921 + 0.728986i    0.827661 
 0.207478 - 0.796867i    0.823434 
 0.207478 + 0.796867i    0.823434 
 0.579533 + 0.583056i    0.822078 
 0.579533 - 0.583056i    0.822078 
 0.821983   0.821983 
-0.405707 - 0.708090i    0.816082 
-0.405707 + 0.708090i    0.816082 
 0.010349 - 0.808500i    0.808566 
 0.010349 + 0.808500i    0.808566 
 0.722679 - 0.263357i    0.769170 
 0.722679 + 0.263357i    0.769170 
-0.628162 + 0.424883i    0.758362 
-0.628162 - 0.424883i    0.758362 
-0.702770 + 0.242265i    0.743356 
-0.702770 - 0.242265i    0.743356 
 0.355614 - 0.577831i    0.678491 
 0.355614 + 0.577831i    0.678491 
-0.160405 - 0.643484i    0.663176 
-0.160405 + 0.643484i    0.663176 
-0.198359   0.198359 
-0.074838   0.074838 
-0.000877 + 0.000639i    0.001085 
-0.000877 - 0.000639i    0.001085 
 0.000337 - 0.001028i    0.001082 
 0.000337 + 0.001028i    0.001082 
 0.001080   0.001080 
No root lies outside the unit circle.
VAR satisfies the stability condition.
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B. Optimal  Lag
We try to fi  nd out what the optimal lag is for our simulation. 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: DRATE DEX_RATE DDEP DLOAN DCAR_SIM 
DSEC DIHSG DGDP DCPI 
Exogenous variables: C DRATE 




















































* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
Using the VAR lag order selection criteria, the candidate for optimal lag is 4, 2, 1 and 
0. From our analysis,  we conclude that lag 2 will give the highest value for adj R-square in 
our main variable.




































































































Based on the residual correlation matrix above, we can see that in the majority, the 
correlation value is below 0.2. Hence based on Ender (1995), the ordering of variables in a 
VAR is not relevant.  
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D.  Pairwise Granger Causality Test Securities vs SBI Rate
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests




RATE does not Granger Cause EX_RATE









Note: using 5% confi  dential level
Based on the test results above, we can see that the hypothesis for exchange rate does 
not granger cause rate is not rejected while the other hypothesis is rejected. Th  e  exchange 
rate does not aff  ect SBI rate but SBI rate aff  ects exchange rate.
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Appendix 2
Data Specifi  cation
Data Sources
Th   e data used in this paper is derived from commercial bank monthly reports, Jakarta 
Stock Exchange and Indonesia statistical data. Th   e commercial bank monthly reports are 
unaudited bank monthly submissions to the central bank.
Data Simulation
On the simulation, the CAR variable is constructed from:
    
Th  e capital variable used original data while the risk weight assets variable used 
original data with additional top-up of 13.89% (QIS 5 results). Th   e top-up is assumed as the 
additional increase as a result Basel II implementation.
Defi  nition
Credit Data
Credit data constitutes the credits recorded in the balance of a Bank and does not take 
into account, the channel of credit recorded in the off  -balance sheet, unless otherwise stated. 
Credits include credit claims from citizens and non-citizens (Rural Bank data only includes 
credit claims from citizens). 
Non-Performing Data
Non-performing loan data is shown as the gross non-performing loan without taking 
into account the reserves formed in anticipation of the risk of losses. 
Risk Weighted Assets
consist of:
1.   Assets in the balance sheet that are ranked according to the level of risk of the credit 
in question.
2.   Several accounts in the off   balance sheet that are ranked according to the level of risk 
of the credit in question.
Th   ird Party Deposit
Non-bank third party deposits funds consisting of demand deposit, savings deposit 
and time deposit.
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Credit 
Th   e provision of funds or related claims based on an agreement or contract to borrow/
loan funds between banks and another party that obliges the borrower to pay off   his/her 
debt according to a designated schedule and interest charges, including:
1.   Th   e purchase of Money Instruments by clients, complete with a Note Purchase 
Agreement (NPA).
2.   Th   e transfer of claims involved in factoring activities. 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)
CAR = Capital / RWA
Capital, consist of:
1.   Tier One Capital
2. Supplementary  capital
Tier One Capital consists of:
1. Paid-In  Capital
2.  Additional capital reserves, consisting of:
a. Plus  Factors:
1. Agio
2. Capital  contributions
3. General  reserves
4. Designated  reserves
5.  Last year’s earnings aft  er taxes
6.  Current year’s earnings aft  er taxes (50%)
7.  Positive adjustment resulting from the conversion of overseas branch    
 offi   ce fi  nancial reports.
8. Paid-In  Capital
b. Minus  Factors:
1. Disagio
2. Retained  losses
3. Current  earnings
4.  Negative adjustment resulting from the conversion of overseas branch    
 offi   ce fi  nancial reports.
5.  Decrease in value of portfolio equity investments that are ready to be sold.
Tier one capital is calculated minus goodwill.
Supplementary capital consists of:
1.  Fixed assets re evaluation reserve
2.  PPAP general reserve (maximum 1.25% of RWA)
3. Borrowed  capital
4.  Subordinated loans (maximum 50% of tier one capital)
5.  Increase in the value of portfolio investments that are ready to be sold at the highest 
45%.
Return on Assets Ratio (ROA)
ROA = Annual Profi  t before taxes / Average Assets
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Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR)
LDR = Credit/Th   ird Party Funds Credit is total credit to third party (not including third 
party bank). Th   ird Party Funds consist of demand deposit, savings deposit and time 
deposits (not including interbank)
Non-Performing Loan Ratio (NPL)
NPL = Credits that are sub-standard, doubtful and loss) / Total Credits 
Net Interest Income (NII)
NII = Interest Income – Interest charges
Annual net interest income is used for the calculation of NIM
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CHAPTER 4
1. Introduction
Th  e Basel II framework was introduced by the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) via its paper entitled “International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards” issued in June 2006. Th  e Basel II framework, which replaces the 
current broad-brush Capital Accord introduced in 1988, was designed to be more risk 
sensitive in computing regulatory capital vis-à-vis the risk levels in a banking institution. 
In accommodating the diff  erent levels of sophistication among banking institutions, it 
introduces an array of options ranging from the simplest, such as the SA for credit risk, to 
the most sophisticated such as the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach. 
Th  e objective of the Basel II framework is to ensure resilience and stability of the 
banking system in order to promote fi  nancial stability and sustainable economic growth. Th  e 
Basel II framework intends to ensure that banking institutions have suffi   cient capital levels 
that can adequately absorb losses and provides incentives which advocates improvement in 
risk management practices. 
While the framework may contribute towards developing more robust banking 
institutions, concerns have been raised on the likely procyclical eff  ects of implementing Basel 
II, exacerbating fl  uctuations in the economic-cycle.  Th  e framework which incorporates 
capital charges based on the quality of underlying assets may require banking institutions 
to allocate more capital in order to maintain an acceptable level of RWCR in an economic 
downturn. While banking institutions’ capital is eroded by provisions or write-off  s from 
defaulted assets, the risk-weighted assets amount would increase as higher risk charges are 
imposed on downgraded or defaulted assets, further suppressing the RWCR level. In this 
regard, banking institutions may react by tightening lending standards which in turn would 
contribute to a credit crunch and further aggravate the economic condition.  
While research has been done to assess the possible impact of procyclicality, its 
magnitude can only be seen upon actual occurrence. Nevertheless, these studies may 
assist in formulating appropriate policy responses, whether in the conduct of monetary 
policy, modifi  cation of relevant prudential policies or implementation of risk management 
practices.
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL II IN MALAYSIA
by Nurhayati Mohd Khalid+, Diana Paharodzi*, Raymond Yeo*
+  Prudential Financial Policy Department, Bank Negara Malaysia
*  Econometrics Unit, Financial Conglomerates Supervision Department, Bank Negara Malaysia
  We wish to express our gratitude to Dr. Pungky Purnomo Wibowo and M. Ardian D. from Bank Indonesia, Jessica Chew and Mohd Zabidi Md Nor 
from the Prudential Financial Policy Department of Bank Negara Malaysia as well as Dr. Ahmad Razi, Dr. Norhana Endut, Mohd Helmi Ramlee 
and other referees from the Economics Department and Monetary Assessment and Strategy Department of Bank Negara Malaysia for their helpful 
comments and suggestions.
  Th   e views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Central Bank of 
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Th   erefore, this paper attempts to assess whether Basel II implementation, namely the 
SA, would result in procyclicality to the Malaysian economy. Th   is study is conducted for 
the research programme of the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and 
Training Centre which sees the participation of nine SEACEN countries. Th  e  methodology 
chosen and processes involved in this study were largely derived from the discussions within 
the group of members involved in this research project.
 
2.   Overview of the Banking Sector and Basel II Implementation in 
Malaysia
Malaysia has a comprehensive fi  nancial system that continues to evolve in response to 
the changing domestic and international landscape. Malaysia operates a dual banking system 
(conventional and Islamic banking) consisting of commercial banks, investment banks and 
Islamic banks. Islamic banking activities are conducted either through Islamic banking 
windows or via Islamic bank subsidiaries set up by conventional banks. Th  e  composition 
of banking institutions in the banking system3 regulated by BNM, the Central Bank, as at 
December 2007 is given below: 
Table 1











Assets of the banking system grew approximately 81% to USD360.7 billion as at 
end of 2007 from USD173.4 billion as at end of 2000. Larger growth was experienced aft  er 
2003, when the country began stronger recoveries from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Growth continues to be generated from, among others, the increase in the assets of the 
Islamic banking system as well as higher volume of trading activities in both equity and 
bond markets. 
Outstanding loans in the banking industry expanded by 54.6% to USD194.5 billion as 
at end of 2007 from USD109.6 billion as at end of 2000. Th   ere has been greater diversifi  cation 
of loans over the years as the focus gradually moves from predominantly corporate lending 
towards a more balanced mix with retail lending. In 2007, the loans extended to the household 
sector and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) accounted for 55.1% and 17.7% of total 
outstanding loans of the banking system respectively. 
Growth in deposits mobilised by the banking sector expanded by 84.7% from   
USD123.8 billion in 2000 to USD262.8 billion in 2007. Growth has also been seen in terms 
of diversity and product range. As at end of 2007, deposits accounted for 172.5% of GDP. 
3  From this paragraph onwards, banking system refers to institutions in the banking industry only.
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Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) continued to improve resulting in the overall decline 
in net NPL ratio based on the 3-month classifi  cation basis from 9.7% at the end of year 2000 
to 3.2% as at end of 2007, the lowest level in a decade. Eff  orts in ensuring a lower NPL level 
continues through better risk management practices as well as higher recoveries. 
Capital ratios remained high, stable and well in excess of the minimum requirement. 
Th   e Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio (RWCR) and Core Capital Catio (CCR) had consistently 
averaged at approximately 13% and 9.9% respectively throughout 2000 to 2007. As at end of 
2007, total capital in the banking system stood at USD34.3billion, while the risk-weighted 
assets stood at USD242.1 billion. 
A new interest rate framework was introduced in 2004, whereby the Overnight Policy 
Rate (OPR) replaced the three-month intervention rate as the policy rate which serves as an 
indicator of the monetary policy stance. Th   e OPR was set at the prevailing average overnight 
interbank rate of 2.70% in 2004 and reached an average rate of 3.50% as at end of 2007. Th  e 
Base Lending Rate (BLR) for commercial banks experienced a reduction in the years 2004 
and 2005 at approximately 5.98% but increased to 6.72% as at end of 2007. Th  e average 
overnight interbank rate of the Malaysian banking industry was less than 2.66% in the year 
2000, increasing to 3.50% as at end of 2007.
In 2005, Malaysia shift  ed to a managed fl  oat exchange rate regime under which the 
value of the Ringgit would be determined by economic fundamentals, marking the end of 
the fi  xed-exchange rate regime introduced in 1998. Th   e Ringgit strengthened against the US 
Dollar (USD) over the years reaching RM3.31 to the USD as at end 2007 as compared to the 
fi  xed-exchange rate of RM3.80 to the USD in the year 2000. 
Th  e Malaysian capital market has assumed an increasingly signifi   cant role in 
mobilizing and allocating resources to fi  nance capital expenditures to both the public and 
private sectors. Finance, insurance, real estate and business services sectors are the main 
issuers of the debt securities since 1999 as the corporate sector increasingly taps the bond 
market to raise funds. Total outstanding debt securities amounted to USD169.3 billion as 
at end 2007. In the secondary market, the volume of debt securities traded has increased 
signifi  cantly in recent years, with sale and purchase transactions amounting to USD117.1 
billion in 2007. 
BNM’s approach to prudential regulation and supervision has also evolved in response 
to the changing landscape and maturity of the fi  nancial sector. Th   e prudential framework 
has gradually moved away from overly prescriptive regulations and a one-size-fi  ts-all 
approach to a more principled-based regime that is adaptive to changing market conditions 
and innovations. With the growing maturity of the market and its players’ capabilities, this 
approach facilitates diff  erentiated regulation and supervision based on the size, complexity 
and risk of individual banking institutions. It also emphasises improved disclosures to achieve 
more eff  ective market discipline. Greater fl  exibility is accorded to institutions that have 
strong risk management and corporate governance practices in place. Th  e  principled-based 
regulatory regime is reinforced by the adoption of a risk-based approach to supervision. 
In 2006, the Risk-Based Supervisory Framework (RBSF) for the supervision of fi  nancial 
institutions was further enhanced to facilitate the early identifi  cation of emerging risks and 
provided a more structured and forward-looking approach to assess fi  nancial institutions’ 
risk profi  les and risk management systems. 
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For the banking sector, initiatives taken to prepare the banking institutions for Basel 
II have been aimed at promoting better risk management capabilities and practices, building 
capacity and facilitating greater operating fl  exibility with appropriate prudential safeguards. 
Malaysia’s adoption of the Basel II accord is based on the following principles:
Th   e need to accommodate capacity building eff  orts, via among others, a more fl  exible 
timeframe, with strong emphasis on gradual enhancement of the risk management 
framework for all banking institutions;
Maintaining an appropriate balance between the costs and benefi  ts of regulation by 
emphasising the business justifi  cation for the adoption of IRB approaches instead of 
imposing a regulatory mandate; and
Th   e need to establish an enhanced supervisory methodology to assess internal models 
and advanced risk management systems.
Malaysia is adopting a two-phased approach for Basel II implementation.  Th   e SA for 
credit risk and Basic Indicator, Standardised and Alternative Standardised Approaches for 
operational risk will be implemented in January 2008. Th   e IRB approaches for credit risk 
will only be made available from 2010.  
3. Methodology
3.1 Logical  Framework
Th  e logical framework, as suggested by Dr. Pungky Purnomo Wibowo, the lead 
researcher for this research project, is based on the following channel in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1
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Th   e logical framework describes the relationships and fl  ow of events which links the 
capital framework of banking institutions to the economy. Although there are numerous 
possibilities for a trigger event which causes cycles within the economy, the logical framework 
above chose the monetary policy tool as the trigger event causing economic reactions. 
Changes in monetary policy, such as an increase in interest rates would aff  ect the pricing 
and performance of assets such as loans. Increased NPLs would cause provisioning levels 
to rise, thus reducing the regulatory capital levels of banking institutions. Consequently, 
banking institutions’ lending behaviour may change, in their eff  ort to minimize losses from 
lending activities, causing negative growth in loans or a credit crunch, which eventually 
aff  ects the real economy.
3.2 Th  e  Model
 
A semi-structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) model is used in this paper to 
investigate the dynamic eff  ects and relationships between economic variables. Th  e VAR 
model, which is conducted in EViews 6 for the purpose of this research paper, enables 
the assessment of the responses of the endogenous variables to a shock of key variables of 
interest. It is a system of equations in which each variable is regressed on a constant and on 
its own lags, as well as the lags of the other variables in the VAR system. Th  e  VAR  model 
is chosen as it avoids the need for a complete specifi  cation of a structural model of the 
economy by treating every endogenous variable in the system as a function of the lagged 
values of the entire variables in the system.
In this paper, we employed the semi-structural VAR approach by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) of the form given in equation (1), which can be presented as follows:
(1)  Syt = A(L)yt + εt  
 where  yt is a vector of endogenous variables and
  єt is a vector of structural disturbances
A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L for a VAR(p):
(2)  A(L) = A1L + A2L2 + K + ApLp
 
 where  Lp is a lag operator and
  p is the order of VAR
Th   e Moving Average (MA) representation of (2) is:
 
(3)  y1 = φ (L)εt  
 where  φ (L) = [S – A(L)]-1 
A reduced form of equation (1) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
(4)  yt = S-1 A(L)yt + S-1ψDt +ut    
 where;
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(5)  ut = S-1εt, and
 
(6)  
     
given the assumption:    
Th  erefore,  S-1 is the Cholesky decomposition of Ω, the reduced-form covariance matrix. 
Furthermore, the dynamic responses to shocks are summarised by the MA representation 
(assuming that the process is invertible):
(7)  yt = [I – S-1 A(L)]-1ut = [I – S-1 A(L)]S-1εt       
It is assumed that all the roots of   = 0 remain outside the unit circle in 
absolute value, or are in 1 in the presence of cointegration and unit-roots. In this sense, the 
companion matrix has roots that are less than one in absolute value or are equal to plus 1. In 
those circumstances the VAR is (mathematically) stable.
 Th  erefore, the Cholesky decomposition of Ω provides the zero restrictions (to 
complement the ½ p(p +1) constrains) on Ω needed to identify the elements of S-1. Th  e  latter 
is lower-triangular matrix. Th   e way in which the variables aff  ect each other is determined by 
their positions in the ordering. In this sense, the contemporaneous innovations in the other 
variables infl  uence all those below them in the chain and none of those variables above them 
in the order. Th   e ordering of the variables in the system, therefore infl  uences the recursive 
chain of causality among the shocks in any given period. Th   is study identifi  es shocks using 
the Cholesky decomposition, which imposes a recursive structure on the VAR model.
3.3  Assumptions Used Under the Basel II Assessment
Th   e empirical analysis involves simulations based on the data of RWCR under the 
Basel II implementation. Th   is data was derived from RWCR obtained during the 6-month 
parallel run which started from June 2007. Th   e results showed, on average, that there was 
only a slight reduction in RWCR compared to those under the Basel I framework. Hence, 
this parallel run results data, taking into consideration the possible higher risk sensitivity of 
Basel II compared to Basel I, are used to simulate the RWCR under Basel II for the purposes 
of this study. 
Nevertheless, the risk-sensitivity eff  ect of the Basel II framework under the SA is 
expected to be fairly limited due to the following reasons:
(i)  Most of banking institutions’ exposures are unrated, which means that there may be 
no signifi  cant changes in the applicable risk weights;
(ii)  Even the exposures which are rated may not experience volatile ratings migration. Th  is 
is because the risk weights applied are mapped to ratings used by the External Credit 
Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) that employes ‘through-the-cycle’ methodologies 
and are therefore relatively stable over economic periods; and
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(iii)  Malaysia exercises the national discretion provided under Basel II framework for 
defaulted exposures whereby a lower risk weight is charged if higher provisioning levels 
are made. Th   erefore, exposures may not necessarily receive a higher risk weight upon 
default as the risk weights applicable would depend on the level of provisioning.
4. Data
Th  e application of the VAR model to study the impact of Basel II implementation 
on the economy typically uses variables that represent policy instruments, transmission 
channels and the fi  nal targets, namely price or output. 
 Th   e analysis involves the usage of nine variables in the manner of ordering and 
sources as given in Table 2. Th   e data, collected on monthly a basis, consists of time series 
from January 2000 to September 2007. Th   e sample period was chosen due to readily available 
monthly data for all the series involved. Th   e data on RWCR based on the Basel II framework 
(RWCR2) were derived from the historical data of RWCR under the Basel I framework 
(RWCR1) which were adjusted based on the results received during the Basel II parallel run 
reporting period.
Table 2
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5.  Stationarity of Variables
In order for the variables to be analysed for the eff  ects of economic shocks, stationarity 
of variables must be achieved to ensure that the variables refl  ect constant fl  uctuations and 
do not exhibit any form of patterns. Only when the variables in the systems are stationary, 
VAR stationarity can be achieved. However, referring to the plots of variables in levels in 
Appendix A, we cannot conclude that any of the variables are stationary. Moreover, most 
variables exhibit seasonality and therefore transformations are required to remove the 
seasonal components. Table 3 is a summary of the stationarity tests which were performed 
on all the variables and the transformation conducted to achieve stationarity. 
Table 3
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Both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were 
performed to examine whether the series exhibited a unit-root.
H0 = Th   e series is non – stationary (there is pressence pf unit-root)
H1 = Th   e series is stationary (there is no pressence of unit-root)
 
Th   e null hypotheses of the tests state that the series is a unit-root, i.e. non-stationary. 
Based on the results in Table 3, the non-stationary null hypothesis for most of the variables 
(at level) cannot be rejected at 5% level. First-diff  erencing of all variables shows that all of the 
series appear to be stationary with the rejection of the unit-root hypothesis. Th   e plots of the 
transformed variable are illustrated in Appendix B. Th  e  charts  refl  ect stationarity with the 
formal testing for each of the variables in the VAR system. From the stationarity tests, all nine 
variables at level are non-stationary, which means that the series is I(1). However, the same 
set of series becomes stationary when fi  rst-diff  erenced which means that the diff  erenced-
series is I(0) at 5% signifi  cance level.
6. Specifi  cation of the VAR Model
6.1 Identifi  cation and Order of Variables
Th   ere are circumstances where the ordering of variables could aff  ect the reliability 
of a VAR model and therefore, the ordering of variables would need to be tested to assess 
its eff  ect on the VAR model used for this study. In Generalized Impulses Analysis, Pesaran 
and Shin (1998) constructed an orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on VAR 
ordering.  In this study, as the Cholesky’s impulses analysis were employed, we performed 
sensitivity tests in order to check whether the diff  erent sets of orders of variables would 
result in diff  erent VAR models. Several tests were conducted by changing the orders of 
variables and it was concluded that ordering of variables did not aff  ect the VAR model. Refer 
to Appendix C. Th   e shaded columns demonstrate that various test statistics were consistent 
irrespective of the order of variables.
6.2  Lag Length of VAR (p)
Th   e determination of an optimum lag length is to avoid an ‘underfi  tted’ or ‘overfi  tted’ 
VAR model. We began to determine the optimum lag length of the model by using a lag 
length of 6 and the number of lag lengths is reduced sequentially until an optimum lag 
length, p, is reached. Subsequently, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz 
Information Criteria (SIC) are used as selection criteria to select the lag length order. Lower 
AIC and SIC values imply a better model. Interestingly, both criteria selected lag 1 as the 
optimum order lag length. Th  us, the VAR model is estimated to study the procyclicality 
impact of Basel II in Malaysia. Table 4 provides the test statistics of AIC and SIC in selecting 
the lag order of the VAR model.
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Table 4






















Figure 2 shows results of the stationarity test for VAR which was conducted using 
EViews 6. All the inverse unit-roots of the characteristic AR polynomial lie within the unit 
circle. Since all the inverse roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle, the 
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7.  Results and Analysis of the Empirical Findings
Th  e Impulse Response Function (IRF) shows the response of the system over a 
specifi  ed time period due to a shock in one of the variables (innovations) in the system. Th  e 
analysis of the IRF will aid in the interpretation of the dynamic eff  ects of a shock in one of 
the endogenous variables. In order to assess the impact of the Basel II implementation, we 
analysed the sensitivity of the variables that we were interested in (variables of interest) to 
the shock in the chosen innovations. Th   erefore, we established several steps in analysing the 
IRF as follows:
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(i) Th   e impact of changes in interest rates to RWCR. Th   is is done in order to estimate the 
relationship or sensitivity of the RWCR due to any changes in monetary policy; and
(ii) Th   e impact of changes in RWCR to loans and GDP. Th   is is done in order to assess 
whether RWCR changes would have any relationship to the movements in loans and 
GDP. A comparison between the eff  ects of Basel I and Basel II is made in order to 
establish the extent of the diff  erences of impact, if any, under the two frameworks.
Chart A plots the estimated IRF of the RWCR2 as the endogenous variable to one-
standard deviation shock in the interest rate, refl  ecting a one-off   episode of a contraction 
in monetary policy. An increase in interest rates initially results in a fall in RWCR2 in the 
fi  rst two months. As interest rates increase, the cost of borrowing increases leading to more 
defaults from borrowers. Th   is may result, among others, in higher charge for provisions, 
leading to a reduction in capital base and hence, reduction in RWCR level. However, the 
RWCR2 turns around aft  er the second month to reach its previous level and stabilises within 
four months. We can also see that the impulse response of RWCR2 to interest rate around 
the horizontal axe is near zero and falls within the confi  dence interval completely. We can 









Response of D_RWCR2 to Cholesky One S.D. D_INTER_RATE Innovation
Chart A
IRF (Response: RWCR2 and Innovation: Inter_Rate)
  Chart B plots the estimated IRF of loans as the endogenous variable to one-standard 
deviation shock in the RWCR under Basel I framework (RWCR1), refl  ecting a one-off   
episode of a contraction in available capital of banking institutions. An increase in RWCR1 
has a negligible eff  ect within the fi  rst two months. Increase in loan growth can be seen aft  er 
the second month as higher RWCR allows banking institutions to allocate more funds for 
lending activities. However, loans turn around aft  er the third month to reach its previous 
level and stabilises within four months. We can also see that the impulse response of loans 
to RWCR1 around the horizontal axis is near zero and falls within the confi  dence interval 
completely. We can therefore say that the RWCR1 movement does not have a signifi  cant 
impact on loans. 
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Chart B
IRF (Response: Tot_Loan and Innovation: RWCR1)










Chart C plots the same eff  ect based on RWCR under Basel II (RWCR2). Similarly to 
impact from RWCR1 movement, an increase in RWCR2 would cause an increase in loan 
growth aft  er the second month. Loan growth turns around aft  er the third month to reach its 
previous level and stabilises within four months. We can therefore say that RWCR2 impact 
does not diff  er signifi  cantly from RWCR1 impact on loans. 
Chart C










Response of DG_TOT_LOAN to Cholesky One S.D. D_RWCR2 Innovation
 
Under Chart D an increase in RWCR1 initially results in a slight increase of GDP 
growth in the fi  rst month as an increase in RWCR allows banking institutions to allocate 
more funds for lending activities which facilitates loan growth and eventually increases GDP. 
However, the GDP growth starts to reduce aft  er the 1st month to stabilise at its previous level 
at the third month. We can also see that the impulse response of GDP to RWCR1 around 
the horizontal axe is near zero and falls within the confi  dence interval completely. We can 
therefore say that the RWCR1 movement does not have a signifi  cant impact on GDP.
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Chart D









Response of DG_GDP_M to Cholesky One S.D. D_RWCR1 Innovation
Similarly under Chart E, an increase in RWCR2 initially results in a slight increase in 
GDP for the fi  rst month and continues to increase gradually until the third month. However, 
the GDP starts to fall aft  er the third month to stabilise at its previous level at the fi  ft  h month. 
As it takes a slightly longer period (at the fi  ft  h month) for the RWCR2 to stabilise compared 
to RWCR1 (at the third month), we can say that RWCR2 has a slightly greater impact than 
RWCR1 on GDP growth. 
Chart E









Response of DG_GDP_M to Cholesky One S.D. D_RWCR2 Innovation
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8.  Analysis of Study
Th  ere is naturally some degree of procyclicality in the economy. As mentioned by 
Gerlach and Gruenwald (2006), a normally functioning economy would have some degree 
of fi  nancial sector procyclicality. Th   e issue now is whether there is excessive procyclicality 
caused exclusively by Basel II implementation. Th   ere may be some basis to the claim that 
Basel II will cause excessive procyclicality as banking institutions are an important fi  nancial 
intermediary and credit channel is an important transmission channel to the Malaysian 
economy. Th  is is confi  rmed by the fi  ndings by Borhan Nordin (2005), which establishes 
that the most important monetary policy transmission mechanism in Malaysia is the credit 
channel.  
Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that there is an insignifi  cant procyclicality 
impact of both Basel I and the SA under Basel II to the Malaysian economy. In addition, 
there is no signifi  cant diff  erence between the potential impact between Basel I and Basel II 
on procyclicality to the economy. Th   ere is also no signifi  cant impact on RWCR due to the 
movements in interest rates suggesting that RWCR is not highly sensitive to monetary policy 
interventions. Th   is is due to the following reasons:
(i)  As opposed to the IRB approach, the risk-sensitive feature of the SA in the Malaysian 
scenario remains limited and is expected to remain somewhat similar to the impact 
under the Basel I framework. Th   is is due to the limited rated exposures of banking 
institutions in Malaysia and the usage of external ratings under the SA in applying the 
applicable risk weights. As mentioned by Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos 
(2003), ratings issued by external rating agencies would not increase the procyclicality 
impact as ‘over-the-cycle’ rating methodologies, which are more stable over the cycles, 
are used compared to internal rating schemes which fl  uctuate more rapidly over 
time.
(ii) Th   e Malaysian capital market is well developed to facilitate the portfolio diversifi  cation 
by banking institutions into capital market instruments which can serve to cushion 
the impact of losses from lending activities. In other words, banking institutions can 
minimise the losses in lending activities from the returns derived from capital market 
investments in low risk securities, thus minimising reductions in the capital base. 
Refer to Appendix D on comparison of investment levels between securities and loans 
by banking institutions. 
  (iii)  Banking institutions maintain RWCR levels on average at 12%-13% which are well 
above the minimum requirement of 8%. Th   erefore, regulatory capital requirements 
do not constraint the activities of banking institutions as drastic measures, such as 
signifi  cant reductions in lending activities, are not required in order to maintain 
a desired RWCR level. Chart F below shows the movement in the average RWCR 
level of banking institutions throughout the sample period. We can see that banking 
institutions have maintained an eff  ective average level of 4% to 5% of capital above the 
minimum requirements.                    
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Chart F














Notwithstanding the above fi  ndings, in view that the majority of Malaysian banking 
institutions adopt the SA, its impact to banking institutions’ lending behaviour and eventually 
the fi  nancial system should be continuously monitored in order to avoid any possibility of 
excessive procyclicality. It is currently premature to assess accurately the procyclical impact 
of SA implementation and whether an intervention is required. In turn, when the causes 
have been identifi  ed and the impact assessed, the choice of which policy instrument to use 
comes into play. Among others, supervisors may consider using the discretion provided 
under Pillar II requirements to limit any material procyclical impact of Basel II. Th  ere  will 
also be a need to ensure that surveillance is enhanced in areas potentially contributing to 
RWCR volatility such as impact of downward adjustment for equity prices and value of 
collaterals in a downturn environment. Nevertheless, the choice of policy tool to combat 
excessive procyclicality has itself spawned an entire debate, with no clear answers. 
In anticipation that many banking institutions aspire to adopt the IRB approach 
moving forward, the larger concern is on the implementation of the IRB approach, which 
derives regulatory capital calculation using internal estimates. As reiterated by Gerlach and 
Gruenwald (2006), the time horizon on which banking institutions assess risk would have 
an impact on the degree of procyclicality and it is more likely to be exarcebated by banking 
institutions that uses point-in-time rating schemes which is based on average default rates 
over the cycle. However, the actual impact of the IRB implementation is also diffi   cult to 
assess as its impact to banking institutions’ lending practices may vary depending on their 
risk rating practices and internal capital calculation currently. For sophisticated banking 
institutions, the IRB approach only brings capital regulation in line with current economic 
capital allocation practices. Th   e requirements of the Internal Accounting Standards (IAS) 
39 could possibly introduce further volatility via fair value measurement requirements. In 
order to better understand the total impact to the fi  nancial system, these combined eff  ects 
would need to be monitored and assessed holistically.
9. Conclusion
Th  e empirical results of a semi-structural VAR model used in this study indicate 
insignifi  cant eff  ects in terms of procyclicality of the Basel II implementation to the Malaysian 
economy.
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 Appendix D
Movement of Change in Investment Levels
Th  e chart below shows the comparison of change in investment levels between 
securities and loans by banking institutions. We can see that there is somewhat an inverse 
relationship on the change of investment level between securities and loans, whereby there is 
an increase in the growth rate for securities and reduction in the growth rate of loans during 
economic downturn and vice-versa. Th  is  signifi  es that there is potentially a shift   in banking 
institutions’ investment behaviour into alternative sources of income of higher quality, such 
as low risk securities, when there is a reduction of income from lending activities. Th  is  would 
assist banking institutions in conserving capital levels during an economic downturn.
Chart G
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CHAPTER 5
1.   Th   e Impact of Basel II in the Mongolian Economy and the Banking 
Industry
1.1   Development of Basel II
Credit institutions, in their capacity as fi  nancial intermediaries, play a special role in 
today’s economies and confi  dence in the stability of the banking sector is essential for this. 
In this context, the solvency of banks is especially relevant.
One of the most important tasks of fi   nancial intermediaries is the professional 
management of credit, market, liquidity and other risks. Th  ese risks must not become a 
threat to the solvency of the institutions or lead to instabilities in the fi  nancial sector. Over 
and above the institutions’ own risk provisioning measures, specifi  c regulatory rules were 
therefore laid down for credit institutions, primary among which are the capital adequacy 
requirements.
Th  e 1988 Capital Accord (Basel I), which was applied until the end of 2006, 
concentrated solely on the minimum capital for banks as the decisive factor for limiting risks 
and therefore also for the losses in the case of insolvency of an institution. Basel I included 
capital requirements that involved only credit and market risks and were based on a slightly 
diff  erentiated calculation method than for the calculation of the capital requirements for 
credit risk.
Building on Basel I, the new Basel Framework for the International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II) aims to improve the stability and 
soundness of the fi  nancial system. Th   e key objective of the new capital adequacy framework 
is to adjust banks’ capital requirements to refl  ect more accurately the actual incurred risk 
than in the past and to take into account the recent innovations in the fi  nancial markets as 
well as institutions’ risk management. Additional focal points of the new framework are basic 
principles for qualitative banking supervision and the expansion of disclosure requirements 
in order to enhance market discipline.
In order to achieve this, the Basel Framework is divided into three pillars, the second 
and third of which are new in comparison to Basel I.
Pillar 1 consists of minimum capital requirements including requirements for credit 
risk, market risk and operational risk. To determine the capital requirements for these three 
risk areas within the framework of an evolutionary approach, various risk measurement 
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL II IN MONGOLIA
by Battulga Ulziibat1
1  Author is Supervisor of the Policy Regulation Division of the Supervision Department at Th   e Bank of Mongolia. Th   e views expressed in this paper are 
those of the author and do not necessarily refl  ect views of Th   e Bank of Mongolia. 
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methods are available such as the basic, standardised approaches as well as more advanced 
and more risk-sensitive approaches that are based on internal methods of banks. Th  e  more 
advanced and more precise risk measurement methods can lead to capital relief. Pillar 1 lays 
down a fl  exible framework within which a bank, subject to supervisory approval, may apply 
an approach that best suits its complexity and risk profi  le. Th   e approaches for calculating the 
required underlying capital for market risks, by which Basel I was extended in 1996, were 
adopted in the Basel Framework.
Pillar 2 consists of the supervisory review process (SRP), which adds a qualitative 
element to the quantitative minimum capital requirements of Pillar 1. Th  e SRP mainly 
aims to identify the overall risk of an institution and the main infl  uential factors on its risk 
situation and to evaluate them from a supervisory perspective.
Pillar 3 refers to market discipline, i.e., institutions are to be subject to enhanced 
disclosure requirements in order to make use of the disciplining forces of the markets as a 
complement to the regulatory requirements.
Basel II is mainly directed at large, internationally active banks. Th  e  basic  concept 
should, however, be also suitable for application to banks of varying levels of complexity 
and business activities. During the development of the Basel II Framework, which started 
in 1998, there was an intensive dialogue between the banking supervisors, the banking 
industry, policy makers and other interested parties. Th   ree consultation papers and several 
Basel Committee impact studies contributed to the development of rules that are in line with 
common practice. 
With the help of quantitative impact studies (QIS), in which banks made test 
calculations for the respective current rule proposals, it was possible to estimate the 
resulting future capital requirements. On this basis, the risk weight formulas were adjusted 
so that, when institutions change to more advanced measurement approaches, they still have 
moderate incentives for capital reduction with the previous worldwide capital level staying 
more or less the same.
Th   e Basel Framework was published in June 2004, extended by trading book aspects 
and the treatment of the double default eff  ects for guarantees in July 2005 and came into 
force at the end of 2006.
1.2   Overview of Basel II Implementation in Mongolia
Although the supervisory framework of the Mongolian banking sector has been 
developing in recent years, the risk management systems of banks are still relatively weak. 
While Th  e Bank of Mongolia did not adopt the Basel Accord offi   cially, it had tried to 
follow its recommendations. Currently, Mongolian banks abide by the Basel I method for 
measurement of credit risk for reporting regulatory capital. Banks are allowed to use the 
VaR method for market risk measurement if they have developed the required system. In 
practice, however, only one bank is authorised to use this approach currently.
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According to the “Medium-term Development Strategy of Banking Sector”, 
implementation of Basel II will begin in 2010-2011, but there has yet to be any detailed plan 
for now.
Regarding Pillar 1 of Basel II, Mongolian banks do not estimate the capital adequacy 
indicators based on the standardised approach, mainly due to lack of and/or rather limited 
activities of rating agencies in Mongolia. Th  erefore, Th  e Bank of Mongolia has adopted 
several guidelines on the IRB approach as an alternative. Th   ese include guidelines on credit 
risk, market risk, and operational risk. In addition, the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 
10 percent, which is higher than the Basel minimum ratio by 2 percentage points, acts as 
the capital buff  er recommended by Pillar II. Also, Th   e Bank of Mongolia has taken several 
measures to address Pillar III with the intention of increasing market discipline through 
enhanced transparency and disclosure.
1.3   Overview of the Mongolian Banking Sector
Mongolia started the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy 
in 1990. Along with the transition towards a market economy, one of important policy issues 
was developing an effi   cient fi  nancial system. Prior to 1991, a one-tier banking system existed 
in Mongolia. In 1992, a new banking law was introduced which enabled the reorganisation 
of the banking system into a two-tier structure. Since then, Th  e Bank of Mongolia has 
taken the role of a central bank, responsible for the implementation of monetary policy 
and supervision of fi  nancial institutions. State-owned and private commercial banks were 
opened to provide  fi  nancial services in the country. 
At the start of the transition, the banking sector was underdeveloped and vulnerable 
as there was a lack of understanding in profi  t oriented approaches in business, and the 
supervisory framework was weak. Output contractions led to inability of enterprises to 
pay their loans, resulting in a high rate of non-performing loans which eventually led to a 
banking sector crisis. From 1996 to 2000, many banks became insolvent, and the credibility 
of customers fell signifi  cantly. Th   e Bank of Mongolia worked together with the Government 
of Mongolia to strengthen the banking sector and as a result, credibility of customers 
improved.
 
Th   e Mongolian banking sector is growing and fi  nancial intermediation is deepening 
over the last eight years. Th   e range of fi  nancial services off  ered by banks has increased and 
the scope has widened. Banks have also improved their corporate governance.
By September 2007, Mongolia’s banking sector comprised a total of 16 commercial 
banks, with a total 952 branches and 8,828 staff  .
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1.3.1 Total  Assets
As of September 2007, the total assets of the banking sector amounted to USD 2,472.8 




















Total Assets of Mongolia’s Banking Sector (2000-2007.09)
During the same period, the total liabilities of the banking sector reached USD 2,185.1 
million, with an average annual increase of 37.1 percent. Th   e aggregate owners’ equity of the 
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Loans as a proportion of total assets gradually climbed from 28.6 percent in 2000 to 
67.1 percent in September 2007. Short-term investments as a proportion of total assets fell 
steadily and stood at 6.0 percent, which was a result of the increase in loans. Th  e  proportion 
of cash in total assets was relatively stable and stood at 21.6 percent (Figure 2).
1.3.2  Loans and Deposits
In recent years, deposits of households, companies and other institutions have steadily 
increased. As of September 2007, banking deposits totaled USD 1,698.8 million, with an 
average annual increase of 35.0 percent from the end of 2000. Deposits to GDP ratio have 
increased signifi  cantly and reached 45.3 percent by September 2007 (Figure 3). Th   is is an 
indication of the restoration of public confi  dence in banks.
Figure 3























































































As funds of the banking sector have risen, loans to the private sector have also 
increased steadily. In 2000, total loans of the banking sector were USD 61.8 million issued 
to 1700 customers, in contrast to total loans of USD 1,659.7 million issued to 483 thousand 
customers in September 2007.















































Deposits & Loans of Banks and Loan-Deposit Ratio (2000-2007.09)
As of September 2007, the gap between banks’ deposits and loans continued to decline, 
reaching USD 39.1 million, compared to USD 98.4 million in 2000. Th  e  loan-deposit  ratio 
was 97.7 percent, an average annual decline of 8.8 percentage points (Figure 4). In recent 
years, banks not only intensively raised their loans, but also successfully expanded their 
range and reach of services, especially in rural areas.
Figure 5















As seen from the breakdown of loans by economic sector, loans issued to the 
construction sector and mining sector increased, thanks to growth at these sectors. Loans 
issued to other sectors were relatively stable (Figure 5).
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1.3.3 Capital  Adequacy
Th  e total capital of the banking sector fell below zero during the fi  nancial crisis 
which occurred during 1996-2000. Th   e Bank of Mongolia and the Government of Mongolia 
implemented necessary measures to overcome the crisis such as refi  nancing, restructuring, 
and regulatory policies. As a result, banks’ capital was increased and the risk-bearing capacity 
was strengthened. Th  e minimum capital requirement for banks increased steadily, from 
around USD 1 million in 2000 to USD 7 million in March 2006. Profi  tability of banks was 
high in last several years with  a signifi  cant part of their capital increase coming from their 
income. Mongolian banks have also been opened to foreign as well as domestic investors. As 
a result, total capital of the banking sector rose from USD 27.3 million in 2000 to USD 284.4 
million in September 2007. Th   e capital adequacy ratio fl  uctuated between 14 and 24 percent, 
which is 1.8-3 times higher than the Basel minimum requirement (Figure 6).
Figure 6



































































Capital Capital adequacy ratio
1.3.4 Asset  Quality
Commercial banks have strengthened credit management in recent years. As a result, 
quality of assets improved as demonstrated by the NPL ratio. By September 2007, the NPLs 
of all commercial banks measured by the fi  ve-category loan classifi  cation standard totaled 
USD 58.2 million. Th   e NPL ratio was 3.5 percent, with a decrease of 18.1 percentage points 
since 2000 (Figure 7).
Seacen_Pungky.indb   99 Seacen_Pungky.indb   99 6/27/2008   2:13:54 PM 6/27/2008   2:13:54 PM100
Figure 7









































































1.3.5 Profi  tability and Interest Rates
Expansion of banks’ branches and competition among banks contributed to reducing 
interest rates of loans and kept deposit rates high, which resulted in gradual decrease of net 
interest margin (Figure 8).
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Figure 8
Average Loan Rate, Deposit Rate & Net Interest Margin (2000-2007.09)
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Profi  t of banks increased even as net interest margin was declining due to enhanced 
earning abilities of banks. In September 2007, the average rate of net return on total assets 
(ROA) and net return on equity (ROE) of banks were 2.7 percent and 26.1 percent respectively. 
Th   e income portfolio of banks improved dramatically and became more diversifi  ed, with 
fee-based income accounting for 8.5 percent of total income. Th   us, the overall profi  tability 
and fi  nancial sustainability of the banking sector improved considerably (Figure 9). 
Figure 9
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2.   Pro-cyclicality Impact of Basel II in Mongolia
2.1   Model Specifi  cation
Our analysis of pro-cyclicality of Basel II through lending on the real economy would 
be based on the empirical standard semi-structural vector autoregressive (VARs) model. Th  is 
model avoids the need for a complete specifi  cation of a structural model of the economy. 
We employ the semi-structural VAR approach by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) of the 
form given in equation (1). It can be presented as follows:
Syt = A(L)yt + εt           ( 1 )
where A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L for a VAR (p):
A(L) = A1L + A2L2 +…+ ApLp       ( 2 )
Th   e MA representation of 2 is:
yt = Φ(L)εt           ( 3 )
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where  . Th  e structural parameters of the contemporaneous 
endogenous variable are contained in S. yt is the vector of endogenous variables in the system 
including one policy (indicator) variable and non-policy variables. While for εt, the vector 
of structural disturbances,   and as in Sims (1980)2,   = In. In this case   will 
be In if yt = n × 1, the matrices S and Ap being conformable with the y vector. Lp is the lag 
operator, where p describes the order of the VAR.
Th   e deterministic terms can be added on the right-hand side, as is frequently the case 
in a Johansen’s analysis of co-integration, by adding a term ΨDt. We do so in order to allow 
dummies to capture possible structural breaks. Th  en, a reduced form3 of equation (1) is 
estimated by OLS:
  yt = S-1 A(L)yt + S-1ΨDt + ut       ( 4 )
where
ut = S-1ε t,  and        (5)
         ( 6 )
  
   given the assumption: 
 
 
So S-1 is the Cholesky decomposition of Ω, the reduced-form covariance matrix. 
Furthermore, the dynamic responses to shocks are summarised by the moving average 
(MA) representation (assuming that the process is invertible):
 yt = [I – S-1 A(L)]-1ut = [I – S-1 A(L)]S-1εt     (7)
It is assumed that all the roots of    = 0 remain outside the unit circle in 
absolute value, or are in 1 in the presence of co-integration and unit roots. In this sense, the 
companion matrix has roots that are less than one in absolute value or are equal to plus 1. In 
those circumstances the VAR is (mathematically) stable.
Th  erefore, the Cholesky decomposition of Ω provides the zero restrictions (to 
complement   constraints) on Ω needed to identify the elements of S-1. Th  e  latter 
is lower-triangular:
 
2  Th   at is, they assumed covariance matrix is diagonal, which implies that the structural disturbances are orthogonal (mutually independent) (Sims, 
1980).
3   It is assumed that the errors are i.i.d and are normally distributed, being independent of any vector Dt; and that yt-1, yt-2, K, yt-p, Dt, t = 1,2,K,T, 
are not perfectly collinear.
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Th  e system is then a recursive model or Wold-causal chain; the way in which the 
variables aff  ect each other is determined by their position in the ordering. In this sense, the 
contemporaneous innovations in other variables infl  uence all those below them in the chain 
and none of those variables above them in the order. Th   e ordering of the variables in the 
system therefore infl  uences the recursive chain of causality among the shocks in any given 
period.
Th   erefore, according to Sims (1992) the policy variable, such as leading indicator of 
monetary policy, is ordered fi  rst if we assume that there is no contemporaneous feedback 
from non-policy variables onto policy variables. Th  us, we assume that monetary policy 
decisions are set without considering the simultaneous evolution of economic variables. 
Th   is assumption is applied if information on non-policy variables is not readily available 
to the monetary or policy-making authorities. Furthermore, should we assume that the 
policy variables would respond to contemporaneous feedback from non-policy variables, 
the policy variable should be ordered last.
However, in our study, given the high frequency data (monthly or quarterly) that 
we employ in constructing our VARs and hence, the existence of information lag from 
non-policy variables4, we prefer the former identifying restriction. Nevertheless, since the 
correlations across residuals εt are very small, the ordering is actually not signifi  cant. Th  is 
condition is supported by Enders (1995) who stated that if   < 0.2 for i ≠ j , the ordering 
of variables in a VAR is not relevant.
Furthermore, we must explain the models that we propose to estimate and the 
variables that they contain (see Table 1). In examining the eff  ects of monetary policy on the 
bank balance sheet, we adopt Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1995) in 
specifying the VAR. For an example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) also employed this kind 
of VAR.
Based on such possible relationship as found by Gertler and Gilchrist above, we 
developed the system involving nine variables VARs with the following ordering: inter-bank 
money market overnight rate, bank deposits, bank loans, minimum bank capital (regulatory 
minimum capital as required by Basel II for the second VAR to detect the diff  erences in 
comparison to minimum bank capital), bank securities, stock market index, output (real 
GDP) and prices (Consumer Price Index or CPI). In this case, a random innovation to one 
variable oft  en occurs simultaneously with innovations to other variables in the system. 
In order to overcome this issue, as noted above, the innovations are orthogonalised by a 
Cholesky decomposition in which the covariance matrix of the resulting residuals is the 
lower triangular. 
By including conditioning variables, the stock market index, output and prices, which 
are likely to be associated with the aggregate demand for loans, the VAR could determine 
how loan supply responses vary across diff  erent capital requirements (minimum bank capital 
and regulatory minimum capital). In addition, we also employ the exchange rate in the VAR 
as it (as proposed in the “money view”) plays an important role in relatively small and open 
4  As interest rate data (the policy variables) is readily available, while non-policy variables such as real output, stock market index and price were 
available with a lag.
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economies like Mongolia and other SEACEN countries. Here, any changes in the exchange 
rate aff  ect the banks’ balance sheet variables, stock market index, output and prices. 
Moreover, if we are to conduct tests for the presence of co-integration within a specifi  c 
VAR, it is necessary to determine the order of integration of the variables. In general, to use 
the standard procedures developed by Johansen (1995), we require them all to be I(1), which 
are stationary in their fi  rst diff  erences. In addition, as Philips (1986) demonstrated, any OLS 
regressions which are based on the levels of the variables will be a spurious one. However, 
the implication that only stationary, I(0), variables should be included in VARs has tended 
not to be accepted. We fi  rst concentrate on tests for the presence of unit roots, that is, for the 
existence of I(1) variables. 
Th   ere are three “important” tests for unit roots, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), 
Phillips-Perron and Perron’s (1997) structural break test. Th  ese tests are conducted in 
order to test whether the null hypothesis is rejected, then the series y are considered to be 
stationary, y~I(0). A non-rejection of the unit-root null hypothesis for level data raises the 
question as to whether its fi  rst diff  erences is stationary, y(1). Th   e testing procedure, by further 
diff  erencing, can be continued until a stationary series is achieved. Th   is testing procedure is 
justifi  ed when we assume that most economic series are I(1).
2.2   Data
To estimate the models described in the previous section, we will use monthly 
data from 2000:01 to 2006:12 for each variable: interest rate (determined by Th  e  Bank  of 
Mongolia), exchange rate, loans, deposits, capital adequacy ratio, securities, consumer price 























The Bank of Mongolia rate
Tugrik to USD rate
Total loans
Total third party funds at banks
Capital adequacy ratio
Securities owned by banks
Consumer price index






















Since Mongolia did not conduct a Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) 5, we do not have 
add-on data for CAR needed for calculating the impact of Basel II implementation. However, 
as the add-on is same on all CAR data, we assume results of simulations will be same without 
the add-on. We derived monthly GDP data through extrapolation because only quarterly 
GDP data were available.
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EViews 4.1 was used for the simulation while data sources included banks’ monthly 
reports, National Statistics Offi   ce of Mongolia, and the Mongolian Stock Exchange.
2.3   Empirical Results
2.3.1  Unit Root Test
When estimating the VAR model, we must fi  rst check if all data are I(0), i.e. stationary. 
As shown in Table 2, some data are not I(0) at their levels and 1st diff  erences, but all are I(0) 
in their 2nd diff  erences. Hence, we will use 2nd diff  erences of data in further simulations. 
Table 2























































Remark: The test was performed using Automatic selection lag length (Schwartz Info Criterion with maximum
  lag of 5), * - MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values 
At level
Variable




The Bank of Mongolia rate
Tugrik to USD rate
Total loans
Total third party funds at banks
Capital adequacy ratio
Securities owned by banks
Consumer price index
Stock market index on MSE
Gross domestic product
We will use VAR model in next section to analyse pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II 
in the economy. 
2.3.2 Simulation  Results
We estimated the VAR models using the  nine variables above. Th   en using its results, 
we derived the impulse response of variables for 20 months, followed by cumulative impulse 
response for 20 months, and variance decomposition for 20 months. While impulse response 
functions trace the eff  ects of a shock of one endogenous variable on the other variables in 
the VAR, variance decomposition separates the variation in an endogenous variable into 
the component shocks on the VAR. Th   us, the variance decomposition provides information 
about the relative importance of each random innovation in aff  ecting the variables in the 
VAR.
Th  e  eff  ect of monetary policy (BoM Rate) on the components of consolidated banks’ 
balance sheet (deposits, loans, CAR, and securities), exchange rate, stock market index, 
infl  ation, and GDP for all periods were estimated by computing the impulse response 
function derived from nine variables VAR as shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10
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Stock Market Index
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
As seen from Figure 10, bank deposits respond negatively for the fi  rst 2 months before 
positively for the next 2 months. It then turns negative in the 5th month and positive for 
the 6th month. In the following months, bank deposits’ response is relatively stable over the 
horizontal line. Bank loans respond positively for the fi  rst month, then negative for the next 
2 months aft  er turning to positive for the 4th month. It becomes negative for the 6th month 
and stays relatively stable for the following periods. Bank deposits and bank loans show 
opposite patterns with diff  erence of one month. As for the CAR, it shows a similar pattern 
with loans, but is more unstable.
Since Mongolia has a small economy, the exchange rate plays an important role in the 
market. Exchange rate moved negatively for the fi  rst month, then turned positive for the 
next 2 months. For the rest of the period, it was mostly negative except for the 8th month. 
Since the capital market is underdeveloped, the response of the stock market index to 
a change in the BoM rate is relatively unstable. It is also the case with securities owned by 
banks as banks are only allowed legislatively to buy a relatively small amount of securities.
Seacen_Pungky.indb   106 Seacen_Pungky.indb   106 6/27/2008   2:13:57 PM 6/27/2008   2:13:57 PM107
In terms of output, the GDP response is similar to the loans response, but is more 
unstable. From the results of the Granger causality test (Table 3), we can see that the 
hypothesis GDP does not granger cause Loans was rejected and vice versa, with a confi  dence 
level of 5%. It means that bank lending does aff  ect GDP and GDP also aff  ects bank lending. 
Table 3
Pairwise Granger Causality Test GDP vs. Loans
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests




GDP does not Granger Cause LOAN









On the other hand, the Granger causality test shows that (Table 4) capital market does 
not aff  ect GDP and vice versa. Th   is evidence is feasible since the number of listed companies 
is very few and trading amount is small. Hence, investment from the capital market does not 
aff  ect GDP signifi  cantly.
 
Table 4
Pairwise Granger Causality Test GDP vs. Stock market index
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests




INDEX does not Granger Cause GDP 









Based on the accumulation response from the simulation, we conclude that a shock 
from the BoM rate does not have signifi  cant eff  ect on other variables. If we implement Basel 
II, banks still can play their intermediation role. One reason is that the average CAR of 
Mongolian banks is high enough, thereby not limiting their lending activities. Hence, there 
will be no signifi  cant eff  ect on GDP.
Th   e variance decomposition from the simulation shows the contribution of changes in 
the BoM rate to changes in each variable. If the BoM rate changes by one standard deviation, 
loans would move by 1.7 percent. Since the current average CAR is above 14%, banks can 
still do their lending activities. Also contribution on GDP of 1.5 percent shows there is no 
signifi  cant impact.
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3.   Summary and Conclusion
Basel II is a new capital framework issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the purpose of which is to maintain fi  nancial stability through enhanced risk 
management in banking sector, accurate supervisory framework, and greater transparency. 
However, there are some issues associated with its implementation, one of which the most 
talked about is the pro-cyclicality eff  ect of Basel II on the real economy. Th   is paper studied 
the existence of the above eff  ect on Mongolia, and concludes that the pro-cyclicality impact 
of Basel II is not signifi  cant in case of Mongolia, the main reasons being as follows:
1. Th   e average CAR of Mongolian banks is well above the minimum capital requirement. 
Mongolia did not conduct QIS 5 and hence information on the increase of risk-
weighted assets from the implementation of Basel II is not available. However, 
considering the fact that minimum capital requirement of 10% for Mongolian banks 
is higher than the Basel II minimum requirement of 8%, we can conclude that the 
implementation of Basel II will not have signifi  cant impact on the banking sector.
2. Th  e results of the study show that bank lending and GDP aff  ect each other, while 
capital market and GDP does not aff  ect each other. Since the banking sector comprises 
about 95% of assets in the fi  nancial market, the banking sector has a major impact on 
GDP. Th   erefore, any regulation that aff  ects bank lending behaviour is likely to aff  ect 
GDP also.
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Th  e estimated VAR is stable (stationary) if all roots lie inside the unit circle. We ran all 
possible simulations, and found out that maximum lag, which VAR is stable, is 5.
Roots of Charactersitics Polynomial
Endogenous variables: D(BOMRATE, 2) D(EXRATE, 2)
D(DEPOSIT, 2) D(LOAN, 2) D(CAR, 2) D(SECURITIES, 2)
D(CPI, 2) D(GDP, 2) D(INDEX, 2)
Exogenous variavles: C D(BOMRATE, 2)
Lag specification: 1 5
Date: 02/10/08   Time: 03:55
Root
 0.509165 + 0.844522i
 0.509165 - 0.844522i
 0.301410 + 0.926707i







 0.111186 + 0.909726i





 0.787862 - 0.423533i
 0.787862 + 0.423533i
 0.587765 - 0.672085i












 0.577067 - 0.375816i
 0.577067 + 0.375816i
 0.220992 + 0.633025i
 0.220992 - 0.633025i
 0.479240 + 0.389609i




 0.000948 + 0.000694i




No root lies outside the unit circle.
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Optimal Lag
We ran “VAR lag order selection criteria” to fi  nd out optimal lag for the simulation.
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: D(BOMRATE, 2) D(EXRATE, 2)
D(DEPOSIT, 2) D(LOAN, 2) D(CAR, 2) D(SECURITIES, 2)
D(CPI, 2) D(GDP, 2) D(INDEX, 2)
Exogenous variavles: C D(BOMRATE, 2)




















































* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
As shown above, various criteria nominated 0, 3, and 5 as an optimal lag. From results 
of VAR simulations, lag 3 gave highest Adjusted R-squared value for BoM rate.
As seen from results of VAR residual correlation matrix above, the majority of 
correlations between residuals are below 0.2. Th   erefore, we can conclude that ordering of 
variables in the VAR simulation is not signifi  cant based on Ender (1995).
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Chapter 6
1.   Introduction 
The  international  economy,  since  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century  has  been 
characterised by economic reforms, globalisation as well as liberalisation. A number of 
countries have benefited from such reforms and liberalised economic policies and their 
economies have seen amazing developments as a result. One important part of economic 
reforms is related to financial intermediation, which has caused aggressive credit growth 
leading to inflation, higher consumption and other related impacts on the economy. 
It is widely claimed that financial liberalisation is crucial for boosting economic 
development. It has been proven in the past that countries enjoy high growths through 
their reform and liberal financial policies. Countries that are emerging competitively in the 
international market resulting from their liberal financial policies are capable of attracting 
foreign investments which have positive impacts on productivity and overall economic 
growth. The reforms in the financial sector comprise of adoption of international best 
practices and prudential regulations. The recent development in the international banking 
arena is related to Basel-II.
The New Capital Accord, namely Basel-II, requires banks to compute their capital 
in relation to the riskiness of their assets. The assessment of riskiness of a bank’s assets is a 
difficult task. The final documents issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) in June 2004 have clarified many areas related  to the banking industry although 
the effective implementation of the new framework and their consequences have yet to 
determined in the industry. It is well accepted that financial institutions must be managed 
in a safe and sound manner so as to assure financial stability. Financial stability should 
not be compromised at any cost, and this is seen in the the various advanced approaches 
recommended  by  the  new  accord.  Basel-II  would  improve  internal  risk  management 
practices through the capital measurement process that will have a substantial impact on 
banks’ soundness on a sustainable basis.  
There are several challenges for the accord’s implementation. The riskiness of assets at 
a particular point of time may not necessarily be the same at another point of time. Similarly, 
under the Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach, the amount of capital that a bank will 
have to set aside against a given exposure will depend on the function of the estimated 
credit risk of the exposure. It is also evidenced that the IRB approach for credit risk is an 
innovation and also the ultimate objective of Basel-II for credit risk. Based on this approach, 
one important concern raised by most economists is that new framework would result in 
worsening credit growth and affect the business cycle adversely. In this regard in a down 
turn, when loan losses are increased due to poor quality of assets, capital may be eroded. 
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL-II IN NEPAL
by Maha Prasad Adhikari1
1  The author is Director of the Bank Supervision Department of Nepal Rastra Bank
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It may reduce the lending capability of individual banks and force them to require more 
capital for existing exposures. At the same time, it is quite costly for the bank to raise more 
capital during difficult periods. In this situation, the bank may need to reduce its existing 
exposure and lending activities, contributing to further worsening of the downturn of the 
economy. Hence, the concern which arises during implementation is that, such movement 
on the riskiness and risk based capital framework may have cyclical impact on credit growth 
and overall economic activities.
Bank themselves are the true assessor of their riskiness under the IRB approaches.   
They may underestimate their capitals during booms by way of enhancing and aggressively 
exposing high risks during those times and may underestimate downturns by squeezing 
lending, providing excessive loan loss provisions that may erode existing capital. In this 
way, if banks mis-assess risks over the course of the business cycle, the potential for credit 
booms and busts is increased. This can lead to greater financial amplification of the business 
cycle and increase the risk of financial instability. In this sense, it is difficult to measure 
capital requirements at different points of time on a systematic basis. What should be the 
optimum level of capital: regulatory capital or economic capital? Since Basel-II closely aligns 
regulatory capital to the economic capital of an individual bank, it must be reasonable and 
accepted by the international community. There is one argument that capital should be built 
up in good times, so that when the bad times come, a sufficient buffer exists to absorb losses 
thereby managing the risk of solvency of the bank.  
This research study aims to analyse the procyclicality impact of Basel-II in SEACEN 
countries in the context of Nepal. How does Basel-II affect the economy and the banking 
industry in SEACEN countries? Does the regulatory capital as required by Basel-II overstate 
the magnitude and economic significance of procyclicality in new accord relating to existing 
accord? How does the lending behaviour respond to the riskier behaviour as a result of 
tightened capital constraint?
2.   Overview of the Nepalese Banking System 
The Nepalese banking system comprises of 23 commercial banks, 58 development 
banks, 79 finance companies and some micro finance institutions. Among these financial 
institutions, commercial banks hold the majority of the banking assets in the country. Nepal 
has initiated its liberalisation policy for the last two decades. The central bank has initiated a 
transparent and prudent regulatory framework for banks and financial institutions and the 
effectiveness of the central bank’s regulatory framework is also reflected in the stock market. 
Some of the regulations imposed by the central bank are capital adequacy related regulation, 
loan classification, loan loss provisioning, single obligor limit, accounting and transparency, 
risk management, corporate governance, cash reserve ratio, deprived sector lending etc. 
These regulations have contributed to the soundness of Nepal’s financial system. 
In addition to regulations, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) has initiated the financial sector 
reform programme since 2002/03 to make government owned banks more competitive 
with the private sector banks. Based on existing situation, the effective implementation of 
capital related regulations and their uniform application in the system is not practicable. The 
existing minimum capital requirement regulation in the Nepalese banking system is based 
on the 1988 recommendation of the BCBS. For the new capital standard, Nepal will take into 
account the applicability and practicality of the new framework in the Nepalese context. 
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During the last decade, the performance of the Nepalese economy has not been very 
encouraging due to the insurgency in the country and issues related to the appropriate 
allocations of resources within the country. GDP growth has remained low with moderate 
inflation and unemployment is a normal phenomenon. The level of the NPA is high while 
overall capital of the banking industry is negative.  
The following table reflects the various key indicators of the commercial banking 
system of Nepal.
Table 1












Total loans and advances
Total deposits




Number of commercial banks
Total Assets
Interest rate
9.1 On Treasury Bill (91 days)
9.2 Saving deposits (Highest)
9.3 Mortgage lending (Highest)




































3.   Development of Basel-II
The Nepalese banking industry has been improving with the introduction of new 
products and practices. For the last few years, the use of credit cards and IT services in 
the banking business has been growing. As such, the banking system is also encountering 
increased  risks  created  by  these  new  business  operations.  Not  only  has  there  been  an 
increment in the volume of deposits, loans & advances and new products, the banking 
culture and inherent risk management practices in most banking entities have also improved. 
However, the overall market development is still poor, characterised by poor governance 
public/private entrepreneurship.
The  international  community  in  the  global  financial  system  is  focused  on  the 
convergence for the capital standard, which is vital for financial stability and cushioning 
from unusual shocks in the financial system or in an individual institution. The international 
convergence on capital measurement and capital standard or Basel-II is in place, although it 
is a complicated framework for implementation.
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NRB has initiated its journey towards Basel-II although its achievement is still a long 
way off  considering its level of banking development and market sophistication. The IRB 
approach for credit risk, internal module for market risk and AMA for operational risks 
would need concerted effort and time to achieve. Since the conceptual framework is useful 
for improving market behaviour on the existing framework, NRB has decided to embark on 
the new framework by adopting the simplest approaches of Basel-II. The implementation 
is phased out by way of parallel run in the first year of 2007/2008. The approaches selected 
for the initial implementation are the Simplified Standardised Approach for credit risk, net 
open position approach for market risk and basic indicator approach for operational risk. 
With respect to the Pillars, all the three Pillars are concurrently reinforced. Under Pillar 
2, specific supervisory actions known as prompt corrective actions (PCA) have also been 
initiated for the implementation. 
4.   Nature and Definition of Data
The  procyclicality  impact  of  the  implementation  of  Basel-II  is  attempted  in  this 
research paper. Historical quarterly data prior to implementation of Basel-II are used and 
they consist of the following: gross non-performing loans, net non-performing loans, total 
credits, different portfolio of credit, total deposits, deposit products, investment in securities, 
Tier –1 Capital, Tier-2 Capital, risk weighted assets, capital adequacy ratio, total assets, net 
interest margin, interest rates, exchange rates, GDP, CPI and stock market index
4.1  Gross Non-Performing Loans
The present regulation of NRB requires all commercial banks to categorise their 
credit into four categories, namely (1) Pass (2) Sub-Standard (3) Doubtful and (4) Loss. The 
classification criterion is based on overdue periods of the loan. Loans overdue for more than 
90 days are considered as NPL. Non-performing loans (NPL) of private sector banks are 
used for the purpose of this paper since historical data for the government owned bank are 
not reliable and also because of the enforcement of capital regulation in government owned 
banks. Similarly, regulatory directives are too difficult to enforce on state owned bank and 
hence data related to private sector banks are used. The data are in million US$ of NPL of 
the private sector banks in the Nepalese banking sector while the sample period is 2003:Q2 
to 2007: Q1.
4.2  Net Non Performing Loans
Loans overdue for more than 90 days are considered as NPL. The net NPL data used 
is related to the private sector commercial banks only. The net NPL data are reflected in 
million US $ of NPL in the private sector banks in the Nepalese banking sector reduced by 
the amount of provision made on those NPL and the sample period is 2003:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
4.3  Total Credits
Total credits of the Nepalese banking industry as well as private sector bank credit are 
separately collated for the purpose of the analysis. In order to make the analysis consistent, 
only the private sector banks’ total credit is used.  The data are in million US $ of loans and 
advances in the private sector banks while the sample period is 2003:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
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4.4  Different Portfolio of Credits
The loan data of six prominent commercial banks are used for the analysis. All loans 
with long term maturity of more than one year except for retail products are placed under 
term loan while all revolving type loans, overdraft facilities, cash credits, TR loans and all 
other working capital financing are categorised under the working capital loans while all 
retail type consumer loans are categorised under the consumer loans. The total portfolio 
data are in million US $ of loans and advances of selected banks and the sample period is 
2000:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
4.5  Total Deposits
Total deposits of the whole commercial banking sector as well as of private sector 
banks are separately collated for the study. The amount of total deposits are in million US $. 
Data related to the whole banking industry are for the period of 2000:Q3 to 2007:Q1 while 
those for  private sector banks are from 2003:Q2 to 2007:Q1.
4.6  Deposits Mix
In  the  Nepal,  deposits  are  categorised  as  time  deposits,  saving  deposits,  current 
deposits, call deposits, margin deposits, etc. Current deposits and margin are non-interest 
bearing deposits while all other deposits are interest bearing. The deposit mix used reflects 
the total deposit mix of the Nepalese banking industry including state owned banks. The 
amount of deposit mix is in million US $ amount and the sample period is 2000:Q3 to 2007:
Q1.
4.7  Investment in Securities
Investment in securities comprise of total investment portfolio of commercial banks 
in Nepal and consist of equity, government bond/ treasury bills and other placements. 
Government bonds and treasury bills account for more than 65% of total investments. The 
data are  in million US $ amount and the sample period is 2000:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
4.8  Tier-1 Capital of Private Sector Banks
Only the Tier-1 Capital of private sector banks is used.  The core capital data is based 
on the existing eligible capital as stipulated by the existing framework.  The amount of Tier-1 
Capital is also in million US $ amount and the sample period is 2000:Q3 to 2007:Q.
4.9  Tier-2 Capital of Private Sector Banks:-
The Tier-2 Capital of private sector banks is used for the analysis.  The supplementary 
capital data collated are based on the existing eligible capital as stipulated by the existing 
framework.  The amount of Tier-2 Capital is in million US $ amount while the sample period 
is 2002:Q2 to 2007:Q1.
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4.10 RWA Estimation Based on Basel-II of Private Sector Banks
The Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) of private sector banks applied for the study are based 
on the Nepalese QIS conducted in 2004 using the selected approach for implementation 
from the Nepalese perspective. The new Nepalese framework are spelt out in the simplified 
standardised approach for credit risk, net open position basis for market risk and basic 
indicator approach for operational risk. Data are based on assumptions and results of the 
NQIS are not actual. The amount of RWA is in million US $ amount and the sample period 
is 2003:Q2 to 2007:Q1.
4.11 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)
The CAR of private sector banks alone is taken for the analysis and the data are derived 
from the actual capital adequacy ratio based on the existing capital adequacy framework and 
not the new framework. The amount of CAR is presented in terms of percentage of total 
existing capital in relation to the total existing RWA. The sample period  is from 2002:Q2 to 
2007:Q1.
4.12 Total Assets
The total assets reflect the gross assets stated in the balance sheet of all commercial 
banks in Nepal including state owned banks. The amount of total assets is also in million US 
$ amount covering the period of 2000:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
4.13 Net Interest Margin (NIM) of Private Sector Banks
The NIM of private sector banks which reflects the gross interest income reduced by 
interest expenses incurred during the respective period of time, is used for this study. The 
interest incomes normally fluctuate in different time periods depending on the collection 
efforts made by the banks during those quarters. The amount of total NIM is in million US 
$ amount for the period of 2003:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
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4.14 Interest Rates
The NRB bank rate is a published rate by the central bank. It is normally published 
while announcing the monetary policy in mid-July and also at the mid-term review 
around early February every year. The sample period is 2000:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
Government  securities  are  issued  basically  in  the  form  of  national  saving  bond, 
development bond and treasury bills. Out of these securities, treasury bills are the 
most popular and interest sensitive instrument in the market. The NRB manages all 
government instruments and there are treasury bills of different maturities, such as 28 
days, 91 days, 182 days, and 364 days. For the purpose of this research, the 91 days TB 
rate is considered due to its popularity and significant volume of trade in  the market 
for the period of 2000:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
Time deposits or fixed deposits as they are known in Nepal, are the rates decided 
within the bank depending on the tenure of the deposit and also the liquidity position 
of the banks and their ALM strategy. For the purpose of this study, the highest 
published rate within the range of time deposit is considered for the period of 2000:
Q3 to 2007:Q1.
Saving deposits of banks consist of various products such as saving plus, special saving 
etc and their interest rates differ within the bank and among banks. For the study, the 
highest published rate of saving deposits is used for the sample period of  2000:Q3 to 
2007:Q1.
The lending rate of a term loan is also different among banks. The highest rate of term 
lending is used for this study for the sample period: 2000:Q3 to 2007: Q1.
The lending rate for working capital loans is also different among the banks. The 
highest rate of working capital loan is considered here using the sample period of 
2000: Q3 to 2007:Q1.
Retail lending or consumer lending is a new concept in the Nepalese market and was 
introduced 5-7 years back and is now gaining popularity. The rates vary among banks 
ranging  from 1% to 2 %. For this study, the highest published rate is considered for 
the period 2000:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
4.15 Exchange Rates
Nepal Rastra Bank has adopted full convertibility in the current account and partial 
convertibility in the capital account. More importantly, the exchange rates with all other 
convertible currencies are on a float whereas the rate with the Indian currency is fixed. The 
NRS vs. US $ rate fluctuates on a day-to-day basis. The exchange rate data are for  2000:Q3 
to 2007:Q1 and expressed in terms of Nepalese Rupee per US dollar.
4.16 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Nominal GDP at factor cost as well as nominal GDP at producer’s prices are used for   
this study and are in terms of million US $. Data related to GDP growth is also used and the 
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4.17 Consumer Price Index (CPI Index)
The consumer price index is derived by the central bank based on its data base 
collected from various locations of the country.  The national urban consumer price index is 
one of the important indexes constructed by the central bank. The national urban consumer 
price index is used for the period of 2000:Q3 to 2007:Q1.
4.18 Nepal Stock Exchange Index (NEPSE Index)
The Nepal Stock Exchange is the only stock exchange in the country. The Nepalese 
Stock Index is the NEPSE Index. As the stock market is not matured, data related to the 
stock index are used as an index based on base figures.  The sample period is for 2000:Q3 to 
2007:Q1.
5.   Empirical Results
There are minor changes in the RWA based on the new framework compared to 
the existing RWA in each quarter. The increase in capital requirement is basically due to 
the introduction of capital charges for operational risk, which is well compensated by the 
reduction in the credit risk by way of risk weight based on net of specific provision. Similarly, 
the rebate by way of credit risk mitigates (CRM) and the retail portfolio will also have an 
impact on the overall capital position for maintaining it at par with the existing framework.
The increment on the overall Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) from Basel-I to Basel-II 





























RWA based on Basel-II Existing RWA
The new Nepalese framework requires banks to maintain CAR of 10% at minimum. 
Out of that 6% must be of  Tier-1 Capital. The quarter with the highest existing capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) of 13.95% was reduced to 12.81% due to the Basel-II implementation. 
Similarly, the quarter with the lowest capital adequacy of 9.58% is reduced to 9.21% due 
to the Basel –II implementation. On the Tier-1 Capital side, the existing CAR ranges from 
11.74% to 7.5% for different quarters. This was reduced from 11.31% to 7.5% for those 
respective quarters. 
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Chart 2
Capital Adequacy Ratio











The data analysed included the risk weighted assets and the capital adequacy ratio. 
The increase or decrease in the RWA as an aggregate from the sample based on a quantitative 
impact study was computed. The increase or decrease in the quarterly data is used to simulate 
the RWA. Based on the RWA simulation, data on CAR was calculated. The CAR simulation 
and the RWA simulation were used as proxies for the impact of Basel-II implementation 
based on the VAR model used for the research study.
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The results of the simulation are  as follows:
Chart 3
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Response of DRATE to DGDP
6.  Issues from Research Workshop Group Discussion 
Several issues were raised during the second SEACEN research workshop on the 
procyclicality impact of Basel-II as follows: 
1.  The policy regarding risk based capital requirement will have a procyclicality impact 
if the approach selected is more advanced and responsive to the riskiness of the 
counterparty. The simpler the approach selected, the less will be the procyclicality 
impact. It will be more cyclical as the approach moves to a more advanced one. At the 
same time, however, a simpler approach may have a sudden impact on the economy 
rather than on a continual basis.
 
2.  Procyclicality also depends on the buffer capital available in the banking industry. 
If the banking industry is well capitalised with a holding buffer with substantially 
high capital adequacy ratio compared to the required, the impact will be minimal. 
However, if the banking industry is poorly capitalised and has a marginal buffer level, 
the new framework will have some impact from procyclicality. 
Chap 6.indd   124 6/30/2008   9:46:14 AM125
3.  The  procyclicality  impact  is  also  dependent  on  the  state  of  liberalisation  of  the 
economy. Where the economy is open with accessible foreign capital flow into the 
market, the new tightening policy will have less procyclicality impact. In other words, 
financing needs shall be met through foreign investments and other modes of foreign 
financing. Whereas, if the economy is not open and foreign flow of capital is restricted, 
there will be more procyclicality impact from the new framework.
7.   Conclusion and Recommendation
The impact of the new framework in the Nepalese context would be that the private 
sector banking industry would be able to gear their Tier -1 Capital from the existing capital. 
However, in view of the existing level of exposure, it is envisaged that there will be a shortage 
of total capital. With the implementation of Basel-II, the lending capacity of the banking 
industry is expected to be reduced slightly due mainly to the cost incurred for maintaining 
soundness and stability of the financial system. 
Based  on  the  observations,  there  seems  to  be  some  procyclicality  impact  in  the 
Nepalese context due mainly to two factors. First, the existing total capital of the banking 
industry is negative and private sector banks’ capital is also tight. Coupled with this is the 
fact that there is no buffer in the system. Second, foreign capital flow is not able to match the 
demand of the market. 
The study is based on the data prior to the implementation of Basel-II. This initial 
analysis on procyclicality may not be valid after the implementation of the new capital 
framework.  Hence,  it  is  recommended  that  another  study  on  procyclicality  impact  be 
conducted after the implementation of Basel-II when data on the business cycle can also be 
plotted. 
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CHAPTER 7
1.  Overview of the Philippine Banking System
Th  e Philippine banking system is made up of three types of banks – commercial 
banks (further subdivided into universal and regular commercial banks), thrift   banks, and 
rural and cooperative banks.  Universal banks, aside from undertaking commercial banking 
functions, are allowed to engage in the activities of investment houses and to invest in the 
equity of companies engaged in activities not related to banking.  Th  rift   banks, on the other 
hand, cater mainly to the consumer retail market and small- and medium-sized enterprises.   
Rural and cooperative banks, meanwhile, are expected to provide banking services in the 
rural areas.  
As of end-March 2007, there are 861 banks in the Philippines. Of that number, 39 are 
commercial banks, 84 are thrift   banks, and 738 are rural and cooperative banks. In terms 
of assets, as of end-2006, the Philippine banking system has total assets of P4.86 trillion, 
or roughly 81% of the country’s GDP in the same period. Of that fi  gure, 88% is owned by 
commercial banks, while only 9% and 3% are owned by the thrift   banks and rural banks, 
respectively.  
Th   e banking system’s assets grew by 12.6% in 2006, supported by strong growths in 
main sources of funds: deposits at 17.7%, capital accounts at 11.3%; as well as a new source 
of funding – unsecured subordinated debt – which posted a heft  y 48.9% increase.  
Total loan portfolio as of end-2006, meanwhile, reached P2 trillion, which is a 10.5% 
increase from the previous years’ P1.8 trillion. Th  is expansion in lending – which is the 
highest in 8 years – has been primarily driven by consumer lending on the back of strong 
private consumption resulting from steady infl  ow of overseas Filipino workers’ (OFWs) 
remittances.
Th  is expansion in total loan portfolio has been accompanied by improving asset 
quality.  End-June 2007 NPL and NPA ratios stand at 5.8 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively, 
which are quite close to their pre-Asian crisis levels.  Th   is resulted from banks’ need to clean 
up their books prior to the implementation of Basel II, which in turn led to signifi  cant asset 
disposals either through special purpose vehicle (SPV) – driven transactions (A SPV Law 
was passed in 2001 and extended in 2006 to give incentives to banks selling their NPAs to 
special purpose vehicles) or other innovative models of asset disposition (i.e., joint venture 
agreements, public auctions, and debt write-off  s). So far, around P126 billion of NPAs have 
already been disposed by the banking system.  
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL II IN THE 
PHILIPPINES
by Jermy Y. Prenio1
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Profi  tability measures have also been respectable with net income aft  er tax growing at 
29%, while ROA and ROE fi  gures registering at 1.3% and 10.6%, respectively.
Banks have also been strengthening their capital positions in preparation for the Basel 
II implementation, with some resorting to the issuances of innovative capital instruments 
such as unsecured subordinated debts that qualify either as hybrid Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 
capital. As of end-March 2007, the banking system’s consolidated capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) stood at 18.83%.  Th   is is well above the 10% and 8% BSP and international standards, 
respectively.  It is worth noting that since the BSP adopted a capital adequacy framework 
based on the Basel standards in 2001 (based on the 1988 Basel Accord), the banking system’s 
consolidated CAR has not gone below 15% (Figure 1). With the implementation of Basel II, 
data from the validated parallel run reports of universal banks showed that CAR, on average, 
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2.  Background on Basel II Implementation in the Philippines
As early as December 2004, the BSP already announced to the banking industry its Basel 
II implementation plan (Figure 2). Th   e plan envisaged universal and regular commercial 
banks, as well as their subsidiary banks and quasi-banks, to adopt the standardized 
approaches of Basel II by 2007. Th   e advanced approaches of Basel II, on the other hand, 
may be allowed by 2010.  Prior to 2007, however, the plan provided for a gradual phasing 
in of Basel II elements into the then existing BSP risk-based capital framework in order to 
set the stage for the eventual full adoption of the entire Basel II standardized provisions.   
Th   ese elements included the lower capital requirements for highly rated credit exposures to 
corporate entities and higher capital requirement for non-performing loans.  
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Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review)  -
-
a continuing process
Pillar 3 (Market Discipline)  gradual implementation 
starting 2007
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Basel II Implementation in the Philippines
Pillar 1 (Minimum capital requirement) 
It is worth mentioning that even before the offi   cial implementation plan was released 
in 2004, the then existing risk-based capital framework of the BSP – which was based on the 
1988 Basel Capital Accord – already contained elements of Basel II. Th   e Basel II elements 
adopted earlier included the lower capital requirements for highly rated credit exposures to 
sovereigns and banks, and lower capital requirements for portfolios of loans to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). 
In 2005, the BSP issued the draft   guidelines for the adoption of Basel II in the 
Philippines. Th   e guidelines were exposed for comments for over a year, then on 4 August 
2006 the fi  nal guidelines were issued for implementation in July 2007. 
Th  e  signifi  cant changes in the BSP’s risk-based capital adequacy framework brought 
about by the Basel II adoption include greater reliance on external ratings, addition of a 
capital requirement for operational risk, and enhanced market disclosure.
3. Possible  Pro-cyclicality  Eff  ect of the Various Capital Frameworks
Under the 1988 Accord-based capital framework, assets were divided into 4 classes 
– exposures to sovereigns, exposures to banks, residential mortgage, and all others – and an 
asset’s capital requirement depended on its classifi  cation. Th   us, in this kind of framework, 
capital requirements change over time only if a bank’s portfolio structure changes, e.g., shift   
from more corporate loans to more residential mortgage. Th   is is the reason why the 1988 
Capital Accord was not seen as having a strong cyclical component.  
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Some have argued, however, that capital adequacy requirements, in general, can 
reinforce macroeconomic fl  uctuations by requiring banks to raise additional capital in 
economic downturns (see for example Blum and Hellwig (1995)). In view of this, it is this 
paper’s intention to look into the possible additional procyclicality impact of the Basel II 
framework as it is implemented in the Philippines, rather than the inherent procyclicality of 
regulatory capital requirements per se.
3.1  Pro-cyclicality of the Basel II Credit Risk Framework    
Under the Basel II framework, capital requirements for credit risk exposures of banks 
are assessed using either the external credit ratings (standardized approach) or banks’ 
internal credit ratings (the more advanced internal ratings-based, or IRB approach). Of the 
two, the use of internal ratings has been the focus of study on the procyclicality impact of 
Basel II because of two reasons.  Th  e  fi  rst is that banks’ internal ratings systems have a ‘point-
in-time’ orientation and a one-year horizon. Th   is means that changes in current economic 
conditions are likely to generate a change in internal ratings of credit exposures, and hence 
their corresponding capital requirements.  Th   e second reason is the fact that collateral value, 
which mitigates the credit risk of an exposure thus also reducing the capital requirement, 
becomes infl  ated during strong economic growth and becomes signifi  cantly low during 
recession.  Hence, collateral would lead to more reduction in capital requirement in the 
former, and less in the latter, thereby exacerbating the procyclicality eff  ect of the ‘point-in-
time’ orientation of banks’ internal credit ratings.
 
Th   e external ratings approach, on the other hand, while may be less sensitive to the 
cycle, is also not immune from procyclical movements. For instance, it has been observed 
that there are many more downgrades occurring in recessions than in booms.  In addition, 
downgrades may occur in large steps and only aft  er the risk has materialized. Th   is may lead 
to more sudden and larger jumps in capital requirements than would be the case with the 
internal ratings approach.  
4.  Possible Pro-cyclicality Eff  ect in the Philippines
Of the two mentioned Basel II credit risk approaches, however, the more relevant to 
the Philippines – and hence the focus of this paper – is the external ratings approach, which 
is already being implemented since July 2007. Although the internal ratings approach may 
be allowed starting 2010, only 6 domestic banks have signifi  ed their interest to shift   to this 
approach.
4.1  Ratings Downgrade and Economic Growth
In the above discussion, it was mentioned that procyclicality of the external ratings 
approach may result from the observed signifi  cant increase in downgrades during recessions.  
Th   e next question then is whether these same ratings downgrades have also been observed 
during economic recessions in the Philippines.  
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It should be noted that rated issuances in the Philippines are very limited (Table 1) 
and it was only in 1992 to 2001 that it increased to a relatively ‘signifi  cant’ level. Th  us,  any 
analysis with regard to percentages of rating downgrades should be done with caution and, 


























Comparing GDP growth and percentages of ratings downgrades (Table 2), one 
can see that the percentage of ratings downgrades shot up in 1998 – basically from nil to 
18.75% - when the Philippine economy contracted by 0.6% because of the Asian crisis.   
However, percentage of ratings downgrades remained high since then until 2002 even if 
GDP growth has returned to positive territory.  Ratings downgrades peaked at 26% in 2001 
when the economy almost went into a recession with GDP growth registering at only 1.80%.  
Th  e limited evidence, at the least, seems to indicate the occurrence of signifi  cant ratings 
downgrades during economic downturns in the Philippines.    
    























































Th   e next question now is whether ratings downgrades during an economic downturn 
in the Philippines would translate to changes in banks’ capital requirements that are enough 
to result in reduction in lending.  Th   e assumption is, if aggregate bank lending would decrease 
as a result of increase capital requirements, then this would mean less funds available for 
productive activities in the economy, and hence this would result in a reduction in real 
economic activity which could further fuel the economic downturn.  
4.2  Possible Impact of Ratings Downgrades During a Recession on 
Banks’ CAR
Based on the validated results of the parallel run of the existing BSP risk-based capital 
adequacy framework and the BSP Basel II implementing guidelines, only around 11.42% 
of universal banking assets have external credit ratings upon which their risk weights can 
be based. If we include regular commercial banks – which are also included in the scope of 
Basel II implementation in the Philippines, and which we may surmise as having even lesser 
holdings of exposure with external credit ratings – we may conservatively assume that 10% 
of total banking assets that are subject to Basel II in the Philippines have external credit 
ratings.
Th  is means that external credit ratings downgrades during economic downturns 
would have very little impact on banks’ capital requirements.  Assuming only 26% of the 10% 
rated banking assets will be downgraded during a recession (the 26% is based on the highest 
percentage of downgrades experienced thus far in a given year), and assuming further that 
these downgrades will result in increase in capital requirements from 0% to 10% (eff  ectively 
from 0% to 100% risk weight -  a rather very conservative assumption), the current capital 
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adequacy ratio (CAR) – assuming there is an economic downturn now – will decrease by 
only 80 bps2 (Please see Table 3 for computation).
Simulated Car Under a Recession
Table 3
(in PHP millions, using end - 2006 figures) -
Total qualifying capital
Risk weighted assets (RWA)
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR)
Total assets
10% of total assets
(assumed to be externally rated)
        448,278 
      2,422,501 
18.5%
      4,289,285 
        428,929 
Externally rated assets that will be         111,521 
downgraded during a recession
(assumed to be 26%)
Simulated RWA under recession       2,534,023 
Simulated CAR under recession 17.7%
Possible reduction in CAR 0.8%
Th  is 80 bps, however, will matter if banks’ capital requirements are binding. But 
looking at the CARs of the commercial banking industry since 2001 (the year Basel I was 
implemented by the BSP), it is very clear that the said industry is far from being capital 
constrained. Average CAR for 2001-2006 period is 17.35% (Table 3) - 7.35% higher than the 
regulatory minimum3. Put another way, this means on average actual capital of banks for 
2001 to 2006 is 74% higher than the minimum regulatory capital requirement.  
4.3  Determinants of Actual Levels of Capital
Alfon et. al. (2004) provides some reasons why actual capital levels may be greater 
than the regulatory minimum. First is that actual capital levels may be a result of internal 
capital drivers. Th  ese range from banks’ own assessment of risks which may be more 
comprehensive than the regulatory assessment, motivation by bank management such 
as future acquisitions, and bank management’s desire to minimize the adjustment cost in 
raising capital. Th   e last one may be of interest to the procyclicality issue. It is said that cost 
of raising capital varies with the cycle, where economic downturns are associated with rising 
cost due to adverse market perceptions. In order to avoid this rising cost, which occurs at the 
very time when regulatory capital requirement are supposed to increase, banks may choose 
to raise capital in good times and hold it as a buff  er. Th   is may therefore have an off  setting 
eff  ect on the procyclicality of regulatory capital requirements.  
2  Th   e author would like to point out, however, that the simulated change is only based on possible changes in RWA that will be caused by ratings 
downgrades. Reductions in CAR that may be caused by possible reductions in the value of capital during an economic downturn, as well as other 
portfolio adjustments of banks during an economic downturn, are not taken into account. It should be added though that these excluded factors also 
play a role even under the existing framework. Th   us, their procyclicality eff  ect is already there even before the Basel II implementation.
3  In addition, distribution of the latest CARs of individual domestic universal and commercial banks show that most fall within the 18%-20% range.  Th  is 
means that, on average, capital requirements for all assets would have to almost double before the minimum regulatory capital ratio is breached.
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Th  e second reason why actual capital levels may be greater than the regulatory 
minimum is the eff  ect of market discipline. Th  is may take the form of shareholders and 
investors demanding capital levels that they think appropriate to compensate for the risks that 
they bear, or a bank forced to hold a certain level of capital to access certain capital markets 
or to maintain a certain external credit rating. Th   e third reason cited was the infl  uence of 
other non-capital charge regulatory factors, such as the desire to avoid regulatory scrutiny 
or intervention should the actual capital levels approach the minimum.           
4.4  Actual Capital vs. Regulatory Minimum
Th   e next question then is whether the observed buff  er capital – the excess of actual 
capital over regulator minimum –dampens the transmission of changes in the regulatory 
minimum through to actual capital levels and potentially bank lending. Th  is dampening 
may not occur if actual capital moves with the regulatory minimum. As Taylor and Goodhart 
(2004) points out, “the balance of evidence appears to suggest that any additional cyclicality 
in regulatory capital requirements is likely to lead to some movement in actual capital (albeit 
of an unknown magnitude).”  
For the Philippines, the BSP implemented a Basel-type capital requirement only in 
2001, hence the limited data (Table 4) gives an unclear relationship between actual capital 
and regulatory minimum. Even data on capital issuances of banks seem to indicate that 
these issuances are but a result of regulatory relaxation rather than cyclical reactions4.       
Year
Table 4
HT1 and T2 




2002 6,663 4.40% -0.71% 7.43%
2003 26,500 4.90% 6.65% 11.77%
2004 6,000 6.40% 5.55% 13.63%
2005 4,500 4.90% 4.85% -0.33%
2006 29,850 5.40% 5.30% 9.76%
1/ Issuances of Hybrid Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital; in PHP millions 
5. Concluding  Remarks
In summary, the adoption of the Basel II standardized approach for credit risk by 
the BSP may have very little procyclicality eff  ect, if at all, because of two reasons: (i) the 
limited number of rated credit exposures of Philippine banks, and (ii) the signifi  cant excess 
in banks’ actual capital over the regulatory minimum.
4  Th  e  signifi  cant increase in issuances in 2003 followed the release of a BSP Memorandum, dated 17 February 2003, outlining the guidelines for the 
issuance of unsecured subordinated debt, while that in 2006 followed the release of Circular No. 503 dated 22 December 2005 allowing the use of 
Hybrid Tier 1 capital.
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Th  e use of external credit ratings to determine the capital requirement of a credit 
exposure is one element in the Basel II framework that makes it more procyclical than 
the old 1988 framework. Th  us, banks’ limited exposure to externally rated credits makes 
their capital requirements very similar to that in the old framework, and hence curtails the 
procylicality eff  ect of Basel II.
Moreover, the signifi  cant excess in banks’ actual capital over the regulatory minimum 
means that banks are not capital constrained. Th  us, any increase in capital requirements 
during an economic downturn may not result in reduction in lending since banks still have 
enough capital buff  ers to work with. Th   e only caveat to this analysis is if actual capital levels 
move with the regulatory minimum. Such co-movement may still potentially lead to a 
transmission of changes in the regulatory minimum through to bank lending.  Unfortunately, 
the relatively recent adoption of the Basel capital standards in the Philippines provides us 
with very little information as to the relationship of actual levels of capital and the regulatory 
minimum.  At the moment, however, it can be said that changes in the level of banks’ actual 
capital is driven more by regulatory relaxation than cyclical reaction.  
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CHAPTER 8
1.  Introduction to Sri Lanka’s Banking System
Th   e banking sector is the dominant sub-sector within the fi  nancial sector of Sri Lanka 
with a total assets of US$ 21bn accounting for around 60% of the total fi  nancial system assets 
of US$ 36bn. Total assets of the banking industry was around 1.4 times the GDP as at the 
end of 2nd quarter of 2007. Th   e banking system comprises of 23 Licensed Commercial Banks 
(LCBs)1 and 15 Licensed Specialised Banks (LSBs)1 with a total number of 38 banks. LCBs 
include 2 state banks, 12 foreign banks and 9 domestic private banks (Table1). 
Licensed commercial banks (LCBs), which undertake a wide array of fi  nancial services 
including payment services, dominate the banking sector in Sri Lanka with a share of about 
82.5 per cent of banking assets. Th   e deposits held by the public with LCBs constituted 89 
per cent of money in circulation in the consolidated broad money supply (M2b) and 75 
per cent of broad money supply, M4 (it covers the balance sheets of the CBSL, LCBs, LSBs 
and Finance Companies), which is a broader monetary aggregate. Further, of the bank 
branch network, 3,516 banking outlets or 89 per cent of the total bank branches operating 
in the country are operated by LCBs providing banking services to a broader geographical 
clientele. Two LCBs have overseas branches, though their overseas operations to operate 
exchange houses overseas, especially to attract migrant remittances to take advantage of the 
growing remittance business. 
Licensed specialised banks (LSBs), the other category of banks, which mainly cater to 
projects with long-gestation periods or strategic sectors for socio economic development are 
relatively less systemically important in comparison to the LCBs, both in terms of size and 
their impact on the payment and settlement system. Th   ese banks account for about 17.5 per 
cent of total assets of the banking sector. Th   e contribution of deposits of LSBs to the money 
supply (M4) was 18 per cent compared with 75 per cent by LCBs.
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL II IN SRI LANKA
by H. Anuradha Hettihewa*
*  Author is Assistant Director of the Bank Supervision Department of Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Th   is paper is a part of the SEACEN research project. 
Th   e views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
1  Th  e  diff  erence between LCBs and LSBs are; LSBs cannot accept demand deposits and cannot deal in foreign exchange transactions.
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22 1,374 22 1,417 23 1,530
11 1,342 11 1,380 11 1,491
11 32 11 37 12 39
14 406 14 369 14 376
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Even though the banking sector comprises of 23 LCBs and 15 LSBs, 6 LCBs account 
for the major share of banking sector assets. Th  ese LCBs, which are oft  en referred to as 
systemically important banks (SIBs), consist of two state commercial banks and the four 
largest domestic private commercial banks. SIBs represent about 77.5 per cent of total assets 
of the commercial banking sector. In terms of deposits, the SIBs hold a market share of 
82.6 per cent and 68.7 per cent of LCB sector and banking sector deposits, respectively. 
Th   erefore, the stability and soundness of the six SIBs are vital. Hence only LCBs’ fi  nancials 
has been considered for this paper.
2.  Overview of Basel II Implementation in Sri Lanka
 
2.1  Development of Basel II in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka adopted Basel I in 1993. Credit risk was the only risk element captured in the 
calculation of capital adequacy under Basel I. In April 2005, CBSL enhanced the minimum 
capital requirement of LCBs from Rs.500Mn to Rs.2,500Mn and of LSBs from Rs.200Mn to 
Rs.1,500Mn to strengthen the banking industry, which inturn facilitates implementing Basel 
II in Sri Lanka. Th   e existing licensed banks were given time till December 2009 to meet the 
shortfall of the minimum capital requirement.
2  Number of bank branches per 100,000 persons.
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As a pre-requisite to the implementation of Basel II, Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) 
has introduced the capital charge for market risk for the capital adequacy computation under 
Basel I, based on the standardised measurement method, with eff  ect from 31 March 2006. 
To facilitate this, guidelines on the ‘Classifi  cation of Investment Securities’ were issued by 
CBSL. 
CBSL has decided to implement Basel II for all banks with eff  ect from January 
2008. Th   e Standardised Approach will be adopted for calculating credit risk, Standardised 
Measurement Method for market risk and the Basic Indicator Approach for calculating 
operational risk. CBSL may consider allowing banks to migrate to Internal Ratings Based 
(IRB) approaches aft  er adequate skills have been acquired, both in banks and at the 
supervisory level.  
At present, the minimum capital adequacy ratio stipulated in Sri Lanka is 10% as 
against the Basel’s recommendation of 8%.  
2.2  Overview of Basel II Implementation in Sri Lanka
Since the implementation of Basel II involves enhanced banking risk management 
practices, CBSL formed a Basel II Sub-Committee of the Sri Lanka Banks’ Association 
(SLBA) in January 2006 in order to fi  nalize the modalities for implementing Basel II. 
Further, the Sub-Committee formed a forum for the banking industry to discuss the 
implementation issues and solutions for them. Th   e regulations in terms of the legal provisions 
for the implementation of Basel II were issued in 2006 and the banks were required to have 
a parallel application of the new rules commencing from the fi  rst quarter of 2006.   
A ‘Consultative Paper on the Implementation of the New Capital Adequacy Frame 
Work – Basel II’ was issued in June 2007 with the simplest approaches, revising the draft   
guidelines issued in March 2006. It has incorporated Pillar 3 requirements and resource 
requirement for the implementation of IT infrastructure. Th  e banks were required to 
undertake a parallel run on a quarterly basis, based on such revised guidelines commencing 
June 2007 until the implementation of Basel II in January 2008.
Parallel computation accuracy check of around 20 banks was carried out for the 
quarter ended June 2007 and banks have been encouraged to develop their systems to 
facilitate the Basel II requirements and for accurate reporting on it. Th  e impact study of 
Basel II on all banks found that the average capital adequacy ratio decline by 10 percentage 
points. At the same time the Basel II help desk of the Department of Bank Supervision, 
CBSL was set up in June 2007 to assist the banking industry in clarifying the Basel II capital 
adequacy computation as per the ‘Consultative Paper on the Implementation of the New 
Capital Adequacy Frame Work – Basel II’. Awareness programmes have been arranged for 
the banking industry staff   of Sri Lanka with the issuance of the Consultative Paper and 
supervisory training arrangements for the staff   of Bank Supervision Department have been 
carried out for the last few years to facilitate the implementation.
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2.3 Th   e Banking Indicators in Sri Lanka
 
Th   e banking indicators in Sri Lanka are detailed in Annex. 1. Th   e asset quality and 
capital adequacy of the banking industry have improved over time, providing greater risk 
absorption capacity of banks.
3. Th   e Nature and Defi  nition of Data
3.1 Data  Sources
To estimate the VAR model, this study uses monthly data from 2000:01 to 2007:06 
for each variable: interest rate (issued by CBSL), exchange rate, deposits, loans, capital, risk 
weighted assets, capital adequacy ratio, securities owned by banks, consumer price index, 
stock market index, and GDP (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Data Sources



















Securities Owned by Banks











Department of Census and Statistics
Colombo Stock Exchange
Department of Census and Statistics
Data collected from the Department of Bank Supervision (BSD), Database of CBSL , 
are based on audited annual accounts and unaudited monthly returns sent to BSD by each 
LCB including the domestic banking units, off  shore banking units and all branches. 
3.2 Defi  nitions
Defi  nitions of variables are annexed (Annex. 2).
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3.3 Data  Simulation
Basel II will be implemented in Sri Lanka in January 2008. Until such time Basel 
I is the regulatory requirement for capital adequacy. Th  erefore when converting Basel I 
data to Basel II data, the following assumptions were made based on the June 2007 parallel 
computation results under Basel II; (a) Tier I and total capital base under Basel II is equal 
to 90% of Basel I; and (b) Proportion of claims risk weighted assets reported in June 2007 
under Basel II were used for past data (Figure 1). Further quarterly data on Tier I capital, 
total capital and GDP were assumed to be linearly distributed in the intervening months.
Figure 1






















RWA CAR (Tier II)
4. Specifi  cations of the VAR Model
4.1 Th   e Semi-Structural VAR Model
Analysis of pro-cyclicality of Basel II through lending on real economy would be based 
on empirical standard semi-structural Vector Auto Regression (VARs) models by Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992) of the form given in equation (1). Th   e VAR model would be employed 
since this methodology avoids the need for a complete specifi  cation of a structural model of 
the economy. It can be presented as follows:
(1)  Syt = A(L)yt + єt
A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L for a VAR (p):
(2)  A(L) = A1L + A2L2 + K + ApLp
Th   e Moving Average (MA) representation of 2 is:
(3)  yt = Φ(L)єt
Where   Φ(L) = [S – A(L)]-1 .
  
Th   en, a reduced form of equation (1) is estimated by OLS:
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(4)  yt = S-1 A(L)yt + S-1ΨDt + ut
Where;
(5)  ut = S-1 єt, and
(6) 
  
     ’ given the assumption:
 
So S-1 is the Cholesky decomposition of Ω, the reduced-form covariance matrix. 
Furthermore, the dynamic responses to shocks are summarized by the moving average 
(MA) representation (assuming that the process is invertible):
(7)  yt =  [I – S-1 A(L)]–1 ut = [I – S-1A(L)]S-1 єt
It is assumed that all the roots of    = 0 remain outside the unit circle in 
absolute value, or are in 1 in the presence of cointegration and unit roots. In this sense, the 
companion matrix has roots that are less than one in absolute value or are equal to plus 1. In 
those circumstances the VAR is (mathematically) stable.
Th  erefore, the Cholesky decomposition of Ω provides the zero restrictions (to 
complement the ½ p(p +1) constrains) on Ω needed to identify the elements of S-1. Th  e  latter 
is lower-triangular matrix. Th   e way in which the variables aff  ect each other is determined by 
their position in the ordering. In this sense, the contemporaneous innovations in the other 
variables infl  uence all those below them in the chain and none of those variables above them 
in the order. Th   e ordering of the variables in the system, therefore infl  uences the recursive 
chain of causality among the shocks in any given period. Th   is study identifi  es shocks using 
the Cholesky decomposition, which imposes a recursive structure on the VAR model.
4.2  Variables of Interest
In examining the eff  ects of monetary policy on the bank balance sheet, we adopt 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1995) in specifying the VAR. Based on 
such possible relationship as found by Gertler and Gilchrist above, we develop the system 
involving eleven variables VARs as described in the 4.1 above. 
5.  Results of the Empirical Study
5.1     Unit Root Tests
We fi rst examine the stationarity of each stochastic variable applying three standard 
tests for the stationary process, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and Phillips-Perron 
(PP) tests. Th  e  computer  soft  ware applied is E-Views 5. All specifi  cations include a constant 
term, either with or without a trend, and up to nine lags. 
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According to the ADF tests (Table 3), most of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic values are smaller than the critical values. Th   erefore null hypotheses (variables have 
unit root) are accepted. However for deposits, loans, capital and RWA, ADF test statistics 
without a linear trend (τμ) rejects the null hypotheses, I(0). Further fi  rst diff  erences of all 
variables appear to be stationary.
τμ ττ τμ ττ
Table 3
















































































































Notes: (1) τμ , Exogenous: Constant; ττ , Exogenous: Constant with Linear Trend.  (2) Numbers in 
parentheses are MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. (3) ***Indicates significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, and * significant at 10%. (4) Lag Length:  9 (Automatic selection based on Schwarz Information 
Criterio, MAXLAG = 9).
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As the generation of the data series on the variables is likely subject to a structural 
change, the Phillips-Perron test is used for checking stationarity. In the case of Sri Lanka, the 
interest rates including repurchase rate announced by CBSL exhibit a structural break at the 
beginning of 2001 (Figure 10 in Annex), when the Sri Lanka Rupee was fl  oated and interest 
rates were increased to support the exchange rate. 
Notes:(1) τμ
τμ
 , Exogenous: Constant; ττ
ττ τμ ττ
 , Exogenous: Constant with Linear Trend.  (2) Numbers in 
parentheses are MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. (3) ***Indicates significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, and * significant at 10%. (4) Bandwidth: 4 (Newey-West using Bartlett Kernel spectral estimation method).
Table 4 
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As per the results of PP tests (Table 4), the non-stationary null hypothesis of the unit 
roots for most of the variables cannot be rejected. However for deposits, loans, capital and 
RWA, PP test statistics without a linear trend (τμ) rejects the null hypotheses, I(0). Further 
fi  rst diff  erences of all variables appear to be stationary with the rejection of the unit root 
hypotheses even at a 1% signifi  cant level. Th  erefore,  fi  rst diff  erences of all eleven variable 
series in the sample are integrated of order zero, I(0).
5.2 Impulse  Response  Eff  ects
Since the time series data for eleven fi  rst diff  erence variables are stationary, we 
conduct the VAR model estimation and perform the impulse response analysis. Impulse 
responses show the responses of the point-to-point growth in GDP to a one-standard 
deviation (positive) change (shock) in the other endogenous variables in the model. In this 
paper we attempt to investigate the degree of pro-cyclicality impact of Basel II in Sri Lanka. 
Our objective is to scrutinize whether the requirement of minimum regulatory capital as per 
Basel II overstate the magnitude and economic signifi  cance of pro-cyclcicality in the new 
accord relative to the existing capital requirement in Sri Lanka. Th   e following graphs (Figure 
2) show the impulse response of GDP to one standard deviation change (shock) in the other 
endogenous variable in the model. 
Figure 2
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations








































Response of DGDP to DRWA




























































Response of DGDP to DSMI
Since the impulse responses of interest rates, exchange rates, deposits, loans, capital, 
RWA, securities owned by banks, consumer price index to GDP around the horizontal axes 
are near zero and falls into the confi  dence interval completely, such variables do not have any 
signifi  cant eff  ect on the GDP. Although the responses to such variables are not signifi  cant, 
it can be seen that the direction of the changes in the point-to-point growth in the GDP in 
response to changes in those variables is empirically consistent.
However, at a signifi  cant level of 5 per cent, the responses to the CAR and stock 
market index are less signifi  cant within 2 – 4 months given that both the upper and lower 
bounds of these response functions are diff  erent from zero in one direction. Th  e  point-to-
point growth in the GDP increases within 2 – 3 months in response to CAR and the shock 
dies out towards the 10th period. On the other hand, point-to-point growth in the GDP 
decreases within 2 – 3 months in response to stock market index and the shock disappears 
towards the 10th period.   
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Given that the capital adequacy ratio aff  ect the real economy through bank lending, 
the impulse response of loans to one standard deviation innovations in CAR is considered 
(Figure 3). Th   e results demonstrate that the CAR does not have any signifi  cant eff  ect on 
bank lending and vice versa. 
Response of CAR and Loans
Figure 3
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E
Response of DTCR to DCAR
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5.3 Variance  Decomposition
Further to the impulse response, variance decomposition of the point-to-point 
growth in the GDP gives the changes in the variable GDP attributable to each of the other 
selected variables (Table 5). As per the results aft  er 10 months, about 58% of the variance 
in the point-to-point growth in GDP is from itself; about 12% of the variance is from the 
point-to-point growth in CAR and stock market index; about 3% of the variance is from the 
point-to-point growth in loans; etc. Th   erefore it provides evidence to the results of impulse 
response and shows that there is an impact of CAR and stock market index on the GDP of 
Sri Lanka.    
































Variance Decomposition of Selected Variables
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6.  Analysis of the Empirical Results
As seen from the empirical results, the insignifi  cant eff  ect was noted for interest rates, 
exchange rates, deposits, loans, capital, RWA, securities owned by banks and consumer price 
index. However, it showed a minor signifi  cant eff  ect of CAR and stock market index. As 
per the simulated data for Basel II (Figure 1), it was noted that the capital adequacy ratio 
dropped to 6% during the year 2003, which was below the 8% minimum requirement during 
that period. Th  ereaft  er it increased to around 8% as CBSL revised the guideline of CAR to 
9% in 2002. However, CAR improved to around 12% with the direction issued by CBSL 
amending the minimum CAR to 10% since 2003. 
7.  Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed whether the requirement of regulatory capital as 
required by Basel II overstate the magnitude and economic signifi  cance of pro-cyclicality 
relative to the existing capital requirement in Sri Lanka.
Monthly data was selected from 2000:01 to 2007:06 for each variable: interest rate 
(issued by CBSL), exchange rate, deposits, loans, capital, risk weighted assets, capital 
adequacy ratio, securities owned by banks, consumer price index, stock market index, and 
GDP. 
Th   e literature surveys indicate mixed results on whether the requirement of regulatory 
capital as required by Basel II overstate the magnitude and economic signifi  cance of pro-
cyclicality relative to the existing capital requirement.
Th   e results of this study, which was based on simulated data, indicate that the impact 
of changes in CAR on GDP of Sri Lanka is marginal in the short run. However, the lending 
behaviour in Sri Lanka is mainly based on collateral and not on information. On the other 
hand, the Basel II capital adequacy framework focuses on information based lending rather 
than collateral based lending as it considers external rating of customers, etc. Th  erefore,  with 
greater use of external ratings in lending activities by banks, the results of this study would 
diff  er in future.
Th   is study was supported by the simulated data for Basel II based on the results of 
the parallel computations. Th   e results drawn from using actual data under Basel II could be 
diff  erent from the current fi  ndings.
Th   e scope of the study could be expanded to examine whether diff  erent results would 
be obtained if data relating to diff  erent categories of borrowers based on their risk profi  le 
(eg: corporate customers, SME customers, etc) are used instead of aggregate data. 
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Annex 1
Th   e Banking Indicators in Sri Lanka
Th   e data of key fi  nancial indicators of the banking industry are from year 2000 to 
June 2007.
1. Total  Assets
Total assets of Sri Lanka’s banking industry have increased by 31% on average (Figure 
9). Th  is increase has been supported by the enhancement of capital of licensed banks 

































Total deposit base increased on average 18% – 20% during last 5 years (Figure 5) and 
consists of 74% of rupee deposits and 26% of foreign currency deposits. Rupee deposits 
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3. Loan  Performance
Loans and advances portfolio of Sri Lanka banking industry has been growing on 
average 24% - 25% during last fi  ve years. 21% of such portfolio consists of overdraft  s. In 
terms of loans, which are 72% of total portfolio, 29% are trading, 19% are consumption, 16% 
housing and 9% industrial loans. 
Figure 6
Loan Performance


























4.  Non-Performing Loans (NPL)
While loans and advances portfolio grew by 37% on average, NPL (gross) increased 
only by 11%. As a result NPL (gross) showed a 12.27pp decline since year 2000. 
Th   e provision coverage has currently increased from 59% in January 2005 to 67% in 
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5. CDR  (Credit/Deposit  Ratio)
CDR has been increasing in recent past as a result of high credit growth (Figure 6). 
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6.  RWA (Risk Weighted Assets)
 
RWA has increased by 35% on average during last 7 years as a result of the increase in 
share of loans from 58% in year 2000 to 65% of total assets in year 2007 (Figure 7). 
Further, the aforementioned growth resulted from the increase in risk weights 
on ‘loans secured by primary mortgage over residential property’ and ‘other loans and 
advances’ up to 55% (from 50%) and 110% (from 100%) respectively.
7.  CAR (Capital Adequacy Ratio) 
As Tier II capital increased by 42% on average, which is higher than the increase of 
RWA (34% on average), CAR has increased by 2.04pp over the last 7 years. 
A continuous improvement in CAR was recorded during the last 2 years as a 
consequence of enhancement of minimum capital requirement of licensed banks and the 
infusion of new capital by foreign banks with the change of computation base for single 
borrower limit (SBL). 
8. Interest  Rates 
Main policy interest rates of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka are repurchase rates and 
reverse repurchase rates. Th   ere are several money market interest rates including weighted 
average call money market rate, Treasury bill rates (91 days, 182 days, 364 days) and Sri 
Lanka inter bank off  er rates (SLIBOR – overnight, 7 days, 1 month). In addition, average 
prime lending rates (AWPR – weekly) of LCBs are also issued by CBSL. 
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Th  ese interest rates have the same volatility (Figure 10) and are highly correlated. 
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9. Exchange  Rate
Both month end exchange rate and monthly average rate of Sri Lanka Rupees to USD 
rate showed the same growth rate and similar pattern of volatility during the period (Figure 
11). Th   erefore month end exchange rate has been used for the fi  nal model.
Figure 10
Interest Rates
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Annex 2
Defi  nitions of Variables
1.  Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) =           Regulatory Capital           ≤ 10%
   Total Risk Weighted Amount
2.  Regulatory Capital = Tier I + Tier II + Tier III capital
Tier I capital includes;
a.  Paid-up ordinary shares/ common stock/ assigned capital
b.  Non-cumulative, non-redeemable preference shares
c. Share  premium
d.  Statutory reserve fund
e.  Published retained profi  ts/ (accumulated losses)
f.  General and other reserves
g.  Surplus/ loss aft  er tax arising from the sale of fi  xed and long-term investments 
h.  Unpublished current year’s profi  t/ losses
i.  Minority interests (consistent with the above capital constituents)
j.  Approved perpetual debt capital instruments
k.  Less: Goodwill; Net deferred tax assets; Other intangible assets; Advances 
granted to employees of the bank for the purchase of shares of the bank under 
a share ownership plan; Amount due from head offi     ce & branches outside 
Sri Lanka in Sri Lanka Rupees (applicable only to branches of foreign banks); 
Amount due to head offi   ce & branches outside Sri Lanka in Sri Lanka Rupees 
(-)(applicable only to branches of foreign banks); Amount due from head offi   ce   
& branches outside Sri Lanka in Foreign Currency (applicable only to branches 
of foreign banks); 50% of Investments in Unconsolidated Banking and Financial 
Subsidiary Companies; and 50% of Investments in Unconsolidated Banking and 
Financial Subsidiary Companies
Tier II capital includes;
a.  Revaluation reserves (approved by CBSL)
b. General  provisions
c.  Hybrid capital instruments (Debt/Equity)
d.  Minority interests arising from preference shares issued by subsidiaries
e.  Approved subordinated term debt
f.  Less: 50% of Investments in Unconsolidated Banking and Financial Subsidiary 
Companies; and 50% of Investments in Unconsolidated Banking and Financial 
Subsidiary Companies
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Tier III capital includes Approved Short Term Subordinated Debt. Th  is must at a 
minimum: (i) be unsecured, subordinated and fully paid up, (ii) have an original maturity 
of at least two years, (iii) not be repayable before the agreed repayment date unless the prior 
consent of CBSL is obtained and (iv) be subject to a lock-in clause which stipulates that 
neither interest nor principal may be paid (even at maturity) if such payment means that the 
bank falls below or remains below its minimum capital requirement.
3.  Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) = Risk Weighted Amount for Credit Risk + (Total 
Capital Charge for Market Risk + Total Capital Charge for Operational Risk) * 10
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CHAPTER 9
1.  Overview of Basel-II Implementation in ROC (Taiwan)1
1.1  Development of Basel-II
Th  e Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was set up under the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) in 1974. In 1988, it issued the Basel Capital Accord, or Basel-
I, which required banks’ capital-adequacy ratios to be not less than eight percent.
Th   e Basel Committee issued the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework,” referred to as the New Basel Capital Accord, 
or Basel-II, in June 2004. Th   e main goal of Basel-II is to strengthen risk management within 
the banking industry by emphasizing the three pillars of minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review process, and market discipline.
1.2  Overview of Basel -II Implementation in ROC (Taiwan)
ROC (Taiwan) is a small, open and emerging economy, known for its “economic 
miracle.” In addition to its remarkable economic growth, ROC (Taiwan) is also advanced 
in sound fi  nancial market development through the government’s promotion of fi  nancial 
liberalization and institutional reforms (Chiu 1998). 
Prior to the 1990s, ROC (Taiwan)’s fi  nancial system was characterized by regulation 
and conservatism. Stable growth, rather than market competition and effi   ciency, was the 
primary concern of banks. Th   eir average return-on-equity ratio exceeded 20 percent (TABF 
2005). Nevertheless, the government paid considerable attention to Basel-I issued in 1988. 
Article 44 of the Banking Act was revised accordingly in 1989 requiring the capital-adequacy 
ratios of banks to be not less than eight percent.
Since the 1990s, the government has speeded up fi  nancial liberalization to keep 
abreast of the globalization trend and the domestic economic development. Th  e  Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) promulgated the Regulations Governing the Establishment of Commercial       
Banks in April 1990. From then to 1992, 16 new private banks were set up, each with a 
minimum capital requirement of NT$10 billion. Many investment and trust companies and 
credit cooperatives were also converted into commercial banks. Hence, Taiwan’s fi  nancial 
sector entered an era of intense competition. 
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL-II IN ROC 
(TAIWAN)
by Johnny T. C. Hou*
*  Th   is paper is part of the SEACEN research project. Th   e views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Central 
Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).
1  ROC (Taiwan) refers to the Republic of China (Taiwan).
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In 1992, the Regulations Governing the Capital Adequacy Ratio of Banks were 
implemented. Furthermore, the Enforcement Rules of the Act of Privatization of Government-
Owned Enterprises were also amended in 1992. Subsequently, the privatization of Chan Hwa 
Bank, First Bank, and Hua Nan Bank was completed in 1998. Meanwhile, the Regulations 
Governing the Capital Adequacy Ratio of Banks were revised to incorporate market-risk 
capital requirements. Of the total assets of all fi  nancial institutions, assets of private banks 
rose from 8.9 percent in 1991 to 51.5 percent in 2001, while those of public banks declined 
from 53.7 percent to 19.7 percent during the same period.
 In 2001, fi  nancial holding companies were allowed to be established. A cross-agency 
Basel-II task force was also set up. As fi  nancial holding companies merged together sub-
sectors, boundaries within the fi  nancial sector were increasingly blurred. Th  e  supervisory 
framework with sub-sector-based division and responsibilities shared by three authorities 
was thus severely challenged. To consolidate the framework into one single organization, the 
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was inaugurated in July 2004.
In 2005, in compliance with the Basel-II capital accord issued by the BIS, the 
Regulations Governing the Capital Adequacy Ratio of Banks were revised by the FSC. Starting 
in 2007, Basel-II was formally implemented in ROC (Taiwan). 
Th   e New Basel Capital Accord not only changes the capital calculation and reserve 
method, but it also asserts the concept of establishing and promoting a banking risk- 
management system. Taiwan aims to follow the BIS schedule for Basel-II implementation in 
accordance with the international regulations (FSC 2004, 2006).
1.   Setting up a Basel-II Joint Taskforce
  To facilitate banks’ appropriate actions to implement Basel-II and to foster 
improvement in banks’ risk-management practices, the Banking Bureau of the FSC 
and the Bankers Association of the Republic of China established the Basel-II Joint 
Task Force in 2001. Th   e Task Force comprises 28 domestic banks and two non-profi  t 
organizations—the Joint Credit Information Center (JCIC) and the Taiwan Academy 
of Banking and Finance (TABF).
2.   Major achievements of the Task Force
  By the end of July 2006, the Basel-II Joint Task Force had completed the following 
work (with the relevant research results published on the FSC’s website (FSC 2006).
2.1  It completed analyses of the implications of the fi  nal release of Basel-II (June 2004).
2.2   It conducted three studies on the quantitative impact of Basel-II based on banks’ data 
of 2002, 2003 and 2005.
2.3   It proposed a tentative draft   of the capital requirements for banks’ operational risk, 
credit risk, market risk and securitization.
3.   Integrated platform for credit- risk analytical databases
3.1    According to the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach, the minimum data 
observation period for Probability of Default (PD) estimates is fi  ve years, while that 
for Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure at Default (EAD) estimates is seven years. 
Banks face a serious problem of insuffi   cient data available to apply the IRB approach.
3.2   Th  e JCIC set up an Integrated Data Research Platform and is in the process of 
constructing the Integrated Credit Assessment Models Platform, which would be 
accessible for banks in ROC (Taiwan).
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4.  Quantitative impact study on ROC (Taiwan)’s banking sector
  A quantitative impact study on all the 47 domestic banks was conducted by the 
Basel- II Joint Task Force based on the tentative draft   of the capital requirements as of 
June 30, 2005. Th   e Standardized approach to credit risk and the Basic Indicator (BI) 
approach to operational risk were applied and the following results were found:
4.1   Th   e average capital adequacy ratio decreased by 0.35 of a percentage point, refl  ecting 
the impact of the change in credit-risk capital.
4.2   Th   e ratio decreased by about one percentage point resulting from the required capital 
for operational risk.
5.  Approach to implementing Basel- II in ROC (Taiwan)
  ROC (Taiwan) aims to follow the BIS schedule for Basel- II implementation. In 
January 2007, the Standardized approach and the Foundation Internal Ratings-Based 
(FIRB) approach to credit risk became available, and so did the BI approach and the 
Standardized approach to operational risk.
5.1   For banks failing to adjust themselves to this new framework, the FSC may extend 
time limits according to their readiness.
5.2  For banks wishing to adopt the IRB approach, the FSC will leave the choice of approach 
entirely to the banks, support and encourage them, but not in a compulsory manner.
  According to a recent survey conducted by the FSC, for credit risk four banks are 
planning to adopt the FIRB approach and the rest are planning for the Standardized 
approach. For operational risk, eight banks are planning for the Standardized approach 
and the rest are planning for the BI approach.
6.  Risk-based and market-based regulatory system
6.1   Banks are required to report capital adequacy ratios on a quarterly basis since May 
2007.
6.2  Starting in 2008, the FSC will periodically review and evaluate banks’ internal capital 
adequacy assessments and the robustness of their internal control systems. Th  e  FSC 
will also require each bank to perform a self-assessment of its capital-adequacy 
strategy annually.
6.3  Starting in 2008, the FSC will set up a mechanism to disclose timely information on 
banks’ fi  nancial and business activities, corporate governance, and risk management 
operations.
 Th   e FSC plans to guide banks towards a more sophisticated risk-sensitive management 
system and establish a more resilient and reliable banking system in Taiwan.
Seacen_Pungky.indb   159 Seacen_Pungky.indb   159 6/27/2008   2:14:14 PM 6/27/2008   2:14:14 PM160
1.3   Pro-cyclicality Eff  ect of Basel-II 
Mendis (2005) pointed out that the ultimate objective of Basel-II is “fi  nancial stability.” 
Caruana (2006) also explained the main reason for implementing Basel-II: “No bank can 
maintain public trust for long if it lacks suffi   cient capital, so supervisors impose capital 
requirements to safeguard the banking system. Since capital is the last line of defense against 
bank insolvency, regulatory capital requirements are one of the fundamental elements of 
banking supervision.” He further noted, “Basel-II will contribute to a more resilient and 
stable banking system that is capable of promoting sustainable economic growth.”
However, concerns have been raised regarding the likely pro-cyclicality eff  ects of 
Basel-II. Alan Greenspan (2002) addressed this concern: “It is evident that regulatory rules 
can add to ongoing macroeconomic and asset quality cyclicality. Rules are constraints or 
limits that require responses as those limits are approached. Sometimes those limits - say 
capital constraints -may induce tighter lending standards or shrinking balance sheets for a 
number of institutions at the same time, engendering signifi  cant real business-cycle eff  ects. 
We must, therefore, be aware of the implications beyond the original intent of a rule and 
consider its associated tradeoff  s.”
Eva et al (2003) remarked, “Rating schemes that are designed to be more stable over 
the cycle, akin to those of the external rating agencies, would not increase pro-cyclicality, 
but ratings that are conditioned on the current point in the cycle, akin in some respects to a 
Merton approach, could substantially increase pro-cyclicality.”
An empirical study on the correlation between industry sector default rates and 
business cycles based on ROC (Taiwan)’s data suggests that Basel-II tends to be pro-
cyclicality. For example, Point-in-Time (PIT) ratings can be replaced by Th  rough-the-Cycle 
(TTC) ratings in the Standardized approach and FIRB approach to alleviate some negative 
eff  ects, but pro-cyclicality cannot be completely removed (Sheng 2005a, 2005b).
Repullo and Suarez (2007) used a calibration method on a dynamic general equilibrium 
model to analyse the impact of the transition from Basel-I to a more risk sensitive Basel-II 
on capital buff  ers. Basel-II capital requirements slightly reduce the long-term risk of bank 
defaults, but exacerbate the pro-cyclicality of capital buff  ers. Th  e  high  buff  ers in boom times 
will be insuffi   cient to meet capital demands in bad times, causing apparent credit crunch.
In theory, the pro-cyclical eff  ects of Basel-II mainly result from the following factors:
1)    Basel-II implementation will amplify pro-cyclicality as Basel-II adopters severely 
tighten credit standards in response to rising capital requirements in bad times.
2)   Herding  behaviour:  Th  e uniformity imposed by Basel-II in calculating capital 
requirements will result in homogeneous assessment of risk, which in turn will 
amplify herding behaviours in the marketplace.
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ROC (Taiwan) had promoted minimum capital ratios in compliance with Basel-I 
since 1989. Starting in 2007, Basel-II has been implemented to enhance the risk sensitivity 
and risk management of fi  nancial institutions.
In practice the extent to which the impact of the pro-cyclical eff  ects of Basel-II on the 
ROC (Taiwan) economy is an empirical question. What follows is an empirical study using 
the VAR approach suggested by Th   e SEACEN Centre on ROC (Taiwan)’s existing data.
2. Specifi  cations of the VAR Model
Sims’ (1980) classic paper “Macroeconomics and Reality” argued that vector 
autoregression (VAR) would be a useful tool in constructing and evaluating the infl  uences 
of monetary policies and business-cycle fl  uctuations. Given a minimal set of assumptions, 
structural VARs allow one to estimate the dynamic eff  ects of economic shocks. Furthermore, 
the VAR approach sidesteps the need for structural modeling by treating every endogenous 
variable in the system as a function of the lagged values of the entire variables in the 
system. 
Th  e estimated impulse-response functions provide a natural way to evaluate the 
interactions and shocks of the key macroeconomic variables of interest. Christiano et al 
(2006) concluded that structural VARs are unlikely to lead to misleading inferences in 
practice, even when misspecifi  ed. In particular, they found that even with misspecifi  ed 
structural VARs, the bias in the estimated impulse responses is typically small relative to 
the width of the confi  dence interval. Th   eir conclusions suggest that when correctly used, 
structural VARs can provide a useful insight into the character of aggregate fl  uctuations.
2.1   Th   e Semi-Structural VAR Model
Analysis of the pro-cyclicality eff  ects of Basel-II through lending on the real economy 
would be based on empirical standard semi-structural VAR models (as suggested by the 
research project leader Dr. Punkgy, 2007). In this paper, we employ the semi-structural 
VAR approach of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) of the form given in equation (1). It can be 
presented as follows:
Syt = A(L)yt + εt
A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L for a VAR (p):
A(L) = A1L + A2L2 + K + ApLp
Th   e moving average representation is: 
yt = Ф(L)εt
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Where Ф(L) = [S – A(L)]-1
We then employ the OLS method to estimate the reduce-form equation:
 yt = S-1 A(L)yt + S-1ΨDt + μt, Where μt = S-1εt,
    ,
Given the assumption: 
Th  us,  S-1 is the Cholesky decomposition of, the reduced form covariance Ω matrix, 
given that the structural) innovations are orthogonal. Furthermore, if the process satisfi  es 
invertibility conditions, the dynamic responses to shocks are summarized by the moving 
average representation:
yt = [I – S-1 A(L)]-1μt = [I – S-1 A(L)]-1S-1εt
It is assumed that all the eigenvalues of    = 0 remain outside the unit 
circle in absolute value, or are 1 in the presence of cointegration and unit roots. In this sense, 
the companion matrix has characteristic roots that are less than one in absolute value or are 
equal to plus 1. Under those circumstances the VAR is mathematically stable, and the system 
is then a Wold-causal chain or recursive model.
Th   e residuals covariance matrix of the recursive model is a lower-triangular matrix. 
Strictly assuming the way in which the variables aff  ect each other is determined by their 
position in the ordering. Th   at is, the contemporaneous innovations in the other variables 
infl  uence all those below them in the chain and none of those variables above them in the 
order. What our study relies on to identify shocks is the Cholesky decomposition, which 
imposes a recursive structure on the VAR model. In brief, the ordering of the variables in the 
system infl  uences the research result.
2.2   Variables of Interest
Th  is paper is based on the relationship found by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and 
Kashyap and Stein (1994) in specifying the VARs. We develop the system involving nine 
variables VARs with the following ordering (see variables listed below): exchange rates (Exr), 
inter-bank money market rates (Oni), bank deposits (Depo), bank loans (Loan), capital 
adequacy ratios (CAR), regulatory minimum capital as calculated by Basel-II standards), 
bank securities (Secu), stock-market indices (Pstk), general prices as represented by the   
Consumer Price Index (CPI), and output (real GDP).
























Financial Statistics Monthly 
Financial Statistics Monthly 
Supervisory Database, CBC 
Supervisory Database, CBC 
Supervisory Database, CBC 
Supervisory Database, CBC 
Financial Statistics Monthly 
Price Statistics Monthly 
Quarterly Economic Trends 
Notes:  financial statistics databases of Taiwan in AREMOS, and supervisory
  databases of CBC.
Although in generalized impulses analysis, Pesaran and Shin (1998) constructed an 
orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering, however, in this 
study we still employ Cholesky impulses analysis.
3.  Results of the Empirical Study
As Philips (1986) demonstrated, any OLS regressions that are based on the levels of 
the time series variables are spurious. We fi  rst examine the stationarity of each stochastic 
variable. Two standard tests for the stationary process, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, are applied to examine the null of the unit roots in each 
variable.
Th   e computer soft  ware applied is Eviews6. All specifi  cations include a constant term, 
either with or without a trend, and up to nine lags. Th   e sample period consists of quarterly 
data from the fi  rst quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2006, and the data sources include 
the fi  nancial statistics databases of Taiwan in AREMOS and the supervisory databases of the 
Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (CBC).
3.1   Unit Root Tests
Table 2 reports the ADF test results. It is diffi   cult to draw defi  nitive conclusions 
from such a study. Based on the results in Table 2, the non-stationary null hypothesis for 
most of the level variables cannot be rejected. For CAR and Loan in particular, the ADF 
test statistics with drift   suggests that with or without a linear trend they are I(0). However, 
the fi  rst diff  erences of most variables appear to be stationary with the rejection of the unit 
root hypotheses. For the CPI in particular, the ADF test suggests that the CPI is I(2) at the 
standard signifi  cance level. But the evidence is not conclusive.





























































































ADF Unit Root Tests 
Notes: (1)     , Exogenous: Constant;      , Exogenous: Constant with Linear Trend. (2). Numbers in
parentheses are MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. (3) *** Indicates significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, and * significant at 10%. (4) Lag Length: 9 (Automatic selection based on Schwarz Information 
Criterion, MAXLAG = 9)
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Table 3 
Philips-Perron Unit Root Tests  
Notes: (1) τμ , Exogenous: Constant; ττ , Exogenous: Constant with Linear Trend.  (2) Numbers in 
parentheses are MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. (3) ***Indicates significant at 1%, ** significant at 




























































































It appears that part of the ADF test results is not sensible economically. We perform 
the Philips-Perron (PP) unit root tests to follow up. Th  e PP test statistics are shown in 
Table 3. By the results in Table 3, the non-stationary null hypothesis of the unit roots for 
most of the level variables cannot be rejected. For Oni and CAR in particular, the PP test 
statistics with drift   suggests that they are I(0) at a 10 percent signifi  cance level. However, 
the fi  rst diff  erences of all variables appear to be stationary with the rejection of the unit 
root hypotheses at a one percent signifi  cance level, except that the Oni is stationary at a 10 
percent signifi  cance level. Th   erefore, the fi  rst diff  erences of all nine variable series in our 
sample are integrated of order zero, I(0).
Given that we do not know which Data Generating Process (DGP) is more realistic, 
it is inappropriate to “choose” between the two tests on the basis of power. What we can say, 
though, is that the test statistics, which reverse the null and alternative hypotheses of a few 
variables, has not obviously hurt the capacity of distinguishing between stationary and non-
stationary series. Visually, all the nine level series appear I(1) and all the nine fi  rst diff  erence 
variable series appear I(0) at least; the Philips-Perron test statistics in Table 2 support this.
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3.2   Impulse-Response Eff  ects
Th   e implication that only stationary, I(0), variables should be included in VARs has 
been accepted in our data sample. Since the time-series data for the nine fi  rst-diff  erence 
variables are stationary, we conduct the VAR model estimation and perform the impulse- 
response function analysis directly. For short-run economic analysis, we do not have the  risk 
of spurious correlation. Empirically, a shock to the i-th variable not only directly aff  ects the 
i-th variable, but the eff  ect is also transmitted to all the other endogenous variables through 
the dynamic (lag) structure of the VAR. An impulse-response function traces the eff  ect of 
a one-time shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous 
variables.
In this paper we attempt to investigate the magnitude of the pro-cyclicality eff  ects of 
Basel-II. Would the regulation of the minimum capital requirements, as required by Basel 
II, overstate the magnitude and economic signifi  cance of pro-cyclicality in the new Accord 
relative to the existing capital requirements in ROC (Taiwan)? Th   is is our concern. Since the 
impulse-response functions trace the eff  ects of innovation shocks to one endogenous variable 
on the other variables in the VAR, visually all 9x9 combined graphs are too complicated to 
understand. So we only display the variables of interest, that is, the impulse response of 
changes in GDP to one standard deviation innovations in CAR. In Graph 1, the vertical axis 










Response of D(GDP) to Cholesky
One S.D. D(CAR) Innovation
Graph 1 shows the impulse response of CAR to GDP around the horizontal axis is 
near zero and falls into the confi  dence interval completely. CAR does not have any signifi  cant 
eff  ects on the real GDP. Strictly speaking, the capital-adequacy ratios aff  ect the real economy 
through bank lending. For further study, we graph the impulse response of changes in Loan 
to one standard-deviation innovations in CAR (see Graph 2). Th   e results is the same, CAR 
does not have any signifi  cant eff  ects on bank lending.










Response of D(LOAN) to Cholesky
One S.D. D(CAR) Innovation
Since the impulse-response results of the VAR model simulations are diffi   cult to 
interpret, we use selected VAR estimates for complementary description (see Table 4). Th  e 
student-t statistics in Table 4 show that the overall estimate coeffi   cients of CAR to Loan and 





Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
D(Loan)



















An interesting fi  nding in Table 4 is that bank lending does not have any signifi  cant 
eff  ects on GDP. We graph the result of Loan innovation to response of GDP (see Graph 3). 
In Graph 3, Loan does not have any signifi  cant eff  ects on GDP.
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Graph 3
Response of D(GDP) to Cholesky









3.3   Contemporary Relationships
Even in the short run, it may not be plausible that bank lending does not have any 
signifi  cant relation with the economy. Since only the lagged endogenous variables appear 
on the right hand-side of the equations in the VAR model, the results may be subject to the 
restrictions of no structural relations. For simplicity, we adopted a measure of correlation to 
check this relation. Th   e contemporary correlation coeffi   cient is very high, 0.962 (see Table 
5). Loan and real GDP does have a common linear trend. We applied the Granger-causality 
test on the concurrent level variable of Loan and GDP (see Table 6). Th   e result implies there 
is unidirectional causality. GDP does not Granger-cause LOAN was rejected by the data, 
and LOAN does not Granger-cause GDP was not. It shows that bank lending does not aff  ect 
GDP and that GDP unidirectionally aff  ects bank lending.
Table 5
Correlation Matrices
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0.4200 1.01558 LOAN does not Granger Cause GDP
0.0211 3.56302 32 GDP does not Granger Cause LOAN
Probability F-Statistic Obs Null Hypothesis:
Sample: 1998:Q1 to 2006:Q4
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests (Lags: 4)
Table 6
We summarize the empirical fi  ndings as follows:
1.   We applied two standard-unit root tests to evaluate the attribute of data series for 
our VAR model. Th   e variables of interest include exchange rates, inter-bank money-
market rates, bank deposits, bank loans, capital-adequacy ratios, bank securities, 
stock market indices, general prices as represented by the CPI, and real GDP in 
ROC (Taiwan). All the variables are non-stationary series, I(1), and the entire fi  rst-
diff  erence variable series appear stationary, I(0). 
2.   We conducted VAR model estimation and performed the impulse-response function 
analysis and variance decomposition (see appendix 2) within the sample period from 
1998:Q1 to 2006:Q4. Th   e evidence of the impulse response and VAR model estimates 
show that changes in CAR variation are not likely to have any signifi  cant impact on 
real GDP. It implies that Basel-II requirements on bank capital do not signifi  cantly 
aff  ect the pro-cyclicality of the ROC (Taiwan) economy.
3.   We adopted the Granger causality test for bank lending and real GDP. It shows 
that bank lending does not aff  ect GDP and that GDP unidirectionally aff  ects bank 
lending. It means that bank lending is demand-oriented, and that bank lending is not 
an eff  ective monetary transmission channel in ROC (Taiwan).
4.  Analysis of the Empirical Results
Th   e above pro-cyclicality impact study used the sample period of 1998:Q1 to 2006:
Q4. Th  e Reference Dates of Business Cycles issued by the Council for Economic Planning 
and Development (CEPD) identifi  es ten business cycles in ROC (Taiwan). Our sample 
period covers a trough (Dec. 1998), a peak (Sept. 2000) and another trough (Sept. 2001), 
constituting at least one complete cycle. Th   is complies with the BIS’s requirement for risk 
analysis, i.e. “For a meaningful diff  erentiation of risk, there are requirements to ensure that 
historical data horizons cover appropriate economic downturn conditions”. 
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In addition, Basel-II capital-adequacy ratios are expressed as a percentage of the 
total risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets (see Appendix 1). Risk-based capital is the 
banks’ source of credit extension, while risk-weighted assets represent the banks’ credit 
exposure. In this empirical analysis, two conditions must be satisfi  ed to conclude that Basel-
II implementation has signifi  cant pro-cyclical eff  ects on ROC (Taiwan)’s real economy. First, 
capital-adequacy ratios have signifi  cantly aff  ected bank lending; second, bank lending has a 
signifi  cant impact on GDP. Th   e empirical results based on ROC (Taiwan)’s 1998:Q1 to 2006:
Q4 data indicate that the eff  ects of capital-adequacy ratios are insignifi  cant. Th   e reasons are 
summarised as follows:
4.1   Nonbinding Constraints of Basel Capital Requirements
In 1998, market-risk capital calculation was included in Basel-I requirements in ROC 
(Taiwan). Since then, the banks have abided by the rule that capital-adequacy ratios must 
not fall below eight percent. Th  e banks have also reported their capital-adequacy ratios 
to relevant supervisory agencies on a semi-annual basis. Prior to 2003, the banks’ average 
capital-adequacy ratio exhibited a gradually declining trend, down from 12.36 percent in the 
fi  rst half of 1998 to 10.29 percent in the end of 2003. Th   e ratio recorded a low point of 10.14 
percent in the fi  rst half of 2004, moved up steadily to 11.35 percent in the fi  rst half of 2005, 
and then took a downward turn to 10.87 percent at the end of 2006 (see Graph 4).
During the sample period, the capital-adequacy ratios of banks in ROC (Taiwan) did 
not drop below 10.14 percent, which was higher than the 8 percent minimum requirement 
of Basel-II. Even aft  er accounting for the one percentage point drop from the operational 
risk calculation, as shown in the quantitative impact study on ROC (Taiwan)’s banking 
sector (see Section 1.2), ROC (Taiwan)’s banks still outperform the Basel-II requirement. In 
short, Basel capital requirements are not binding constraints upon banks in ROC (Taiwan) 
and, therefore, have very limited impact on bank lending.
Graph 4
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All data were on a quarterly basis
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4.2   Insignifi  cant Pro-cyclicality Eff  ects of Basel-II 
ROC (Taiwan) is a small, open economy that is highly dependent on external trade. 
In 2006,  the country’s trade dependence (measured by the sum of its nominal exports 
and imports as a percentage of GDP) was 134.31 percent. With exports being the engine 
of economic growth, ROC (Taiwan)’s economic performance is driven by changes in the 
global economy. Th   e expansion or contraction of ROC (Taiwan)’s economy is closely related 
to the contribution of the exports of goods and services to GDP (see Table 7). As external 
demand is largely the determining factor, the constraints of Basel-II on bank lending do not 
signifi  cantly aff  ect economic growth.
Table 7 
Sources of ROC (Taiwan)’s Economic Growth (By Expenditure)
Real Growth Rate (%)
Gross Domestic Product
  Private Consumption
  Government Consumption
  Investment
  Increase in Inventory
  Exports of Goods & Services
(Less): Imports of Goods & Services
Contribution (percentage point)
Gross Domestic Product
(Less): Imports of Goods & Services
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Quarterly National Economic 
Trends, Taiwan Area, R.O.C.
f: forecast
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Moreover, a large proportion of ROC (Taiwan)’s exports are high technology and 
medium-to-high technology products, which combined to make up 71.2 percent of total 
exports in 2006. In particular, the high production values and favorable prospects of its 
electronic sectors, including foundries, ICs, fl  at-panel displays, TFT-LCDs, IC packaging 
and testing, attract abundant foreign and domestic capital through direct fi  nance. Th  ey  do 
not normally resort to bank lending. Th   erefore, Basel-II does not have a signifi  cant impact 
on ROC (Taiwan)’s industrial development (see Table 8).
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4.3   Ineff  ective Credit Channel
A Granger causality test shows that bank lending does not aff  ect GDP and that GDP 
unidirectionally aff  ects bank lending. Th   at is, bank lending does not aff  ect, but is aff  ected 
by the demand side. Because credit is not an eff  ective channel of monetary transmission 
mechanism, Basel-II requirements on bank capital do not signifi  cantly aff  ect the economy.
Chu and Lin (2007) investigated the eff  ectiveness of the bank-lending channel by 
using the theory of the monetary transmission process of an open economy. Th  ey  found  that 
bank credit is not an eff  ective monetary transmission channel in ROC (Taiwan). In theory, 
the impact of the credit channel on money supply is uncertain. Th   e empirical study using 
aggregate data on deposit banks in ROC (Taiwan) also concluded that even when money 
supply expands, bank lending would not necessarily increase.
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5. Conclusion 
R i s k  i s  t h e  b u s i n e s s  o f  fi  nance.  Th  e implementation of Basel-II helps the risk 
management of ROC (Taiwan)s fi  nancial institutions conform to international practices, 
thus raising the competitiveness of ROC (Taiwan)’s fi  nancial sector. It may be possible for 
individual fi  nancial institutions to tighten lending in bad times to maintain the Basel-II 
minimum capital adequacy, potentially causing a credit crunch. However, the empirical 
study on ROC (Taiwan)’s data from 1998:Q1 to 2006:Q4 shows the pro-cyclical impact of 
Basel-II to be insignifi  cant. Th   e reasons are summarized as follows:
1.  Basel capital requirements are not binding constraints. Th  e  capital-adequacy  ratios 
of banks in ROC (Taiwan) stood at 10.87 percent at the end of 2006, higher than the 
eight percent minimum capital requirement of Basel-II. Even aft  er subtracting the one 
percentage point from the operational risk calculation, the Basel capital requirements 
are still not binding constraints upon banks in ROC (Taiwan) and, therefore, are 
unlikely to exert any signifi  cant impact on bank lending.
2.  ROC (Taiwan) is an export-oriented economy, relying on exports as the engine of 
growth and susceptible to changes in the world economy. At the same time, its high 
technology and medium-to-high technology sectors account for a major part of ROC 
(Taiwan)’s export industries. Th   eir high production values and favorable prospects 
make it easy for these sectors to raise funds via direct fi  nance instead of bank lending. 
Even as Basel-II may aff  ect bank lending, the impact on industry development are not 
signifi  cant.
3. Th   e credit channel is not eff  ective in the monetary transmission mechanism in ROC 
(Taiwan). A Granger causality test shows that bank lending does not aff  ect GDP. 
Hence, Basel-II requirements on bank capital do not have signifi  cant pro-cyclical 
eff  ects on the ROC (Taiwan) economy.
Historically, ROC (Taiwan) implemented the Basel-I capital accord in 1992 and 
incorporated market-risk capital calculation in 1998, but Basel-II was just implemented in 
2007. Th   e implementation of Basel-II, in theory, aims to guide banks’ management towards 
market -oriented and risk-sensitive directions, but in practice, it can lead to structural 
changes in banks’ management and lending behaviors. Information contents of the sample 
period in this study do not necessarily reveal future changes in banks’ management. Although 
Repullo and Suarez (2007) were able to simulate pro-cyclicality eff  ects by using a calibration 
method on a dynamic general equilibrium model, this is only possible when based on the 
presumption that banks’ management behaviors remain unchanged. 
Despite the fact that banks’ current capital-adequacy ratios remain high, the minimum 
capital requirement of Basel-II, whether based on the Standardized approach or an IRB 
approach, will aff  ect banks’ capital buff  ers at least in theory. Furthermore, ROC (Taiwan) 
banks’ average capital-adequacy ratios have declined in recent years, making Basel II capital 
requirements an important factor in fi  nancial stability and should be closely and continuously 
watched in the future. Th   e Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (CBC) needs to 
continue enhancing the Financial Stability Mechanism and promoting the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program to achieve its operational objective to maintain fi  nancial stability.
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Appendix 1 
Data Properties and Defi  nitions
Data Sources
All the data of the banking industry from the supervisory databases of CBC 
are collected based on unaudited fi  gures submitted by each domestic bank’s corporate 
headquarters, including the domestic banking units, off  shore banking units and overseas 
branches. However, the information disclosed on the banks’ websites has been audited by 
banks or Certifi  ed Public Accountants (CPAs).
Defi  nitions
Total Risk-based Capital / Risk-weighted Assets
       
Qualifying capital
Qualifying capital =  Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital + Tier 3 capital - deduction items
A.  Tier 1 capital includes:
1.  Common stockholder’s equity
2.  Noncumulative subordinated debt without maturity dates
3.  Noncumulative perpetual preferred stock
4.  Capital reserves (except the appreciation reserves of fi  xed assets)
5.  Retained earnings (deducting the insuffi   ciency of operation reserves and loan loss 
provisions)
6. Minority  interest
7. Cumulative  eff  ect of equity adjustments
8.  Less: goodwill and treasury stock
B.  Tier 2 capital includes:
1.  Perpetual preferred stock
2.  Cumulative subordinated debt without maturity dates
3.  Appreciation reserves of fi  xed assets
4.  45 percentof unrealized holding gains of long-term equity investments
5. Operation  reserves
6.  Convertible debt securities
7.  Allowance for loan and lease losses (except the reserves created against identifi  ed 
losses)
8.  Long-term subordinated debt and long-term non-perpetual preferred stock
C.  Tier 3 capital includes short-term subordinated debt and short-term non-perpetual 
preferred stock. Th   e two items should be unsecured; be fully paid up; have an original 
maturity of at least two years; be not redeemable before the arranged date; include a 
lock-in clause precluding payment of either interest or principal if the payment would 
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D. Deduction  items
1.  Booking value of investments in other banks that are not consolidated for 
accounting purposes and held more than one year.
2.  Booking value of investments in non-bank subsidiaries, excluding the investments 
in banking-related subsidiaries that are consolidated.
E. Restrictions
1.  Tier 2 capital for credit-risk capital charge may not exceed 100 percent of Tier 1 
capital for credit-risk capital charge.
2.  Long-term subordinated debt and long-term non-perpetual preferred stock included 
in Tier 2 capital may not exceed 50 percent of Tier 1 capital.
3.  Tier 3 capital can only be used for market-risk capital charge. 
4. Th   e sum of Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital for market-risk capital charge may not exceed 
250 percent of Tier 1 capital for market-risk capital charge.
5. Th   e sum of eligible Tier 2 and eligible Tier 3 capital may not exceed 100 percent of 
Tier1 capital.
Risk-weighted assets
Th   e risk-weighted assets shall be determined by multiplying the capital requirements 
for market risk plus operation risk by 12.5 and adding the resulting fi  gure to the sum of risk-
weighted assets for credit risk.
•
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Appendix 2
Variance Decomposition Table
Variance Decomposition of D(LOAN):
 Period S.E. D(EXR) D(ONI)
Variance Decomposition









































































































































































































 Variance Decomposition of D(GDP):









































































































































































































 Cholesky Ordering: D(EXR) D(ONI) D(DEPO) D(LOAN) D(CAR) D(SECU) D(PSTK) D(CPI) D(GDP) 
   Standard Errors: Monte Carlo (100 repetitions) 
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CHAPTER 10
1. Th   e Vietnam Banking System – Basel II Implementation in 
Vietnam
Vietnam has a population of 84 million people, growing at an estimated one million 
people per year. Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization in November 2006. Cash 
is the dominant medium of exchange for most economic transactions of individuals and 
small businesses. With a large and growing population, an expanding economy, and a 
considerable number of people without access to banking facilities, Vietnam is an attractive 
growth market for banks. Th   e banking sector is growing at a very rapid pace with assets and 
liabilities increasing by more than 30% per year, which has improved bank intermediation, 
thus fueling economic growth. 
Vietnam’s banking  system  has  undergone  substantial  reform  over  the  past decade.   
Th   e  reform  includes  transforming  a  mono-banking  system  into  a two- tier, market-
driven banking system, with participation from fi  nancial institutions under various types of 
ownership: state-owned, joint-stock, joint-venture and foreign. Th   e reform of the banking 
system has also been undertaken in line with economic reform in various aspects such as     
taxation, public fi  nance, monetary policy and state-owned enterprises reform.
1.1  Structure of Vietnam’s Banking System
State-owned commercial banks: Th  is group controls approximately 70 percent of 
assets and liabilities in the banking sector. Five of the seven banks are likely to be 
partially equitised during the next several years through the government’s plans 
for fi  nancial modernisation. Two remaining institutions, a social policy bank and 
a development bank, remain under government control. Lending by this group is 
characterised by decentralised processes with loan decisions and fi  les located in 
branch networks throughout the country. Public confi  dence in state-owned banks 
is high due to their close association with the government. State-owned banks are 
gradually shift  ing to computerised operating platforms with some off  ering innovative 
consumer products.
35 joint stock company banks: Th   is group controls roughly 20 percent of assets and 
liabilities in the banking sector. Most are headquartered in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City with a few located in smaller cities. Joint stock company banks are thought to 
be the fastest growing among the three categories. Operations vary greatly across the 
group, but generally, the annualised growth of assets may well exceed 40%.
•
•
PRO-CYCLICALITY IMPACT OF BASEL II IN VIETNAM
by Ly Thi Tho1
1  Th   e author is Deputy Manager of the Banking Supervision Department of the State Bank of Vietnam.
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43 foreign entities: 37 branches of foreign banks, 6 joint ventures. Th   is group has a 
market share of about 10 percent of assets and liabilities in the sector. Th  ese  banks 
which have latest management practices and foreign capital, brings with them, a wide 
variety of products and innovations. As a group, foreign banks are also growing faster 
than State-owned commercial banks and are steadily increasing their market share. 
Vietnam banking system also includes the People Credit Fund System (Centre People 
Credit Fund and Regional People Credit Funds), fi  nancial companies and leasing 
companies.
Table 1 
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Chart 2
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1.2   Development and Implementation of Basel II in Vietnam 
1.2.1  Overview of Banking Supervision in Vietnam
Th   e  Banking  Supervision  Department  of  the  State Bank of Vietnam (SBV)  has   
fewer  than  700  employees and is organised in two tiers:   departments of the SBV head offi   ce, 
and individual work groups  at  each  of  the  SBV’s  64  branches. Th   e Banking Inspectorate   
conducts examinations of banks operating in Vietnam at the individual branch level as well 
as at each  bank’s  head  offi   ce. Th   is  methodology  is  used owing to the  decentralised  nature  
of the lending  process  of  the  State-owned  banks. Separate  reports  are  prepared  for  each 
branch offi   ce inspected.
Currently, examinations are compliance-based and the Administration Division of the 
SBV plans on-site activities annually. SBV’s laws, regulation, and instructions are adhered 
to strictly by inspectors and their reports look mainly into the review of compliance with 
legal and prudential requirements.  Th   e inspectors’ length of time of inspection in banks and 
preparation of reports are both set by law although there is no standardised report format,     
no   legal   requirement   for   the   frequency   of   on-site examinations, and no uniform way 
to categorise and fi  le examination working papers.
For off  -site supervision, a relatively small number of staff   process large amounts of 
data, mostly on a monthly basis, from banks. Th   ere  is  a  general sense  of  concern  in SBV 
regarding  the  quality  of  data  received. As a result, the off  -site group  makes periodic 
systematic reports regarding the data received, summarised by category (state- owned,  joint  
stock,  foreign),  and  individual  banks. SBV feels that data  quality  must  be improved, with 
greater  emphasis  placed  on  qualitative  analysis,  risk  implications, and conclusions.
Some functions usually associated with banking  supervision  are  handled  in  separate 
departments of the SBV. Licensing of banks is managed by the Banks and Non-Bank Credit 
Institutions Department. Issuance of regulations for credit institutions is a collaborative 
eff  ort that includes the Banking Supervision Department, although fi  nal decisions do not 
rest with the Department. Th  e existing structure may need some reform for improving 
eff  ectiveness.
1.2.2  Orientations for Developing the Banking        
Supervision System
With a view to meeting the practical requirements of development of Vietnam’s 
banking system and complying with international best practices and standards on banking 
supervision, the existing structure of the State Bank Inspectorate need to be reformed to 
develop an eff  ective banking supervision system (in terms of legal framework, organisational 
model, personnel and supervision approach). Th   is includes the establishment, on the basis 
of the existing Banking Supervision, a general departmental body under the State Bank. 
Th  is needs a step by step approach, towards 2010, to create preconditions for an overall 
fi  nancial supervision body with a higher legal status and role in performing the function 
of supervising all fi  nancial activities, including banking, securities and insurance. Th  e 
principal objectives and responsibilities of this body shall be to ensure the stability of the 
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fi  nancial system with strict compliance to the laws on monetary and banking activities and 
the protection of public interests.
To further improve preconditions for an eff  ective supervisory system:
To give priority to reforming the organisation and operation of the existing Banking 
Supervision Department for increased independence and uniformity in operations, 
directions and management of banking activities under the auspices of the Governor 
of the State Bank.
To improve the legal framework as well as technical infrastructure for bank 
supervision, SBV is currently structuring 4 new laws - Law on Credit Institutions, 
Law on State Bank of Vietnam, Law on Supervision and Law on Deposit Insurance. 
Th   is is to ensure that the supervision body for safe banking activities, shall have all 
necessary powers for supervision of the system and that it observes the provisions of 
the Laws in their operations.
To modernise and eff  ectively apply information technologies to banking inspection 
and supervision.
To restructure the licensing and operation of banks and simplify licensing procedures. 
Th   is is to facilitate the establishment and development of credit institutions, particularly 
non-bank ones, providing them with equal access to the market and the provision 
of monetary and banking services. Th   is would also enhance market discipline and 
raise the criteria for establishment of credit institutions and the safety requirements 
in banking activities so as to ensure that newly established credit institutions shall 
have capacity to compete and have a wide scope of safe and quality operations with 
up-to-date technology. 
To update banking supervision methods and increase their eff  ectiveness:
To improve the quality and eff  ectiveness of off  -site and on-site inspection work, of 
which off  -site supervision shall be regarded as an important operation for early risk 
warning in banking activities; to use results and operations of internal audit and 
independent audit as a tool to support the process of off  -site and on-site inspection.
To improve regulations and prudential measures in banking activities; regulations 
and policies on management of all types of credit institutions and banking activities 
and at the same time, to improve the contents, methods and processes of supervision 
and inspection to make them compatible with the development of information and 
banking technologies on the basis of application of the core principles for eff  ective 
banking supervision established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as 
well as of international standards on banking supervision (Basel Capital Accord - 
Basel I, 1988 and amendment in 1996). Th   is would lead to the gradual and steady 
process towards the compliance of the core principles and standards under the new 
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1.2.3   Th   e Development and Implementation of Basel II in    
 Vietnam 
At present, Vietnamese credit institutions have just started to conform (since January 
2006) to the CAR (under Basel I) which still does not include market risk (Decision No. 
457/QD-NHNN issued in April 2005 in which banks are required to report capital adequacy 
ratio on quarterly basis since January 2006). Besides, the calculation of credit risk is mainly 
based on the quantitative criteria (classifying loans into 5 groups).
Th   e objective of banking supervision is to ensure the stability of the banking system 
as stated in Decree 91/1999/ND-CP which states that banking supervision activities are to 
include the inspection of the adherence of legislation of monetary and banking activities 
as well as the observance of the provisions of banking operation licenses. Th   e current legal 
framework is yet to be suffi   ciently comprehensive and compatible for banking supervision 
activities using the risk-based supervision methodology. Th  e Banking Supervision 
Department is draft  ing the new Decree which will replace Decree 91/1999/ND-CP,  planned 
to be issued by the end of this year.
Procedures on Supervision of Risk Management Processes of Banks 
Including Liquidity Risk, Interest Rate Risk, and Operational Risk as 
well as All Other Risks
Since the Banking Supervision Department of the SBV mainly performs compliance 
supervision of banks, procedures on the assessment of the risk management processes and 
qualitative factors of risk management practices of banks are not adequately performed 
by the supervisors. Th  e lack of skills and knowledge of supervisors in risk management 
procedures is also a weakness at this time. 
Th  e Banking Supervision Department is developing regulations on minimum 
requirements of risk management for credit institutions to provide guidance to banks for 
the establishment of a comprehensive risk management framework and encourage banks to 
develop their own proposals. 
Minimal Capital Requirement for Diff  erent Type of Banks
Minimum legal capital requirements are specifi  ed for all banks based on the category. 
However, in practice, such requirements have remained unchanged for a long time. Th  e 
regulation on minimal capital requirement for each type of banks was issued in 1998 and 
has just been changed last year. According to this new regulation, banks must maintain 
minimum regulatory capital of 3,000 billion VND by 2010 (equal to nearly 200 million 
USD). 
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Regulation on Loan Classifi  cation and Loan Loss Provision 
On 19 April 2005, the State Bank of Vietnam issued Decision No 493/QD-NHNN 
on Asset Classifi  cation and Loan Loss Provision, in accordance with international best 
practices. Banks are preparing for this loan loss provision in accordance with the Article 6 
– Decision 493/2005/QD-NHNN which requires the provisioning to be mainly based on the 
overdue status of loans and not on the realistic expectation of repayments. Bank inspectors 
are currently only checking the compliance with regulations rather than assessing realistic 
repayments.
However, Article 6 will only be valid until 2008 and will be replaced by Article 7 of the 
Decision 493 which requires credit institutions to apply the qualitative method to classify 
debts and make provisions.
Independent Evaluation of a Bank’s Policies Related to the Granting 
of Loans and Making of Investments
It is required by BASEL that supervision should include evaluation of a bank’s policies 
relating to the granting of loans and investments. While supervisors perform adequate 
assessment of the lending policies, the evaluation of a bank’s policies for investments is not 
thoroughly performed by supervisors.    
Procedures on Supervision of Market Risks
Apart from regulation on foreign exchange exposures, there are no laws and regulations 
relevant to market risks for securities, futures, options, or derivatives. In particular, Vietnam 
has not implemented the market risks amendments to the Basel Accord because banks and 
authorities in Vietnam have yet to pay adequate attention to these risks. It is also noted that 
inspectors’ current knowledge and skills about market risks and derivatives is limited. 
SBV currently looks into whether banks set limits for market risks, including their FX 
business and whether they have in place, information and internal control systems to ensure 
the compliance of limits. However, the level of verifi  cation by the SBV varies considerably 
and is dependent on the class of bank being inspected and on the skills and knowledge of 
supervisors
Anti-Money Laundering 
Anti-money laundering stipulation has recently been introduced in Vietnam. Th  e 
legal framework on anti-money laundering in Vietnam is Decree 74/2005/ND-CP dated 7 
June 2005, issued by the Government on the prevention of money laundering. However, up 
to date there are no specifi  c laws on anti-money laundering. 
Generally, the framework is broadly compliant with Basel and other international 
standards relating to the prevention of fi  nancial crime but considerable work has to be 
undertaken within the SBV and banks to implement the new legal framework.
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From July 2007, the Anti-Money Laundering Information Center has been separated 
from Banking Supervision and is acting as an independent Department of the State Bank 
of Vietnam. 
Monitoring Trends and Developments of a Bank
Currently, there is limited statistics for the monitoring of trends and development 
of supervised banks and as such SBV offi   cials have considerable diffi   culty in monitoring 
trends.
Prudent Limits on Large Exposures to a Single Borrower or Closely 
Related Group of Borrowers
In general, regulations of the SBV are in line with Basel on large exposures except for 
the maximum limit of total exposures to a closely related group of borrowers. In accordance 
with Basel, 25 percent of a bank’s capital is the maximum limit for total exposures for a 
closely related group of borrowers while Decision 457 allows the limit to 60%.
Procedure for Controlling Country Risk and Transfer Risk in 
International Lending and Investment Activities of Banks and for 
Maintaining Appropriate Reserves Against Such Risks
Since overseas lending and investments of Vietnamese banks are very limited, the 
SBV and commercial banks have not issued or developed procedures on the assessment of 
country risk.
Recently,  on  24 May 2006,  the government,  approved  Decision  112-2006-QD-TTg   
of  the  government related Scheme on Development of Vietnam’s Banking Sector up to 2010 
and Orientations toward 2020. Of note, the planned reforms include:
In  2008,  the  National Assembly  will  consider  and  pass  a  new  Law  on  the 
SBV,  Law on  Credit Institutions and Law on Deposit Insurance (currently deposit 
insurance is regulated at decree level only). A Law on Supervision of Safety of  Banking 
Activities is also planned.
Forex regulations will be relaxed to further liberalise current transactions and capital 
transactions.
Regulations on market access for foreign investors will be reformed to fulfi  ll Vietnam’s 
commitments to the US, the EU, the WTO and others to open the banking and fi  nance 
market.
1.2.5  Several Important Policies/Events  Infl  uencing the Banking    
Industry 
Th   ere are several important issues that infl  uence Vietnam’s banking industry. Firstly, 
Vietnam has maintained a high economic growth rate over the past fi  ve years. Secondly, 
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of petrol, steel, plastics and foodstuff  , the government’s gradual removal of price subsidies 
for petrol, electricity, coal, cement and steel while expanding total payments to increase 
national foreign reserves, have stabilised the CPI.
Th  irdly, cultural and educational, healthcare, scientifi  c and technological activities 
have expanded nationwide. Job generation, poverty reduction and the elimination of hunger 
and prevention of epidemics were intensifi  ed. 
  Fourthly, administrative reform is making major progress, focusing on procedures 
for streamlining paperwork, clearly defi   ning responsibility for positions, and solving 
entrepreneurs’ issues in the fastest possible way.
 
Fift  hly, Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in November 2006, opened opportunities 
for international cooperation in fi  nancial and monetary activities between central banks, in 
areas of monetary policy management and strengthening supervision and risk prevention. 
Vietnamese banks will be able to take advantage of increased capital, modern technology, 
management best practices, and develop comparative advantage in order to compete 
internationally and penetrate foreign markets. Vietnamese banks will also have opportunities 
to improve the quality of their products and services, to diversify their activities based on 
advanced banking technology, to develop a dynamic, secure, effi   cient banking system that 
follows the international best practices, to support the strategy for industrialisation and 
modernisation of the country and to promote trade liberalisation.
Decision No. 112/2006/Qd-Ttg of 24 May 2006, Approving the 
Scheme on Development of Vietnam’s Banking Sector Up to 2010 and 
Orientations Toward 2020
To thoroughly modernise and comprehensively develop credit institutions to be 
comparable to fi  nancial institutions in other ASEAN countries, the institutions shall 
be diversifi  ed in terms of ownership and types, with broader scope of operation. At 
the same time, foundations are being laid for credit institutions aft  er 2010, that are 
advanced and meet international standards and are able to compete with other banks 
in the region and the world. 
To ensure that credit institutions, including state-owned ones, are profi  t oriented and   
carry out business activities on market principles. 
To develop a system of credit institutions operating safely and effi   ciently with advanced 
technologies, management skills and international practice and standards. 
To develop non-bank credit institutions for a more diversifi  ed and balanced fi  nancial 
system. 
To develop and diversify banking products and services, especially capital mobilisation, 
credit allocation and payments to provide adequate, timely and convenient banking 
services and utilities for the economy.
To develop a banking service market, especially a credit market for sound and 
fair competition among credit institutions of all types, providing easy access for 
organisations and individuals to banking services and to prevent and limit undesirable 
credit operations.
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To separate policy credit from commercial credit on the basis of distinguishing the 
lending function of policy banks from the monetary business function of commercial 
banks. 
To ensure the business autonomy and accountability of credit institutions. 
To create conditions for domestic credit institutions to improve their management 
capability, professional level and competitiveness. 
To ensure the business right of foreign banks and fi  nancial institutions according to 
Vietnam’s international commitments. 
To closely associate banking reform with enterprise reform, especially state enterprise 
reform. 
To continue strengthening and developing joint-stock companies.
To promptly manage poor performing credit institutions to prevent their collapse.
To ensure operations of public credit funds are secure and effi   cient.  
Th   e motto for the development of credit institutions is therefore “Safety- Eff  ectiveness 
- Sustainable Development - International Integration”.
Table 2 
Monetary and Banking Indicators for 2006-2010
1. Inflation (%/year)
2. Average growth of aggregate payment
 tools  (M2)(%/year) 
3. M2/GDP ratio by the end of 2010 (%)
4. Cash in circulation outside bank/M2 up
  to 2010 (%)
5. Average credit growth rate (%/year)
6. Capital adequacy by 2010 (%)
7. Non-performing loans/total debt balance
  by 2010 (%)
8. The banking supervision International
  standard by 2010 
9. Minimum international reserve by 2010




Not exceeding 18 
18-20 




Some commercial banks shall have an equity capital equivalent to USD 800 - 1,000 
million by 2010, strong brand names and international competitiveness. Vietnam will also 
strive to form at least one fi  nancial group operating for multiple purposes in domestic and 
foreign fi  nancial markets.
2.   Simulation 
Th   e purpose of this Paper is to identify the magnitude of pro-cyclicality eff  ects of Basel 
II. Th  e over-riding question is whether the regulation of minimum capital requirements 
under Basel II overstate the magnitude and economic signifi  cance of the pro-cyclicality in 
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Due to limitation of data in Vietnam (RWA and CAR are not available from 2000 to 
2006) and since impulse response functions trace the eff  ects of innovation shocks on one 
endogenous variable on other variables in the VAR, the interest rate variable is employed 
to measure monetary shock, either in recession or in boom situations. DRATE is used to 
measure the impact of pro-cyclicality of Basel II, with the incorporation of data for Tier 1 
Capital (instead of RWA and CAR), which is very much infl  uenced and aff  ected by the Basel 
II regulation. Th   is would enable us to relate what happened in the economy with the change 
in regulation of Basel II (RWA and CAR). 
In order to do so, the impulse response of changes in interest rate to one standard 
deviation innovation in loans, deposits, Tier 1 capital, CPI, GDP are presented as follows: 
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Response of DRATE to DGDP
Chart 4
Simulation with Initial Data Impulse Response




















































































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DRATE to DGDP
Response To Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Chart 5
Simulation with Additional 5% in Tier 1 Impulse Response
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Chart 6
Response To Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
Simulation with Additional 10% on Tier 1 Impulse Response
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Chart 7
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Simulation with Additional 15% on Tier 1 Impulse Response













































































































































































Granger Causality Test: Loan vs GDP 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 01/04/08   Time: 15:34
Sample: 2001:03 2007:06
Lags: 2
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  LOAN does not Granger Cause GDP 74  52.2881  1.5E-14
  GDP does not Granger Cause LOAN  3.56825  0.03352
Seacen_Pungky.indb   196 Seacen_Pungky.indb   196 6/27/2008   2:14:26 PM 6/27/2008   2:14:26 PM197
In the fi  rst case of simulation with initial data, Chart 4 shows that the impulse response 
of interest rate on loan, deposit, Tier 1, CPI, GDP is around the horizontal axis. We could say 
that interest rate does not have any signifi  cant eff  ects from loans and Tier 1 Capital, meaning 
that changes in loan behaviour leading to changes in Tier 1 Capital do not have shocks on 
monetary policy. 
In the second case, simulation is made with an additional 5% in Tier 1 (with the 
assumptions that NPL increase and RWA increase as well as the CAR). Th   e response of the 
interest rate to loans fl  uctuated slightly in the fi  rst six months (Chart 5). Th  e  response  of 
the interest rate to Tier 1 Capital decreased in the fi  rst fi  ve months, increased in the sixth 
month and was stable around horizontal axis, meaning that when Tier 1 Capital increase 5%, 
interest rate may decrease in response to Tier 1 Capital and loans, albeit having insignifi  cant 
eff  ects.
In the third case, simulation is done with an additional 10% in Tier 1 (with the 
assumptions NPL increase, RWA increase, as with the CAR). Th   e response of interest rate to 
loans and Tier 1 is almost the same with interest rate increasing slightly in the fi  rst 3 months, 
then stabilising a little above the horizontal axis.
In the fourth case, simulation is done with an additional 15% in Tier 1. Th  e  response 
of the interest rate to loan decreased slightly in the fi  rst 2 months, subsequently increasing 
in the next month and fl  uctuating there aft  er. Th  e response of the interest rate to Tier 1 
Capital decreased in the fi  rst 3 months and increased sharply in the fourth month, meaning 
that when Tier 1 Capital increases 15%, interest rate changes most in fourth case, albeit  still 
insignifi  cant.
Th   e Granger Causality Test was used for bank lending and GDP which showed that 
bank lending does not aff  ect GDP and vice versa. Th   is means that bank lending is demand 
oriented and is not an eff  ective monetary transmission channel in Vietnam.
3. Conclusion
Implementation of Basel II and compliance with international best practices, would 
aid in the risk management of Vietnam’s credit institutions. However, the empirical tests, 
based on data from 2000 to 6/2007, shows that the pro-cyclical impacts of Basel II are 
insignifi  cant for Vietnam. Th   e reasons are as follows:
1.  Vietnam has just implemented Basel I in 2006 and as such data is not suffi   cient for 
the empirical test.  Th   e requirement for banks to maintain Basel II adequacy capital 
ratio during a downturn cycle, is somewhat akin to implementing monetary policy 
tightening. Banks have to decrease loans and be more prudent in lending activities. 
However, at present, Vietnam has insuffi   cient data to prove this.
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2. Th  e capital of credit institutions (Tier 1) is not aff  ected by loan behaviour (risk 
weighted assets). In recent years, especially in 2006 and 2007, Vietnamese credit 
institutions (Joint stock commercial banks) have dramatically increased regulatory 
capital and  at the same time, improved their fi  nancial status  (decreasing NPL by 
state owned commercial banks). During the rehabilitation of the banking system, the 
capital of credit institutions in last few years, have regulatory orientation than risk 
based requirement.
3. Th   e CAR at present is higher than 8% (according to Basel I calculation).
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